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# POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

## COMPROMISE AND CRISIS IN FRENCH POLITICS

THE faults of the French system of government are proverbial; but the wrong ones are often stressed. French politicians are frequently accused in Anglo-Saxon countries of being unpractical ideologues, pressing their doctrinal disputes with a fanatical zeal that tears the country apart. Government in Paris is believed to be in a state of perpetual turmoil and upheaval. Yet Frenchmen themselves are more prone to criticize the opposite weaknesses. They condemn their representatives for too often preferring office to principle, and denounce the political system, not for inflicting too many and too drastic changes on the country, but for permitting a state of stagnation in which necessary reforms are perpetually deferred. They hold, contrary to the conventional view, that French politicians show too much willingness to compromise and too little sense of crisis.

In Great Britain two powerful and disciplined parties represent the vast majority of politically-minded citizens; but France is too heterogeneous a country to endure so simple a division of opinion. The United States has reconciled still greater national diversity with stability of government by separating her powerful executive from parliamentary control; but France, with her centralized administration and her turbulent history, has felt it necessary to guard against the abuse of power by keeping its holders strictly subordinate to the representatives of the people. Yet differences among Frenchmen are older and perhaps deeper than differences among Americans. In the National Assembly the majority is generally as incoherent, undisciplined, and negative as it is in Congress. But in France the disruption of that majority precipitates a governmental crisis; and to avert or repair this disaster calls for a perpetual process of compromise.

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This process operates among three of the four elements into which the Assembly may be divided: the permanent and the temporary members of the majority, the temporary and the permanent supporters of the opposition. The last of these elements, the permanent, dangerous opposition, remains outside the parliamentary fraternity, its members normally aloof from the bargains and maneuvers of their colleagues, and opposed to the political system of the country. Its hostility is a positive asset to a government. Its occasional overtures are rejected, as M. Mendès-France repudiated proffered Communist votes in 1954; its uncertainties are resolved by deliberate attack, as M. Blum denounced the Gaullists in 1947; its open enmity is welcomed and proclaimed, as M. Mollet in 1956 stressed that he led an administration of the center, exclusive of Communists and Poujadists alike. Yet time and good behavior may allay this mistrust. Tainted Right and Socialist votes, which governments incurred severe criticism for accepting before 1914, became respectable between the wars. The Gaullists, feared as a threat to the Republic in 1951, were in office two years later. Extremists in the United States must come to terms with moderate opinion if they hope for widespread electoral success; in France they learn, when they seek ministerial office, that they must work their passage "from purgatory to paradise."

Among the remaining parliamentarians, who accept the rules of a system based on compromise, a strong and conscious club sense prevails. French deputies no less than American senators belong to an Institution—although the Assembly displays not only the assertive and jealous pride of the Congress, but also the feverish excitement of a party convention in permanent session. Success in this arena goes not to the men of intransigent principle in their splendid isolation, but to the moderate, conciliatory, acceptable men with friends everywhere and few enemies—to the bargainers rather than to the fighters. For, when the executive changes with shifts in the parliamentary majority, an incentive to fluidity prevails which is not found in other systems. The "dangerous opposition" may remain aloof from every majority. But the temporary, "loyal" opposition form potentially part of the next majority. Their entry may drive the temporary, wavering element of the existing majority into opposition;

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but they will still find partners among those members who, like the "king's friends" in eighteenth-century Britain, feel a *vocation gouvernementale* which keeps them in every majority.

The loyal opposition and the waverers require little discussion. Most French Assemblies contain several possible majorities; the more there are, the less stable any one of them will be. The loyal opposition—politicians who accept the system of government but criticize the present ministry—can generally count on a fifth column within the existing majority, comprising those hesitant administration supporters who would really prefer a change of partners. Gradually disillusion with the government swells the ranks of the discontented until the cabinet falls, and the loyal opposition may then be tempted back into office by offers of jobs or concessions on policy. The "king's friends" accommodate themselves without difficulty to the new balance of forces; but the waverers, the section of the old majority with strong views on policy, retire into the wilderness as the new "loyal opposition".

In such a case, the agents of disruption are generally those who were in the old majority from necessity rather than choice. A party without much influence on policy, like the Socialists in 1947-50 or the Mendès-France Radicals in 1956-57, may remain uncomfortably in office rather than provoke a crisis from which it might suffer; for the overthrow of a government is usually unpopular, and the party responsible may lose votes. This is particularly probable when the dangerous opposition is strong. Then the center parties face a grave dilemma. They dare not sacrifice completely the interests of their voters, who might desert to more dangerous and dynamic rivals; nor dare they risk political disturbance which threatens the whole system, as in 1948-49 any ministerial crisis seemed sure to play into the hands of General de Gaulle. But when the dangerous opposition loses ground, and the régime seems more secure, the existing ministry may become weaker, not stronger. The pressure in the country indeed declines, so that the competing democratic parties have less need to behave intransigently. But their fears of dire consequences also diminish, and their new confidence often leads them to press neglected claims for jobs and policy

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concessions. The Mollet cabinet met its first parliamentary trouble when by-elections showed a sharp drop in the Communist and Poujadist vote. So the equilibrium is always unstable, and the rare "long" government is not necessarily a sign of political health.

In these circumstances it is natural that some politicians should feel that any government is better than none, that stability is the chief political virtue, and that no specific policy is worth the disruption of a majority. Around those who are governmentalists on principle cluster others who seek more immediate advantages. Some may look for a reward in office for themselves. In the Third Republic a small group called Republican Socialists, members elected as Socialists but who deplored their party's determination to join no government which it did not control, raised "a record crop of ministerial portfolios to the acre." [1] Since the war the Gaullist dissidents of 1952, the Radical dissidents of 1955-56, have similarly displayed the reluctance of practical parliamentarians to see their careers ruined by the whims of a leader whose sights seemed set far too high. Or such members may hope to trade their votes for concessions to constituencies or pressure groups. Most deputies from overseas territories in particular show an understandable inclination to support governments rather than oppose them, like Scots in eighteenth-century Britain. (The extreme nationalists, who preferred to emulate the Irish of a hundred years later, were mostly eliminated at the 1951 election.)

Members of all parties outside the dangerous opposition are moved by motives of this kind. In June 1954, when M. Mendès-France succeeded M. Laniel—a change of men and policies far more complete than usual—102 deputies nevertheless voted both for the displaced leader at his fall, and for his supplanter a week later: among them were all the Overseas Independents, nearly half the Radicals, and between a fifth and an eighth of every other group except Communists and Socialists.[2] A year earlier, M. Laniel's election had fol-

[1] Siegfried, A., *Tableau des partis en France* (Paris, 1930), p. 169.

[2] The 102 included 12 per cent of all metropolitan and 43 per cent of all overseas members. The Socialists too have their "king's friends", though they are invisible because the party votes as a unit. The most distinguished of them is M. Ramadier, a Republican Socialist before the war and a staunch advocate of Socialist participation in government after it.

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lowed the fall of M. René Mayer's cabinet and the defeat of four subsequent candidates for the premiership. On that occasion 163 members voted for at least five of the six potential premiers, and thirty-five for all six; seven of the thirty-five received office from M. Laniel—and three of them kept their posts under M. Mendès-France.

More important than these scattered individuals and small groups are the large parties which, because of their pivotal parliamentary situation, can never escape the responsibilities of majority and office. The Radical party held this position for forty years after 1900, and attracted many able men seeking a career. M. Daladier's Radical government in 1934 was supported by Socialists and opposed by Conservatives; his next ministry in 1938 had the favor of the Right and the antagonism of the Left; in between his party had belonged to the Conservative Doumergue and Laval administrations until it moved, in time for the 1936 election, into the Popular Front. Radicals provided many members of Third Force cabinets from 1948 to 1951; of Right-wing governments in 1952 and 1953; of the Left-wing Mendès-France ministry in 1954; of the Faure administration in 1955, which had Conservative support and faced Socialist opposition; and of the Socialist-led Mollet cabinet in 1956-57. When M. Mendès-France tried to transform this old electoral coöperative society into a true party with a policy of its own, he alienated four fifths of the Radical deputies and the four Radical leaders who (besides himself) have occupied the premiership since the war.

Such efforts to turn "parties of government" into "parties of policy" are certainly attractive and possibly commendable. But they make the processes of majority-making and cabinet-forming no smoother. Nor does the emergence of a second pivot party, the *Mouvement Républicain Populaire,* which has belonged to the majority of every post-war prime minister except M. Mendès-France. M.R.P.'s members, also, worked with Communists against Conservatives in 1945-47, with the Third Force against both extremes in 1947-51, with the Right against the Socialists in 1952-54 and in 1955, and with the Socialists after the 1956 election. They too had to make repeated policy concessions to their partners, and in the process lost much of their former devotion

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to principles and determination to reform the system. Yet they too displayed, over the European union program, a willingness to go into opposition for their views which did not conform to the traditional rôle of the "king's friends". And their differences with the Radicals on every major problem—from clericalism to colonialism and from the electoral law to foreign policy—added new complications to the politics of the Fourth Republic. Instead of one pivot party, bent on power and little concerned with policy, there were now two—whose aims conflicted.

The high priest of all the "king's friends" is the President of the Republic. Since it is his thankless task to negotiate the compromises by which governmental crises are settled, he is almost occupationally bound to regard duration as the highest virtue of a ministry. He has a responsibility to select an available candidate who can form a cabinet and win a majority, much influence on the course and terms of interparty bargaining, and usually a virtual veto against any leader whom he strongly dislikes. His post is therefore coveted, and his actions regulated by conventions.

These *règles du jeu* should prevent him from abusing his position, or others from abusing his conduct. First, he acts only after consulting several other authorities: former prime ministers; all party leaders; and the presidents of the National Assembly (which elects and ejects the premier) and of the Council of the Republic, the Assembly of the French Union, and the Economic Council (which have no say in these matters). Secondly, the candidates nominated must normally have already held high office—Justice, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Interior, Defense, or a senior post without portfolio. These qualifications may be waived for a nominee from a party in opposition or hitherto excluded from the principal posts; but of the twelve premiers of the Fourth Republic, M. Pinay alone lacked them.[3] Thirdly, the rules prescribe a

[3] Presidents Auriol and Coty have made 65 tentative approaches to potential candidates for the premiership, only six of them to men not so qualified. From the Liberation until April 1957, 42 Frenchmen had held these six highest offices; in Britain the corresponding posts had been occupied by 25, and in the United States by 27 men (heads of government counted, ministers without portfolio not). M. Pinay had held the traditionally next senior ministry, Public Works and Transport. M. Mendès-France had been Finance Commissioner in Algiers.

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definite order in which parties may be given the opportunity to form a ministry. The loyal opposition is allowed to try first; no one expects it to succeed. The waverers responsible for overthrowing the late administration then have their turn. When one of these groups has made a serious effort and has been frustrated, the party which blocked that attempt tries its hand. Thus the task of solving the crisis devolves first on the politicians who provoked it, and then on those who prolong it.

These conventions leave the president much discretion. He may even—if he does not do so too frequently or frivolously—decide that the moment is too grave for the normal, logical, leisurely procedure to be tolerated; he may then send at once for a candidate thought likely to succeed, as M. Auriol did in the crisis which coincided with the outbreak of the Korean War. He has to decide when an opposition party has graduated from the "dangerous" to the "loyal" category. Thus the first invitation to a Gaullist candidate (who declined) was given in January 1953—which was also the first occasion on which that party voted for a potential premier. Again, it is by no means a simple task to settle which "waverer" party brought about the fall of the last ministry. In a multi-party system much effort is expended in obscuring precisely such responsibilities. For instance, on that occasion M.R.P., outmaneuvered by the Radical party, was blamed for precipitating the crisis by deserting M. Pinay; the Radicals were equally determined to upset him but had contrived to postpone their dispute with him to a later point on the parliamentary agenda. Finally the president retains a wide choice of men; as a rule at least twenty eligible politicians possess the qualifications required for the premiership.

Not all of them, however, may be willing. If the political barometer is set fair, there will be no lack of candidates; but if storms are forecast, the old parliamentary hand is likely to decline gracefully and await a more comfortable season. This is the moment for the rising young man, new to high office and eager to try his luck, like M. Edgar Faure in 1952; or for a more senior leader who has missed earlier opportunities and dare not refuse a last chance, like M. René Mayer in 1953. If the adjustment is expected to evoke little friction, a member of the old ministry may be asked to form the new

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one, in which he will reserve a place of high dignity for his recent chief; if relations are strained, the president may summon a weighty personage who has been out of office long enough for his critics to forgive and forget. When an attempt is made to win over part of the loyal opposition, there are always leaders of the majority who, with just such a situation in view, have cultivated friendly relations with the party whose support is coveted. M. Bidault was notoriously the center-party leader most acceptable to the *Rassemblement du Peuple Français;* M. Pinay was adept at winning the conservative wing of that party away from its leaders; M. Mendès-France attracted both the Socialists, and the Gaullists repelled by M. Pinay; M. Pineau enjoyed a moment of glory as M.R.P.'s favorite Left-winger; and the wavering Socialists before 1951 were benevolent toward MM. Queuille and Pleven.[4]

Any prospective premier can count, at least at first, on the votes (though not necessarily on the goodwill) of his own party. His personal claim to the highest post therefore usually rests on his standing with another political group. Less frequently it arises because his own party must make a sacrifice, which it will accept less reluctantly from one of its own men—M. Bidault was the natural first choice to remove M. Schuman from the Quai d'Orsay. Often when a cabinet broke up through internal dissension, as many did before 1951, the member who had deployed most skill and energy in attempting to hold it together was invited to lead its successor. A chance to solve a crisis might thus be a reward for trying to avert it—as with M. André Marie in 1948—or a belated recognition of valiant efforts in a previous crisis—as with M. Mollet's first candidature in 1951. But in all these cases, the qualities of availability—moderation, caution, acceptability among other leaders—are the qualities that bring success. Rarely indeed can the bold, challenging leader hope for a fleeting moment to secure a precarious grip on power. His opportunity comes only in a situation which is not merely desperate, but is manifestly seen to be desperate—by

[4] The latter was tipped by many Paris augurs as the man to reconcile the Socialists (without whose votes no government can long survive) to the eventual fall of the Mollet ministry. He not only has enjoyed excellent relations with the party, but also has been out of office for three years, and out of the premiership for over five.

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the president, the rival politicians, and the ordinary members alike.

France's last three cabinets illustrate how the system works. M. Mendès-France was elected in 1954 in a great emergency in Indo-China. He was nominated in an Assembly which had repeatedly rejected his policies, and posed his candidature on a quite exceptional basis by his spectacular promise to resign unless he made peace within a month. M. Mollet in 1956 was the leader of the largest party in the Republican Front, which had emerged from the general election well ahead of the rival coalition. He was also more acceptable than his ally M. Mendès-France to the "waverers" of M.R.P., whose votes were neded if the new ministry were not to depend on the Communists, and less of a bête noire to the Conservative "loyal opposition" and their settler supporters in Algeria. The intervening government, that of M. Edgar Faure in 1955, came into existence through a parliamentary realignment. As this was a fairly typical ministerial crisis, the circumstances deserve closer attention.

M.R.P., after accepting office in the conservative Pinay and Laniel cabinets, had for the first time gone into opposition against the Left-wing administration of M. Mendès-France. Their rivals were all delighted to see them thrust into the welcoming arms of the Right; but M.R.P. themselves repudiated the clerical-conservative embrace, and yearned to show the country that their hearts were still on the Left. Their attitude determined the evolution of the crisis.

President Coty's first nominee was M. Pinay. Since the fall of M. Laniel he was the unchallenged leader of the Conservatives, the strongest section of the loyal opposition and indeed of the whole Assembly. He had been out of office for two years and three administrations. Popular with Right-wing opinion in Parliament and the country, he was the best man to persuade his followers to accept the inevitable concessions in North Africa (and did so later in the year, with little difficulty over Tunisia and much over Morocco). As a Conservative, he could count on the Right but needed reinforcement on the Left; he therefore presented a very progressive economic, social and colonial program. But for M.R.P. to support a Conservative would have printed even deeper the Right-wing brand they were determined to erase. Faced

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with their unrelenting hostility, M. Pinay withdrew without seriously trying to form a cabinet.

The crisis thus became M.R.P.'s responsibility. They too had opposed M. Mendès-France; now they had stopped M. Pinay. Neither the Radicals nor the Conservatives, therefore, had reason to wish them well—nor had the pro-Mendès-France Socialist party, nor the "anti-European" Gaullist members. So the prospect for an M.R.P. candidate was far from agreeable; and the choice therefore fell on a newcomer to the front rank, M. Pflimlin. His special qualification was the responsibility he had shown over German rearmament. Nearly all the M.R.P. leaders had vented their rancor at the defeat of E.D.C. by voting against the treaties which replaced it. Even M. Robert Schuman had abstained in the interest of party unity; thus M. Pflimlin was the most important supporter of the agreements in the party. This was enough for nomination, insufficient for success. The *Républicains Sociaux* (Gaullists) thought him too "European"; most Radicals did not intend M.R.P. to profit from its opposition to their leader; and the minority of Radicals opposed to M. Mendès-France claimed a disproportionate share of cabinet posts in order to strengthen their influence in the party. So M. Pflimlin abandoned his task.

The third man was a Socialist. M. Christian Pineau had been an active supporter of E.D.C., and his parliamentary prestige was growing. Among those who had upheld M. Mendès-France, he was the leader best able to win over M.R.P.—overjoyed at the opportunity to proclaim its Left-wing allegiance by voting for a Socialist. But no one else wished to abet what others considered a maneuver by M.R.P. to escape the consequences of its actions. Indeed many Socialists showed little enthusiasm for their champion's candidature. M. Pineau's ministerial appointments did him harm, driving into opposition even those faithful "king's friends", the Overseas Independents. His speech to the Assembly was described by critics and the press as an electioneering manifesto rather than a bid for parliamentary votes (and certainly the Socialist campaign later in the year was full of copious references to his proposals). So M. Pineau had a majority of votes cast against him.[5]

[5] Previous candidates for the premiership had needed an *absolute* majority (of the Assembly's membership); a relative majority (of votes cast) did not

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Conservatives, M.R.P. and Socialists had tried and failed; it was the turn of the Radicals. Their obvious candidate was M. Edgar Faure, one of the most skilful conciliators in French politics, who had occupied the Ministry of Finance—most sensitive of posts—under both the Conservative M. Laniel and the "New Dealer" M. Mendès-France. As a man without enemies, he was eminently "available"; as a sympathizer with M. Mendès-France, he would blunt that formidable critic's prospective attack better than anyone else. And as a clever politician he turned into an asset the cabinet-making problem which had damaged his predecessors—distributing the senior offices to influential party leaders, but withholding until after the vote the under-secretaryships to which wavering deputies might still aspire.

These proceedings, requiring four nominees and eighteen days, seem an elaborate way of arriving at an obvious solution, widely anticipated before the crisis began. But the delay was necessary; and the reasons for it explain some fundamentals of French political management. Early in a crisis the parties bargain hard. Usually they deal both with the distribution of offices and with the direction of policy; the former preoccupation, though never absent—since the choice of men may predetermine courses of action—rarely predominates as it did in February 1955. But whatever the subject in dispute, the intransigence of the parties diminishes the longer the crisis lasts. If it is usually unpopular to overthrow a government, it is almost always thought discreditable to prevent one being formed. So the mere passage of time brings pressure on the "difficult" party, which is usually obstinate because it fears that concessions might cost it votes. When public exasperation mounts so high that stubbornness will forfeit more support than conciliation, the crisis is ripe for solution.

The president's craft therefore lies entirely in timing. He must not put forward his favorite's name too soon, lest the candidate fail and the president's own prestige suffer: M. Au-

suffice. Cautious or courteous opponents therefore had only to abstain; this was just as effective as a hostile vote. But by a constitutional revision in November 1954 a prime minister could be elected with a majority of votes cast (and had to form his cabinet before the vote, instead of after it as hitherto). M. Pineau was the first nominee to need only a relative majority—and also the first not to get one.

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riol's standing was not enhanced by his two unsuccessful nominations of fellow Socialists, M. Blum in 1947 and M. Mollet in 1951. Nor can he wait too long; if he misjudge the proper moment, a nominee may succeed who was expected—or intended—to fail. He must not rush things; skimped bargaining means a precarious settlement, and cabinets put together within two weeks generally fall apart within six.[6] He must try to avoid a patched-up truce which decides none of the problems at stake—an acute temptation after a crisis has continued too long. But cabinets where advocates of contradictory policies sit side by side either break up as soon as a choice must be made (like the Marie ministry in 1948) or—still worse—survive by postponing decisions, like the Mayer and Laniel governments in 1953-54. Such impotent combinations discredit the political system even worse than prolonged crises.

The president, therefore, must so manage the negotiations as to confront the parties, the politicians, and the voters too with their responsibilities as soon and as clearly as possible. Before M. Faure could emerge in February 1955, his rivals had to be chastened. The Conservatives had to be shown that they could not succeed, and must accept a premier more liberal than they would have liked. M.R.P. had to face the fact of their unpopularity and moderate their terms. The *opération Pineau,* long canvassed in the lobbies, had to be tried out in order to prove to its advocates that a Left-wing, pro-European combination simply did not have enough votes. Wearing down resistance and "clearing off the mortgage" are essential preliminaries to a solution. Of the Fourth Republic's fifteen crises, ten have required three discarded candidates before a winner could emerge.

But accidents do happen. M. Pinay in 1952 and M. Mendès-France in 1954 were nominated early, to show enthusiasts for a new course that their aspirations could not be fulfilled; both men won unexpected majorities and formed unusually strong governments. Conversely, in the summer of 1953, the Assembly rejected the first two candidates pre-

[6] Since 1948 the only exceptions to this attractively simple rule have been the governments of MM. Pinay and Mendès-France, who both won the premiership by surprise and held it by the rare and risky device of appealing to the public in defiance of the deputies.

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sented to it, MM. Reynaud and Mendès-France, who both made clear that they did not propose to preside over impotent caretaker administrations. Many presidents in the Third Republic systematically hampered and frustrated strong, "dangerous" personalities of this type; and even today such leaders depend for their opportunities on the president's goodwill and judgment (or perhaps misjudgment). For he must decide, not only the right man and the psychological moment for solving a particular crisis, but also which crises during his whole term of office afford opportunities, by the nomination of a spectacular personality, to confront Parliament and the country with the distasteful choices which both would like to ignore or evade.

Yet even the strongest leader is compelled to accommodate himself to the system, and to use the few traditional resources of politicians struggling to win or hold office. Spoils are strictly limited; for, contrary to a widespread belief, the ministerial inflation is no greater in France than in Britain. In each country about a quarter of the six hundred members seriously aspire to office. But while the velocity of circulation is far greater in Paris, the "fiduciary issue" (the number of ministers surplus to those whose intrinsic worth creates public confidence in the government) is so much larger in London that the ministerial *masse monétaire* is about the same on either side of the Channel. British ministries usually have about seventy members, French ones from two dozen to forty, varying inversely with the prestige of the prime minister—when ministers of Merchant Marine and Commerce are appointed, it is a sign that the majority is precarious.

These posts are generally distributed after negotiation among the majority parties, in rough proportion to their numbers or to their votes for the prime minister. Occasionally a Mendès-France may defy precedent by refusing to consult the parties, insisting on choosing his colleagues, and ignoring mathematical *dosage* (though even he took pains to balance his cabinet equally between supporters and opponents of E.D.C.). Positions outside the cabinet may be used for similar purposes. M. Mendès-France sent M. Soustelle to govern Algeria, and M. Faure chose M. Grandval for Morocco, not only as strong and able administrators but as

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Gaullists whose appointments might influence a wavering party. There are also such minor favors as Legion of Honor promotions for the influential constituents of hesitant members, and pork-barrel benefits for the districts of deputies—especially from overseas—who respond to such devices.

Policy decisions, unfortunately, provoke discord among the majority more often than they promote cohesion. Any action to appease one group of waverers will probably cause an equal and opposite reaction among other waverers on the far wing of the majority. Only too frequently, therefore, the most awkward question of the moment is evaded. An investigating committee may be appointed—so M. Pleven managed to delay dealing with the Catholic schools throughout his first cabinet, though the problem reappeared a year later to plague his second administration. Or a candidate for the premiership may be driven into equivocal formulae, like those with which M. René Mayer in 1953 tried to convince M.R.P. that he favored E.D.C. and the Gaullists that he did not. Even M. Mendès-France, who when nominated in 1953 said that no government could refuse to stake its existence on the treaty, was obliged a year later to resort to cabinet neutrality on the question, like any Pleven or Queuille. Such hesitations and evasions injure those who use them; so that the prudent politician will try not to let dangerous problems rise to the surface during his incumbency. If they do appear, his instinct will be to do a little less of what he was doing before, and compensate by ostentatious gestures in a different field. When a Socialist-led government represses an Algerian rising, no one should be surprised to find its leaders reassuring their followers (and themselves), by speeches criticizing the United States, that their hearts are still firmly on the Left.

Governments can also try to appeal to the deputies' sense of responsibility by pointing out the catastrophic consequences of a crisis *now*—an international conference, a colonial negotiation or a financial emergency is always conveniently at hand. This is a rather ineffective device, and one which wears out quickly. M. René Mayer, having once saved himself by engineering at the critical moment a treasury crisis and a visit to Washington, tried in vain to repeat the performance six weeks later by urging the Assembly not

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to deprive France of her government on the eve of the Bermuda conference.

A very bold leader may bring pressure on the deputies by going over their heads to public opinion. MM. Pinay and Mendès-France both employed their personal popularity in the country to carry their measures through a hostile house. Such an appeal, if it contrasts the upright, far-sighted administration with the self-seeking, small-minded legislators, is felt by the members to be contrary to the customs of the club, and arouses lasting resentment. But no one minds a skilful maneuver by which constituents' pressure is brought to bear. Nor do even strong leaders disdain such methods. M. Pinay, when faced with a coming attack from the Right on his foreign minister, ostentatiously refused to accept an "insulting" American note—a glorious gesture which no Conservative could disavow. M. Mendès-France, when Gaullists and Socialists were wavering, arranged an interview with a benevolent General de Gaulle and announced a minimum-wage increase on the eve of a crucial Socialist party meeting.

There are other, indirect ways of bringing the outside public into the calculations of the deputies. Party discipline—which works only if the voters attach importance to the party label—can be used to good effect by the Socialists, and sometimes by Conservatives and M.R.P. The cabinet can demand a vote of confidence, so that hesitant members can justify an unpopular vote to their constituents by explaining that the life of the government was at stake. When wavering groups fear a crisis or a dissolution,[7] or are themselves reluctant to take responsibility, votes of confidence may help a cabinet to get its way. M. Mollet's "loyal opposition" at first feared that his fall would drive the Socialists into the arms of the Communists, and later preferred to keep him in office rather than to take over themselves; he could therefore use this arm more freely than any of his predecessors to carry his more controversial policies—although his party's doctrine forbids a government to coerce the Assembly in this way.

[7] If two governments are beaten within eighteen months, by absolute majorities of the Assembly, on formal confidence votes (not within the first two weeks of a cabinet's life or the first eighteen months of the Assembly's), the ministry may dissolve.

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The strong-minded, independent leader remains under a severe handicap. The deputies dislike constraint, however skilfully applied, and if compelled to give way they are likely to take future revenge. When M. René Mayer first stood for the premiership in October 1949, he disdained to negotiate with the parties in the usual way; he was duly elected but found himself unable to form a cabinet. By 1953 he had learned his lesson, and proved a masterly equivocator. M. Bidault, in 1950, brandished votes of confidence against the Socialists; and they have kept him from forming another government ever since. M. Mendès-France overcame hostility in the Assembly through popularity in the country, but thereby aroused bitter enmity among the *caciques* of all parties. M. Pinay similarly forced the hand of M.R.P., which has subsequently twice blocked his return to the premiership. The domineering character may get his way at the time, but he suffers later. So the prudent careerist will conciliate his critics rather than defy them, temper his actions to the psychology of the house, and resign at the first whisper of its disapproval so as to preserve his reputation as a "safe" man. M. Edgar Faure remained the most "available" of politicians until the dissolution of December 1955—the boldest and most popular act of his career, but one which made him bitter enemies.

Thus moderation, conciliation and prudence are at a heavy premium in the Palais Bourbon, and bold, decisive, challenging conduct is at a severe discount. As in the United States Senate or in an American party convention, availability is the road to advancement. This may not improve the efficiency or the attractiveness of the Paris political spectacle. But the *amour-propre* of the deputies is only a superficial reason; the basic causes—like those for the similar moderate bias in the United States—are far more respectable. Few countries enjoy such complete homogeneity, such secure unity on fundamentals, that they can endure without disruption constant crusades by fiery charioteers. In France no checks and balances are built into the constitutional mechanism; an immense centralized administrative apparatus is controlled only by the supervision of the deputies. French politicians, like American, insist on safeguards against the abuse of executive authority; and, lacking constitutional

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brakes on the wheels, they keep men suspected of speeding habits from access to the driver's seat.

The pivot parties and the "king's friends" also have their justification. When the public demands drastic and sweeping action, these groups go along with each such passionate movement of opinion in turn, restrain it, moderate it, and prevent it from carrying the country irrevocably over the brink. They make life hard for vigorous impatient reformers—but also for the men of violence and their dupes. They ensure that tensions do not become intolerable nor conflicts unappeasable. Through their drab and even sordid activities and ambitions, the shocks of political change are absorbed and the temperature of political dispute is lowered. In 1939 a bitter critic of the great pivot group concluded his survey with the resigned admission, "Perhaps it was a Radical party that Spain lacked in 1936." [8]

The men who break new paths may not be best fitted to lead others along them. The qualities which made a General de Gaulle (some would add a Winston Churchill) magnificent in emergency aroused friction and opposition which impaired their usefulness in calmer times. Without the spectacular methods of M. Mendès-France, Franco-Tunisian relations might have stayed in a rut, or been lifted out too late; yet it was the wily and cautious M. Edgar Faure who set them back on the rails, passing by a 12-to-1 majority the agreements on which his predecessor had recently been overthrown.

Crises, as well as compromises, play a part in the working of the system. They alone, indeed, make some compromises possible. On very grave problems leaders who feel strongly —or think their voters feel strongly—may resist all efforts for decision or concession. The sacrifice of a cabinet may then facilitate the solution of a difficulty. It makes the recalcitrant party take responsibility for its obstinacy—so hard to fix in a multi-party system. It brings home to the leaders that they will incur the blame for governmental instability, and thus a price will be exacted for their intransigence. It obliges their voters to realize the cost of the policies on which they insist, and so gives the representatives electoral and pru-

[8] *Esprit*, No. 80, p. 187 (May 1939).

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dential reasons to weigh on the side of conciliation. M. Faure once called it "a method of government by shock treatment"; [9] it compels both politicians and citizens to face facts they would rather dodge.

Not all crises have beneficial effects. Some register the victory of the obstructionists; a very thorny problem, like German rearmament, may devour several cabinets before the deputies—and their constituents—bow to necessity. Others turn on men rather than measures. They allow new blood to be introduced at the top. They permit the removal of ministers who have become liabilities. In Britain or the United States, critics try to isolate a vulnerable figure from his colleagues; in France the whole cabinet is their target. But the results are much the same, for in most crises the turnover of personnel is quite small: about half the old ministers keep their posts, half the rest change them, and a quarter are replaced. There would be less misunderstanding if these operations were given some appropriate name, like "reshuffles", instead of the misleadingly grandiloquent title of "crises".

Other changes of government take account of, or facilitate, minor shifts in the composition of the majority. In a multiparty system such movements occur—or rather show themselves—more often than in two-party politics. But in the latter too public moods change, and affect the nation's leaders through mid-term elections in the United States, by-elections in Britain. Administrations alter course to respond to new directions of the wind—as New Dealers found prudent in 1938, British Socialists in 1947, modern Republicans in 1955. The French Parliament is highly sensitive to such movements in the electorate; but there the new policy is less likely to be carried out by precisely the men responsible for the old course.

Thus few French crises are due simply to irresponsible or inept behavior by parliamentarians. Indeed a strong case can be made for a converse assumption: that in the present system a long period without a crisis may well be a bad sign, signifying a corresponding period without a decision. Emergencies demand decisive action, which can sometimes be made acceptable only through a change of ministry. In a

[9] *Le Monde*, 27 March 1953.

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real crisis, governmental instability may help to remedy governmental impotence.

Instability contributes indirectly to the weakness of the executive by encouraging deputies and even ministers to chart their course by reference to their expectations about the next government. But it is not in itself the most serious fault (nor is the form of paralysis which prevents major decisions during one month out of every eight self-evidently worse than the variety of the same disease which inhibits them for half a year in every four). The real trouble is that when ministries are in office they are not in power; they lack the political strength to attack the basic problems of the country. Constitutional tinkering may do a little to remedy this, but it can contribute far less than is generally supposed. An irremovable four-year president at perpetual odds with the legislature would make no useful contribution to the country's long-term needs. Devices linking the life of Parliament to that of the cabinet might merely enthrone King Log, ensuring the election of a prime minister guaranteed to offend no one during a five-year term. The easy remedies are ineffective because the main difficulty lies, not in the irresponsibility of politicians, but in the claims, the divisions, and the fears of the ordinary Frenchmen who so willingly blame their elected representatives for all their country's ills.

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# MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION AND SELF-ALIENATION *

IN that theoretically perfect world where consumers possessed "an irrational passion for dispassionate rationality" the sellers of commodities were faceless anonymities. The personality of a seller did not matter since the consumer as a "lightning calculator" thought only in terms of price and quality. Hence the textbook identification of sellers as Farmer Jones and Farmer Smith or Seller A and Seller B was fully justified. No means were available for Seller A to raise his price or lower his quality below the standard set by the market; any attempt to do so was doomed to immediate failure as his customers shifted to one of the many other sellers in the market.

As economists attempted to bring their analysis closer to reality, the problem of product differentiation appeared. The term "product differentiation" has meant many different things to many different people; advertising, trade names and distinctive packaging all have become recognized variations which a seller may employ in order to gain some control over the price charged. Economists have commented profoundly on the reasons why a seller may try varying one of the above rather than altering his prices, and the opinions of the former as to the effectiveness of these variations have been as variant as the variations themselves. All of these possible changes have become aspects of the problem known as monopolistic competition.[1] Generally speaking, most economists have continued to treat such variations as deviations away from the purity of price competition. Only recently has come a recognition that quality competition may

* The author is indebted to Professor Ruby Turner Norris for her numerous helpful criticisms. Any remaining errors, however, are the author's.

[1] A detailed, theoretical analysis of the concept of monopolistic competition is to be found in the classic of the field: Edward Hastings Chamberlin, *The Theory of Monopolistic Competition* (Cambridge, 1947).



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not only be an alternative to price competition, but lead to a more complete kind of competition.[2]

One possible variation which Chamberlin noted was what the sociologists have come to term self-alienation. Self-alienation is the process whereby the seller "sells" his own personality. The waitress who gives the customer a special smile and the gasoline attendant who renders the "extras" in service in order to attract customers are but two examples of an endless multitude which could be cited.[3] To quote Chamberlin,

> Differentiation may also exist with respect to the conditions surrounding the sale. In retail trade, to take only one instance, these conditions include such factors as the convenience of the seller's location, the general tone or character of his establishment, his way of doing business, his reputation for fair dealing, courtesy, efficiency, and all the personal links which attach his customers either to himself or to those employed by him.[4]

It is interesting to observe the reasons for the utilization of a self-selling process. Adoption of self-alienation is most likely to occur when other sources of differentiation fail or become blurred. When the seller has a product which is sufficiently distinctive from that of his competitors, the need to "soft-soap" the customer is reduced.[5] Similarly, where the seller can engage in active price competition, personality selling has a smaller rôle to play. It is when the seller is faced with a situation where little or no difference between

2 See Lawrence Abbott, *Quality and Competition* (New York, 1955).

3 Self-alienation has a close kinship to work-alienation. The worker who holds himself aloof from his work and who takes no interest in his job other than the wages which it will produce is in a position similar to that of the seller who divorces himself from his personality while wooing customers. As Mills has put it, "In the normal course of her work, because her personality becomes the instrument of an alien purpose, the salesgirl becomes self-alienated." C. Wright Mills, *White Collar* (New York, 1953), p. 184. The concepts of the self-alienated individual and the personality market have been developed in some detail in Mills, pp. 182-188.

4 Chamberlin, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

5 One exception to this is found in those companies such as public utilities which have close personal contact with the customers. Listen, for example, to the telephone girl and her "voice with the million dollar smile".

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products exists, or where price competition is difficult because of retail price maintenance laws or "gentlemen's agreements", that a policy of self-alienation emerges and the personality mart assumes importance. It follows from the above generalization that self-alienation may develop irrespective of the number of sellers or the type of product market involved. Thus self-alienation may be employed in any of the intermediate stages of the market where one business man is seeking sales from another down to the final stage where the ultimate consumer enters the picture as the purchaser of the finished product.

One of the groups, for example, relying most heavily upon personality selling as a key to sales is the parts manufacturer who supplies numerous other business firms. Here we have a close approximation to the conditions described above: a standardized product which is well known to the buyer and concerning which he frequently has complete catalogue specifications, a price which is also virtually standardized for all manufacturers and consequently nearly perfect knowledge on the part of all buyers. Under these trying circumstances, the producer is faced with the problem of inducing potential buyers to select his product rather than that of a near competitor. The solution adopted by most suppliers is to rely upon their salesmen and their salemen's personalities to produce customer orders.

Not all writers have accepted this idea that the seller's personality may play an important rôle in the decision of the consumer to buy or not to buy, thus permitting the seller some leeway in pricing decisions. Nichols, for example, has suggested that the process of emulation leads to competitive results.[6] To take one of the types cited earlier, the actions of one gas station attendant in wiping windshields and checking tires, oil and water (all done with an air of "desire to please") are quickly imitated by his rivals. The end result is to leave the customer again indifferent as to which seller he should patronize.

It seems useful, therefore, to explore in more detail the circumstances under which self-alienation will play an important rôle in selling and the conditions which may lead to

[6] Alfred Nichols, "The Rehabilitation of Pure Competition", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, November 1947, p. 56.

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its abandonment. In so doing we will set up three hypothetical situations which will not, it is hoped, prove too far removed from reality.

Let us assume that some seller, becoming dissatisfied with his sales, employs his personality as a means of influencing buyers. Thus undertaken as a deliberate step[7] to woo buyers, it may prove initially very successful in attracting new customers as well as enhancing the loyalty of the "regulars" since the buyers at this stage are deemed to be unaware of the "insidious" character of the seller's program. The result will be to give the seller some control in pricing and an ability to attract and retain customers. Any profit return thus afforded the seller by this latitude in pricing is a kind of quasi rent. Until other sellers have learned the practice, it brings a special return to the owner much in the manner of education or other special talents. At this point the picture clearly resembles the situation which Chamberlin had in mind.

Presumably, however, much in the manner depicted by Nichols, other sellers will quickly adopt similar personality traits. Given this second set of circumstances, one result might be a return to the conditions of perfect competition, with buyers indifferent between sellers except as to variations in price and quality. In this respect the effectiveness of self-alienation resembles that of advertising. The attempts to distinguish one brand from another fail as the sale of other brands is supported by equally impressive claims and testimonials. Those sellers not practicing self-alienation, however, may, like the producers of "off-brands", find themselves handicapped in their sales efforts. Indifference on the part of buyers may develop, whether or not they become aware of the intentions of sellers. If we assume, however, that buyers do recognize the sellers' collective intentions, a number of alternative actions on the part of buyers may take place.[8]

[7] Some sociologists would deny that this is a consciously planned policy, finding that the most repelling aspect of self-alienation lies in the fact that sellers themselves are unaware of prostituting their personalities.

[8] Before exploring these alternatives it might be best if we paused for a moment over the question of whether buyers are likely to become aware of the existence of self-alienation. Do buyers sense that the sellers' winning

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What are the alternatives open to buyers? One possibility is that buyers may resent the appearance of self-alienation and act to punish the seller. They may do this by ceasing purchases of the particular product or by shifting their purchases to other sellers. This may lead to constant shifting as the buyer in turn becomes disgusted with successive sellers until he encounters a seller who either employs the self-alienation process in a skillful enough manner so as to avoid alienating customers or does not practice self-alienation. Do buyers frequently resent the employment of the seller's personality? Although there has not been (and probably never will be) any statistical study on the subject, the present writer is unconvinced that buyers express such resentment. It is true that under certain market conditions there is likely to develop a suspicion of the seller who tries too hard or who appears to have only his personality to sell. A wariness of the overly-nice, smooth talker or the glib, self-assured young salesman is a part of the consumer's book of lore. Even in these instances, however, the buyer's reluctance to purchase is probably confined to those situations where the buyer is unable to judge for himself the quality of the goods being offered, and is undoubtedly a function of the skill with which the seller's personality is projected. It seems likely, therefore, that buyers accept the use by the seller of his personality as part of the " rules of the game " of doing business in the same way as many consumers put up with television and radio commercials.

Even if buyers are not resentful of the use of self-alienation, they may still take advantage of the situation to try to exploit the seller. Let us now assume that buyers are aware of a seller's eagerness to make a sale, and that for one reason or another a price concession by the seller is not possible. Under these circumstances, a buyer may attempt to capitalize on a seller's efforts at self-alienation by securing all of the possible " fringe " benefits in the way of the special service,

smiles and subservient manners are but a cloak for increasing sales? While no definitive answer to this question is possible, it seems likely that in many cases buyers are well aware of the personality mart. Certainly consumers are frequently aware of the excessively solicitious salesman and the waitress with the blatantly phoney smile, while the super-courteous filling station attendant has been the subject of innumerable magazine cartoons and radio skits.

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free dinners, samples, gifts, etc. The writer has been told, for example, of a liquor store proprietor who bled a liquor salesman dry as the salesman tried to push the sale of his particular line. Unfortunately for most consumers, the opportunity for such excessive exploitation of the seller is seldom encountered. Such opportunities are not completely lacking, however. Consider the cases of drivers who have their car completely checked with each purchase of gas and the customer who has all packages, no matter how small, delivered, and the shopper who examines endless varieties of goods with no real intention of buying.

The stage is now set for the third act where sellers in turn become aware that buyers have recognized the sellers' use of their personalities and have become indifferent between sellers so that the effectiveness of self-alienation is reduced. Under these circumstances what will sellers do? A number of alternative reactions may take place depending in part on the personality of the seller and in part on the manner in which buyers have reacted. A seller has the choice of either abandoning his tactics completely or clinging to them perhaps with even greater tenacity. It may be wondered why a seller would continue the practices when he knows that buyers are aware of his efforts. It should be noted first that the practice of self-alienation, unlike many other attempts at product differentiation, frequently involves little or nothing in the way of costly expenditures. Most attempts at product differentiation, treated either as a part of the costs of production or isolated into a separate department of selling costs, are expensive. But the beauty of self-alienation lies in the fact that almost anyone can practice it (with varying degrees of effectiveness, of course) and it is so simple that even a three-year old may practice it (and does as most parents can attest).

The obvious exceptions to this generalization are the high-priced personality hucksters whom large business concerns employ to sell their wares to other business men, but in its rudimentary form self-alienation requires nothing more elaborate than a book of etiquette and a set of smiling teeth.[9]

[9] The assumption is that the supply of labor which is capable of self-alienation is in the long run virtually infinitely elastic. Many would deny

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If, then, buyers become indifferent to the wiles of sellers, the result may be not an abandonment of the practice but rather an intensification. Sellers may exert themselves more strenuously than ever seeking to curry the favor of buyers. Many sellers may possess sufficient self-confidence so that they remain convinced that they can out-smile and out-shine their fellow practitioners in the personality mart. The hopes of a seller that he will do it better or at least as well as anyone else lead him to frenzied efforts in the direction of the bigger smile, the friendlier handshake and the more elaborate expressions of polite behavior. For some sellers, moreover, these efforts may become a means of achieving a sense of accomplishment. Thus they may pride themselves on their ability to sell even the toughest customers and keep them "coming back for more." Other sellers are then forced by the pressures of competition to continue the practice also even though they are doubtful of its effectiveness. Even if the practice of self-alienation does no more than put him on a par with other sellers, a failure to practice when all other buyers are doing so will leave him isolated unless he can adopt other ways to differentiate his product.

The attempt to find alternative ways of attracting customers may lead sellers into one of two directions. Either they may seek new ways to distinguish and make attractive their product by way of renewed advertising, etc., or they may return to a policy of active price competition. In nearly every community one can find some seller who shaves away all of the little "extras" in order to concentrate upon offering the customer a price shaded beneath that of his competitors. The writer recently witnessed an interesting example where price competition replaced self-alienation during a local gasoline price war. Station attendants who had gone out of their way to provide service before the price cuts suddenly became indifferent about service; windshields, oil and tires went unchecked unless specifically requested by the motorist. Only a couple of stations refused to cut prices

this, claiming that salesmen are born not made and are becoming increasingly difficult to find. Where this is true, the increased demand for sales people with a talent for self-alienation will build up wages so that the quasi rent will be imputed to the salesmen in the form of higher wages rather than to the employer.

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and continued to rely upon self-alienation to retain customers. Even these found it impossible to rely solely upon service and displayed large signs stating that it was not only price but quality that mattered, thus implying that the cut-rate gasolines were of an inferior quality. With the termination of the price war came a resumption of self-alienation by all dealers. Another example of this nature is the growth of discount houses and the widespread evasion of the resale price maintenance laws. When self-alienation no longer proved effective, vigorous price competition broke out. It is interesting to note in this connection that many discount houses have seemed almost to pride themselves on their lack of any expression of self-alienation. It is enough that customers obtain sizable price reductions—there is no need to be nice to them too!

Even if buyers are unaware of the practice or take no advantage of sellers, self-alienation may be abandoned if there appears to be no need of it. It is probable that some of the negligent treatment which customers experience in wartime [10] can be attributed to the change in market conditions where the problem is scarce supplies and an eagerness of consumers to obtain the goods at almost any price. Under these conditions the customer changes from a person who is always right to an individual who is seldom if ever right.[11]

When buyers become resentful of self-alienation, there is likely to be a speedy end to the practices which have aroused the ire of customers. This may not, however, mean a complete cessation of the practice, but only a termination of those practices thought to be unpopular. In this respect there is again a close resemblance to the policies of advertising; public resentment of a particularly distasteful form of advertising (or self-alienation) leads to a termination, not of the entire practice, but only of that aspect deemed objectionable.

Not all self-alienation is costless—service frequently in-

[10] Part of the explanation lies in the large labor turnover which exists in wartime in retail trades so that untrained newcomers who have not yet acquired the skills of personality selling appear on the scene en masse.

[11] Evidence that the state of the market affects the extent of self-alienation is also found in the decline of the practice by plumbers, T.V. repair men and auto mechanics as their services became increasingly valued.

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volves considerable expense to the seller. At first glance, a cessation of the expensive forms of self-alienation would occur whenever customers begin to take advantage of the situation and exploit the seller. First appearances are notoriously deceiving, however, and the actual reaction of the seller may prove to be quite different. One practice of sellers is to capitalize upon this response by buyers through the use of advertising. Advertisements proclaim the action of customers and welcome similar reactions from other customers.[12] What such sellers count upon is the reluctance of most buyers to take advantage of the opportunity, thus permitting the seller to acquire a reputation of willingness to meet all customer demands without actually having to fulfill more than a small number.

A more familiar situation in the business world is the case of the expense account. Now the circumstances are changed since the expense account (even after allowing for tax deductions) does involve considerable expense for the seller particularly when he is dealing with a customer who is hard to induce to put a pen to the dotted line. Here we have a situation where both buyer and seller are aware of each other's practices. This leads not to abandoning the policy of lavish entertainment, however; rather the expense account becomes a part of the business ethic. Both sides are aware of its function, and certain institutional rules surrounding the manner and extent of its use are developed.

Nevertheless the competition in employing the expense account may be very great with some sellers unable to match the lavish programs of their competitors. When faced with such a situation the seller often relies even more extensively upon his own personality. One soft drink salesman with whom the writer talked had been handicapped by the fact that his company made no provision for free cases of drink to potential customers while his rivals had fifteen to twenty cases on each truck. When asked how he competed, he replied, "Well it's a matter of personal contact. You have to

12 A New York men's clothing store recently ran newspaper advertisements telling the tale of a customer who had come into the store not to buy anything but to obtain replacements for his lost shirt collar stays. The store announced proudly that it was willing to render similar service to other customers.

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tell them [the customers] that they are doing you a personal favor and play that angle up big. They [the customers] may have no love for the company but if they like you, you're set."

The above analysis suggests three tentative conclusions concerning the relationship of monopolistic competition and self-alienation.

1. Self-alienation as a device for differentiating sellers may collapse, given changes in the market such as a growing hostility by buyers or the development of a sellers' market. Under certain circumstances, however, intensification rather than abandonment of the practice is likely to occur.

2. Aside from exceptional cases, the departure from self-alienation for a more vigorous kind of competition by one or more sellers will usually force other competitors to do the same (at least to the extent of relying less upon self-alienation) since by itself self-alienation is not a sufficiently powerful device to hold customers.

3. Despite these reservations, self-alienation has, with the increased standardization of products, become a well-rooted feature of the American economy. From the corner store to the large super market, customers repeatedly encounter it. Being so widespread it deserves more recognition from economists than it has received in the past.

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# PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY *

IN speaking about the relations of philosophy and history, I am stepping into the middle of a very old quarrel. There are a number of continuing controversies that have marked the intellectual history of the West. Humanists and scientists have been at odds, mystics and logicians, empiricists and rationalists, "ancients" and "moderns". But among these quarrels few have been more persistent than that between philosophers and historians.

Historians have been suspicious of the philosopher's love of generalizations, impatient at his dreamy preoccupation with the ideal instead of with what has actually and brutally happened, and amused at his apparent conviction that one can gain knowledge of men and the world without the tough, unromantic labor of digging for the facts. To call something "philosophy" has been, for many historians, a way of dismissing it as sound history or sound thinking. And ever since Aristotle dismissed history with the remark that it was less philosophical—by which he meant less true—than poetry, philosophers have been returning the compliment. They have suggested again and again that history is a kind of second-rate intellectual discipline, an activity for men who, lacking the power of creative thought, are exercising their memories as a substitute. "To the higher thinker," said Goethe, "history is really only a complexus of nonsense." And higher thinkers—that is, philosophers—have repeatedly suggested that immersion in this complexus of nonsense is at the very least boring and unnecessary, and is probably also a way of dulling the mind and the imagination. To study history, philosophers have felt, is to study error, accident, the mere record of what happens by chance to have taken place; it is not to discover the necessary order that there must be in

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things, or what is rational, or what is possible. "Adam in his earthly paradise knew no history", the seventeenth-century philosopher, Malebranche, is reported to have said. "Why then should we aspire to know more?"

So I have apparently chosen to step into the lion's den. And to make matters worse, my motives are only in part those of a peacemaker. The radical separation of philosophy and history seems to me in many respects to rest on serious mistakes. Recently there have been signs, not simply of a *rapprochement* between philosophy and history, but of what looks suspiciously like a proposal of marriage. A considerable number of philosophers have adopted the position that philosophy itself is essentially a historical discipline, whose results are valid only within the spatial and temporal limits of a given culture. And an increasing number of historians are coming to the view that, since history cannot in the end be written without the silent aid of a philosophy, and since there are no impersonal or objective procedures for choosing among competing philosophies, the writing of history, like the creation of a philosophy, must have an indelibly subjective element about it. In short, it has been suggested that the quarrel between philosophy and history is really a lovers' quarrel, and that the two cannot live at all until they lose their separate identities and are wholly absorbed into one another. If the traditional hostility between the Capulets of philosophy and the Montagues of history has been unfortunate, I am not at all sure that this new romance between Romeo and Juliet is much better.

Nevertheless, there are, I think, important ways in which history is connected with what has traditionally been called philosophy. The writing of history can profit from an explicit recognition of what they are, and it can profit equally from a recognition of what they are not. I wish, therefore, to examine some of the broad statements that are currently made about the relation of history to philosophy, and to try to suggest where, in my view, they are right and where they are wrong.

## I

When the question of the relation of philosophy to history is raised, those who raise it seem to have one or another of

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three fairly definite notions of philosophy in mind. Sometimes they seem to mean a study of the methodology of history-writing—an analysis of the nature and grounds of the historian's arguments or findings, an endeavor to clarify the key terms he uses, and an attempt to indicate the kind of standard by which it is appropriate to evaluate his results. Broadly speaking, this kind of "philosophy of history" is an attempt to determine the general character and value of the evidence that supports the statements that historians make, and to fix the place of history among the intellectual disciplines. My own remarks will be an exercise in this field.

In the second place, the term "philosophy" is frequently employed to designate any set of ordered and fairly comprehensive value-judgments. When men ask what the influence of philosophy is on the writing of history, they are sometimes asking what rôle the historian's ideals or values play in what he does—in the selection of his materials, in the imputing of causes, and in the general way in which he organizes his story. Time will not permit me to make more than one or two remarks in passing about this aspect of the subject.

Finally, when people talk about the influence of philosophy on history, they sometimes seem to have in mind the use by the historian of certain broad generalizations about human nature or social organization—ideas which help the historian to connect the parts of his story and to explain why events had to happen as they did. The term "philosophy" has traditionally, and perhaps usually, been employed to stand for an interest in seeing things, as we say, from a broader point of view. In this quite ordinary usage, a subject becomes more "philosophical" in proportion as it moves on to higher and higher levels of generality. To raise the question of the relation of philosophy to history in this sense, therefore, is to ask about the rôle that generalizations of a peculiarly inclusive sort play in the writing of history; more specifically, it is to ask whether the historian must believe that there are regularities or patterns in history, and what the consequences of interpreting history in such terms are. I shall discuss this question by examining some of the more representative things that are said, particularly by historians, about the relationship of philosophy in this sense to history.

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## II

For many centuries philosophy regarded itself as the queen of the sciences, the discipline whose function it was to provide the first principles on which every other discipline leaned and the final synthesis which brought together in a single system everything men knew and everything they prized. To the joy of many inside philosophy, and to the despair of many outside, contemporary philosophy has progressively drawn away from that high—or pretentious—ambition. But history has come increasingly to take its place, and the view has become very widespread that history holds a unique and peculiarly commanding position among the intellectual disciplines. Where philosophy dealt in abstractions, however, history, it is suggested, is a general intellectual guardian against abstractions, a sort of night watchman whose job it is to keep our thinking "realistic" by bringing it face to face with facts. History, from this point of view, is a discipline whose distinctive function it is to provide a cure for philosophy—to guard the human mind against one of its congenital diseases, the disease of abstractions. For, history, it is said, studies individual and wholly unique facts, and its job is to report these facts in all their bewildering fulness and complexity. In doing so, it inevitably reveals the distortions and the disfiguring element of selectivity that generalizations introduce into any subject matter they touch.

In an influential article the late Charles Beard stated this view in a representative way:

> Useful as a fiction or abstraction, like the economic man or the political man, is or may be for limited and practical purposes, it becomes harmful . . . when we regard it as hypothesis and therefore possibly true. . . . Since all the humanistic sciences . . . are based on abstractions from history-as-actuality, that is, are selective emphases on particular aspects of history, they can be in no respect independent, free-moving sciences. . . . To ascertain the degree of truth in them, it is imperative to check them against comprehensive knowledge of the actuality of history. . . . Indeed such checking against historical knowledge seems to be the chief intellectual operation likely to increase the degree of truth in any of the sciences.[1]

[1] Social Science Research Council, *Theory and Practice in Historical Study*, 1946, p. 10.

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As distinguished as some of its proponents may be, however, this view, it seems to me, rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of the logic of historical inquiry. It is of course true that books on history do not in the main contain generalizations, but rather singular statements asserting the occurrence of complex and unique events at specific times and places. Learning names and dates, if it is not the be-all and end-all of history, is at least its indispensable first step. There is, therefore, an obvious difference between the practice and intentions of historians and the practice and intentions of physicists, sociologists, or philosophers, whose main object it is to state generalizations. However, the view that history is the corrective of abstractions and generalizations rests on an ideal of intellectual activity which is unattainable, and which would be otiose if it were attainable. Indeed, it overlooks the fact that history itself could not be written without the aid of such abstractions and generalizations.

In the first place, there is the obvious fact that the historian employs a language. But a language containing a different word for each individual thing or event—a language made up entirely of proper names — would be a language communicating exactly nothing at all. So long as we use language at all, we are committed to the use of abstract and general terms; and the sentences in which such terms occur obviously cannot describe or account for the characteristics of singular events except to the extent that these events have traits of a certain general *kind* or *type*. It would seem plain, therefore, (1) that generalizations of some kind enter into the construction of historical arguments as much as they do into other sorts of explanation, and (2) that the ideal of describing in their full concreteness all the characteristics of an individual event cannot be completely attained either in history or elsewhere. Accordingly, the difference between history and the generalizing sciences would not seem to lie in the presence or absence of generalizations, but in the different functions which general statements and singular statements serve in the two domains. Roughly, in the generalizing sciences singular statements are instrumental in arriving at conclusions which are general in form; in history general statements are instrumental in arriving at conclusions which are singular in form.

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These considerations are strengthened when we observe what it is that the practicing historian actually has to do. The materials available to the historian for constructing his account of the past are the traces which the past has left in the present—documents, ruins, traditions and institutions that still exist. In offering such present facts as evidence of the occurrence of certain events in the past, the historian must obviously proceed by showing that these present traces are causally related to these earlier events. Hence assumptions about general causal relations, both physical and social, play an indispensable rôle in the structure of his argument. Moreover, the historian does not merely report the occurrence of isolated events in the past. His object is to weave them together in a connected story. To do so, however, it is necessary for him to show that the events he is depicting are causally related to one another, or are at least all effects of a common cause. It would therefore seem to be inescapable that generalizations, whether in the form of universal statements or in the form of probability statements, play an indispensable rôle in the writing of history. And, in fact, we normally measure a historian's achievement in part by the depth and acuteness of his psychological and social insights. Our admiration goes out to Aristotle's *History of the Constitution of Athens* or to Tocqueville's *History of the Old Regime in France* not only because of the erudition and mastery of materials displayed in these books, but because of the power of the organizing ideas which control the story these books tell.

Indeed, it should be added that some of the most interesting and fruitful generalizations that historians have employed are abstractions of a particularly pure sort, resembling the chemist's concept of a pure gas. These are the so-called "ideal types", such as "the Puritan mind" or "the capitalist entrepreneur", which may be construed as devices (as yet rudimentary) for organizing certain historical materials under inquiry. Precisely because the human record is so complex it is difficult to see how any order can be brought to it without the use of such theoretical constructs; and the fact that they are constructs does not mean that they are merely useful fictions and are not really "true". For the notion that they are not true seems to rest on the absurd assumption that we can determine the "truth" of ideas by comparing them with some gross subject matter—in this case,

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"history-as-actuality"—whose properties we can determine without the aid of any abstract ideas. In the end, the position that the job of history is to say "Nay, nay" to all our abstractions rests on the notion that discursive knowledge is inadequate so long as it is not identical with the undifferentiated complex of events which it organizes. But if knowledge were not abstract, and if it were not a selective reordering of our experience, it would not be an advance on our ignorant experience, and would not in fact be knowledge at all.

## III

There is, however, another variant to this view. It holds that the philosophic or generalizing impulse is a danger to the historian, and should be shunned at all costs, because history is plainly the stage for the play of the contingent and the unforeseen. According to this doctrine, the man who attempts to explain historical occurrences by deducing them from general laws is making a fundamental error about the kind of subject with which he is dealing. This is a position which has a great vogue among historians, particularly among those who have reacted, quite properly, against omnivorous philosophies of history, like Hegel's or Mr. Toynbee's, which teach that everything that happens in history is a rational and necessary part of a single design. H. A. L. Fisher, in a famous passage, has given this skeptical view a classic statement:

> One intellectual excitement has . . . been denied me. Men wiser and more learned than I have discerned in History a plot, a rhythm, a predetermined pattern. These harmonies are concealed from me. I can see only one emergency following upon another as wave follows upon wave; only one great fact with respect to which, since it is unique, there can be no generalizations; only one safe rule for the historian: that he should recognize in the development of human destinies the play of the contingent and the unforeseen.[2]

This is itself a philosophy of history, and its message is to warn the historian against being taken in by philosophies of history. There is so much that is sound in it that it is not

[2] H. A. L. Fisher, *A History of Europe* (London, 1935), vol. I, p. vii.

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hard to see why so many historians have adopted it. For, when we look at the past in terms of the ideas and feelings of the men and women who have actually been the actors in history, there can be little doubt that the history of the past is largely a record of emergencies, of accidents, of pretentious attempts to control events in the light of some alleged controlling pattern, and of almost unbroken failures to do so. Very few things in history have worked out as those involved in them hoped or thought they would. The unforeseen dominates the record of the past.

However, all this is anything but to say that there are no generalizations or patterns that apply to history. For these remarks themselves express a generalization about history. And in the form that Mr. Fisher gives them, they go farther, and convert a contingent state of affairs into an inevitability. What Mr. Fisher wishes to reject is the belief that what happens in history is inevitable. But his own statement converts man's enslavement to the unforeseen, which is an undeniable fact about his past, into an unalterable condition of man's future as well.

There are, in fact, certain radical ambiguities in the powerful and plausible words that have been quoted. To begin with, it is at best only a play on words to say that there can be no generalizations about history because history consists of " only one great fact " which is "unique ". After all, the physical world as a whole may also be called, if we wish, " one great fact ". But this does not prevent us from talking about parts of that universe and from making generalizations about the parts. The same is clearly possible with history.

In the second place, the sort of position represented by Mr. Fisher's remarks fails to distinguish between two quite different kinds of generalization that may be made about history—or, in other words, between two different types of philosophy of history. One sort of generalization attempts to predict the over-all direction which history as a whole must follow. The second sort of generalization, in contrast, does not by itself enable us to foretell the inevitable direction of historical change. It merely correlates selected elements in the historical process so that, in conjunction with further statements about the other *independent* conditions that prevail, we are able to predict certain specific aspects of

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events in the future or to discover or explain certain features of what has happened in the past.

As an example of the first sort of philosophy of history, we might take Hegel. As an example of the second, we might take, say, Montesquieu's inquiries into the influence of geography on the manners and politics of nations. The difference between these two types of philosophy of history is very great. To put it very briefly, the first is a kind of astrology. As illustrated by Brooks Adams' attempt to take the second law of thermodynamics out of its proper context and to apply it to the ebb and flow of civilizations, it rests on the obviously false assumption that human affairs, like the astrologer's stars, fall into wholly isolated or closed systems whose course can be foretold because we know in advance that no countervailing influences can be brought to bear upon them. The second kind of philosophy of history, on the other hand, involves a kind of explanation which is similar to explanations in other fields, and which in fact no historian can avoid. The predictions it makes (or its "retrodictions" of past events) are hypothetical and provisional; and it in no way eliminates the contingent from the sphere of history, or commits one to the belief that whatever happens in history is inevitable. For it is forgotten with surprising frequency that scientific theories or generalizations do not as a rule allow us to predict, all by themselves, the actual or inevitable course of events. In general, theories have a predictive value only when they are joined with statements of the initial conditions that happen to prevail; and the character of these initial conditions is a contingent fact which cannot be guaranteed by the theory.

This confusion about two different kinds of generalization that can be made about history is closely tied up with still another confusion. This relates to the meaning of the term "accident" as it is employed in the writing of history. It is frequently said that an explanation of an event in terms of some law or regularity is incompatible with regarding that event as an accident, and that those who believe in the general proposition that laws or regularities obtain in history must also believe that there are no such things as historical accidents. But this involves a fundamental mistake. For, in fact, a belief in the reality of accidents is fully compatible

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with a belief that all events are causally determined in accordance with regular laws.

Consider the simple and classic example. A tile falls off a roof and kills a man who is passing underneath. We call this an accident, and if the man was a major historical figure, a historical accident of some importance. But this certainly does not mean that there was no cause for the tile's being dislodged, or for the man's being in just that place at just that time. It merely means that the man's position, while part of a causal sequence, is independent of the causal sequence involved in the fall of the tile, and conversely that the fall of the tile is independent of the causal sequence involved in the man's position. In similar terms, the history of English letters in the nineteenth century may have been fundamentally affected by the accident that Keats, Shelley and Byron all died young; again, the outcome of World War II may have been altered by the accident that leaders in atomic research like Einstein or Fermi were Jews or married to Jews. "Accident" unquestionably plays a large rôle in history. But it does not mean the absence of patterns or regularities, or the suspension of causal laws. It means the valuable or dis-valuable intersection of two or more independent causal sequences. An "accident" in history is an event whose causes lie outside the particular causal sequence under examination, but whose effects become part of that sequence. And in calling it an accident we mean only to say that we cannot explain it from the point of view of this sequence; we do not mean that it is inexplicable, or that it is not part of any causal sequence. In short, while views like Mr. Fisher's have a basis in the facts of history and of history-writing, they do not have the implications which he and many others seem to think. Here, as elsewhere, it is not philosophy which must be shunned, but only bad philosophy.

## IV

We come, finally, to an extreme view, and a classic one. It is the view that the attempt to impose a set of generalizations on history involves the fallacy of denying a basic fact about human history—namely, human freedom. For if we are going to explain what happens in human history by reference to general causal laws, then we are bound to say, it is held, that

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human actions are determined and therefore not free. This view has recently been stated with admirable vigor and ingenuity by Isaiah Berlin, in his book *Historical Inevitability*. Mr. Berlin writes:

> If the determinist hypothesis were true and adequately accounted for the actual world, there is a clear sense in which . . . the notion of human responsibility, as ordinarily understood, would no longer apply to any actual . . . states of affairs. I do not here wish to say that determinism is necessarily false, only that we neither speak nor think as if it could be true, and that it is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to conceive what our picture of the world would be if we seriously believed it. . . . If the belief in freedom—which rests on the assumption that human beings do occasionally choose, and that their choices are not wholly accounted for by the kind of causal explanations which are accepted in, say, physics or biology—if this is a necessary illusion, it is so deep and so pervasive that it is not felt as such. . . . To make a serious attempt to adapt our thoughts and words to the hypothesis of determinism is scarcely feasible, as things are now, and have been within recorded history. . . . For historians determinism is not a serious issue.[3]

This is, at once, a modest and a probing challenge to those who accept a determinist view. But I confess that I find in a pungent remark of Diderot's a view that seems to me closer to the truth. "It would be very singular", said Diderot, "if all the planets, all of nature, obeyed eternal laws, and yet there was a little animal five feet high, who in contempt of these laws could act as he pleased, solely according to his caprice." I shall try to indicate some of the considerations that lead me to prefer Diderot's view to Mr. Berlin's. They are, on the whole, classic considerations, but they continue to be persuasive.

I must begin by noting a distinction between two ways in which the term "determinism" is normally used. Historians habitually use it to stand for the belief that what happens in history is inevitable or fated, and cannot be affected by human actions. Philosophers, on the other hand, habitually use it to designate the position (briefly and roughly stated) that the same general logic of causal explanation which ap-

[3] Isaiah Berlin, *Historical Inevitability* (London, 1954), pp. 33-34.

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plies to the physical world also applies to human behavior, including the free choices that men make. In what follows, I am following the professional idiom of philosophers, and using the term " determinism " in the second sense. Whether or not this second position denies " freedom " or asserts " fate " is precisely the question at issue. It seems to be Mr. Berlin's view that it does deny " freedom ", at any rate in the sense in which that term is commonly and ordinarily used.

Now the crucial issue on which this question depends is, of course, what we mean by " freedom ". According to the determinist, a man may be said to have acted " freely " when he could have chosen to act differently, and when the only reason why he did not act differently is that he did not choose to do so. The determinist affirms, of course, that there were causes for the man's having made the choice he did, and that it is the business of disciplined historical and social inquiry to explain the individual's actions, whether free or coerced, by subsuming them under general laws. But he does not believe that this contradicts the idea that men sometimes act freely in the sense defined; and he asserts that this is the only meaningful definition of " freedom " that can be given. It is this to which Mr. Berlin objects. What sense does it make, he asks, to say that a man is free when he does as he chooses when, on the determinist hypothesis, he cannot help but choose as he does? If a man's choices are wholly the product of his character and situation, and if these are linked by an inexorable causal chain to his heredity and past experience, it makes very little sense to speak of any choice as " free ". In short, for Mr. Berlin, the idea of " freedom " entails the idea of behavior which is at least in part uncaused and undetermined. He writes:

> Freedom to act depends not on absence of only this or that set of fatal obstacles to action . . . while other obstacles, *e.g.*, psychological ones—character, habits, 'compulsive' motives, etc.—are present; it requires a situation in which no sum total of such causal factors wholly determines the result—in which there remains some area, however narrow, within which choice is not completely determined.[4]

Mr. Berlin's view is not an uncommon one, among either

[4] Berlin, *op. cit.*, p. 34 n.

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historians or philosophers. Nevertheless, it rests, it seems to me, on at least two mistakes.

The first mistake has to do with the idea that "freedom" entails a conception of uncaused behavior. Mr. Berlin lays great store in his argument on the meaning that is attached to "freedom" by ordinary language. But it is questionable that people using ordinary language mean to say that an action is uncaused when they say that it is free. Suppose, for example, that they make the quite plausible statement that the actions of the individuals on a picnic are "free" in comparison with the actions of the individuals who make up an infantry company on maneuvers. Do they mean to say that there are no causes for the actions of the individual picnickers? Or do they mean to say only that the individual picnickers have more control over the conditions that affect their behavior? Thus, if it begins to rain, the infantrymen have no choice but to get wet. The picnickers have the option of running for shelter. But this hardly means that there is no cause for the free act of running for shelter.

The second objection to Mr. Berlin's view is an even more serious one. It is that the conception of "freedom" which he seems to propose involves a self-contradiction. For if, according to Mr. Berlin, a man's actions are not free when they can be shown to be causally linked to his character and past history, then the only circumstances in which it would be proper to call a man "free" would be those in which he acted independently of his received character—independently, that is, of his habits, desires, perspective on life, and all the rest. But how could a man decide what he wants if, by definition, he has no wants? How, indeed, can we call a man's choice "free" unless we can show that it has something to do with what *he* wants to do? And how can we identify this "he", and show that what he does is what he wants to do, if we cannot take account of character, habits, persisting motives and interests, and the like? In short, the trouble with Mr. Berlin's thesis is that it completely dissolves the agent of action. It makes the agent of a "free" action a completely disembodied and unidentifiable entity.

Accordingly, it is anything but the case that a belief in determinism makes nonsense out of blaming, praising, or holding people responsible for what they do. On the contrary, it

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would be clearly unreasonable to hold an individual responsible for his actions if we did not think there was a causal connection between his character and his conduct. When we can show that there is no such connection—as, for example, when a man commits an act as a result of coercion—we do not normally hold him responsible. And this is not because his behavior here is "caused" while the free behavior for which we hold him responsible is "uncaused". It is because there is a difference in the *kind* of cause that is involved. In the case of behavior for which we do not hold a man responsible, the causes of his behavior, we believe, do not fall within the range of things we denominate as his "character", or they are not among the things over which he has any control; and as we gain new knowledge, say, from psychology, about the kinds of causes that affect conduct we change our minds about the kinds of behavior for which we should hold men responsible. Similarly, the determinist thesis does not imply that nothing that human beings do can affect what the future will be. For human actions are themselves causal agencies, so that the future is affected by what human beings do and wish to do. All sorts of things are avoidable, if we choose to avoid them; and if we do not choose to avoid them, this may be a mistake, but it is the sign and the price of our freedom.

The attempt to see in the procession of human affairs the play of regular patterns does not, therefore, deny either human freedom or the responsibility of human beings for what happens in history. The difficulty in taking a philosophic view of history, in viewing the movement of human affairs from the steady vantage point of embracing generalizations, is a serious one. It involves the emotional difficulty of standing back from matters in which one's urgent interests are involved, of being able to see beyond the emergencies or the fashions that prevail in one's own time and place, and, most of all, of finding some generalizations that are true; for such generalizations about human affairs are not easy to come by. But it is not the difficulty of dealing with a balky subject matter that absolutely resists generalizations.

## V

That there should be a long-standing quarrel between history and philosophy is understandable. In many respects, the two disciplines seem at opposite ends of the intellectual

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spectrum. Philosophy is abstract, history concrete. The aim of philosophers has been to produce generalizations of some sort; the primary aim of historians is to make true singular statements. Philosophers like to think that they move in a realm of logical necessity; historians concern themselves with what, "logically" or "illogically", just seems to have happened.

But if philosophy and history seem in certain respects to be at the opposite ends of the intellectual spectrum, there are also some striking similarities between them. The philosopher, it is notorious, is an intellectual busybody who ranges widely over the field of learning. But the same is largely true of the historian. To be sure, "history" as we normally use the term is restricted to the study of human affairs over the last six thousand years. But this record is also the province of other sciences such as economics, political theory, or sociology. Just as there is no particular kind of thing which falls within the domain of philosophy and within no other domain, so there is no particular kind of thing which seems to fall within the domain of history and within no other domain. Both philosophy and history, indeed, do not seem to be clean-cut subjects so much as distinctive *activities*. They are defined, not with respect to a special subject matter which it is their business alone to explore, but with respect to certain kinds of questions which they ask about any subject matter, or, at least, about any human subject matter. Philosophy is concerned distinctively with questions of meaning and value. History is interested in asking about the specific sequences in which events have taken place. To have a historical interest in events is to be interested in them as stages in a process, and to wish to trace the steps by which they unfold. It is an interest, briefly, in telling a story, but a story that is true.

In other words, philosophy and history are two departments of learning which owe their existence to certain more or less permanent and ubiquitous human interests or attitudes. Philosophy arises out of the efforts of men to integrate their beliefs and to organize their lives in the light of some coherent set of standards. History arises out of the efforts of men to keep what has happened in the past from being forgotten, and to remember what has happened in some

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sound and stable way. More than most other subjects, therefore, history and philosophy have an unprofessional side to them, an immediate link with the vital concerns of ordinary men who are neither professional philosophers nor professional historians. What makes them professional subjects is only that they have learned (more or less) how to ask these questions in skilled and disciplined ways.

This is why ordinary men seem to feel fewer inhibitions about criticizing the work of philosophers and historians than they do about criticizing the work of physicists or biologists or even psychologists. This is also why philosophy and history share a peculiar cultural position, a position unlike that of most other learned disciplines. The results of an inquiry in the natural sciences, for example, may or may not fit in with the going institutions of a society, but whether they do or not is incidental to the main business with which such inquiry is concerned. But professional philosophy and professional history are explicitly and directly commentaries on beliefs or on memories that are socially embedded, and they cannot help but be modes of social criticism or social rationalization. They cannot help but be caught in a kind of persisting tension with the society in which they go on; for, in asking a kind of question that ordinary men ask, but in a skilled and sophisticated way, they inevitably challenge or support the ordinary answers that men give to these questions.

It is because philosophy and history are so intimately linked with the social world outside them that we can find something in them—a certain low resistance to infection—that we cannot find so easily in other disciplines. Philosophers, of all men, have liked to think that they view things from some universal and timeless point of view. But the most casual survey of the history of philosophy, past and present, reveals unmistakably that there is such a thing as an American style in philosophy, a British style, a French style, a German style; and even more melancholy is the regular cycle of birth, death and resurrection through which intellectual styles in philosophy move. Although twenty-five hundred years separate them, there is a startling resemblance between Heraclitus and Bergson, Parmenides and F. H. Bradley, Protagoras and one or another of the Bertrand Russells.

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The only progress in philosophy, one is sometimes inclined to suspect, is not that it gets rid of old absurdities, but only that philosophers produce still newer absurdities to defend the old ones.

But before the historian begins to smile, the name of Mr. Toynbee may be enough to remind him that this apparently endless transmigration of souls also seems to take place in history. What exactly *is* the difference between Mr. Toynbee and Saint Augustine, or between James Harvey Robinson and Voltaire, or, indeed, between Mr. Churchill and Thucydides? In the eighteenth century there arose a "new history", conceived as an agency in social reform, which replaced a type of history whose mission it was to justify the ways of God to man; it was replaced in turn by a type of history that returned to this older mission, though it may have substituted the Absolute or the Class Struggle for God; this was replaced again by a new "new history"; and now the cycle seems to have come full circle again, the "new history" is in the doldrums, and we are being reminded once more that history has a structure which the human mind either cannot comprehend or cannot control. Philosophers and historians are so accustomed to this sort of thing, indeed, that one of their most frequent mistakes is to imagine that it is a general feature of intellectual history. But it is not. Physical science, for example, successfully got rid of the notion of final causes in the sixteenth century; and it is most unlikely that it will return to this notion. Philosophers and historians who say that this is likely to happen are being misled by the variability of fashions in their own disciplines, and are imputing qualities to other disciplines which simply do not apply to them.

The recent interest in philosophical circles in so-called "scientific philosophy"—in developing specialized techniques, in making argument more rigorous, in isolating problems and treating them one by one—has been an effort to bring to philosophy some of the independence from changing social circumstances that other disciplines enjoy. It seems likely that if history is to be more than a weather vane responding to every shift in the cultural winds—if it is to perform its function of giving men a steady, enduring and true memory of their past—it will need to yield happily and will-

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ingly to the philosophic impulse toward generalizations. To speak more specifically, it will need to turn deliberately to the conscious use of warranted psychological and sociological generalizations. Unhappily, there are not at the moment many of these animals around. The study of human affairs has not yet developed an independent theoretical structure which systematically turns out such ideas. But historians will not help the emergence of such theories by generalizations about the danger of generalizations. The ideal of a philosophical history—a history illuminated by a view of unchanging and pervasive features of the human situation—is not merely an elevating one. It provides, I think, a sound prescription for the health of history.

## VI

I cannot end without adding one final point. The great historians have not merely "explained" events. They have made us *see* them: Herodotus makes us see Xerxes whipping the Hellespont in rage; Gibbon brings directly before us the terrible assurance of Attila the Hun, sitting on a wooden chair in a tent in the field, and telling the Roman ambassadors that no city in the whole Roman Empire could hope to exist "if it is our pleasure that it should be erased from the earth." And Thucydides makes us the witnesses of the rout of the Athenian armies in Sicily:

> The Athenians pushed forward towards the River Assinarus, partly under the pressure of converging attacks from a powerful cavalry supported by other arms . . . and partly under the stress of exhaustion and the stimulus of thirst. When they reached the banks they threw themselves in, and all discipline was at an end. Each individual soldier was determined to be the first to cross, and the attacks of the enemy were already making it difficult to cross at all. Forced, as they were, to proceed in a huddled mass, they stumbled over and trampled upon one another, and some of them were killed instantaneously by the points of their weapons, while others were tangled in the baggage and carried away by the stream. The opposite bank of the river, which was precipitous, was lined by the Syracusans, who showered missiles from above upon the Athenians, most of whom were drinking greedily and jostling one another in the hollow bottom of the river. The Peloponnesians came down to

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> close quarters and began a butchery, especially of those in the river. In an instant the water had been fouled, but nevertheless the majority continued to drink it, mudded and blood-stained as it was, and even fought to reach it.

Then, after telling us what happens to the Athenian leaders, Nicias and Demosthenes, and about the sufferings of the prisoners of war, Thucydides concludes:

> This tragedy, which was the most colossal that occurred in the late war (and, in my opinion, in all recorded Hellenic history), conferred unparalleled glory upon the conquerors and inflicted unparalleled disaster upon the victims. They were utterly defeated in every way; there was nothing on the small scale in any of their sufferings; fleet, army and everything else was annihilated in the literal sense of the word, and few returned to see their homes out of the many who had left them.

This conclusion does more than simply summarize the events Thucydides has chronicled. The last words, with their muted reference to homes, takes the events back where they began, and, without editorializing, tells us the meaning of what has happened, the difference that the rout of the Athenians has made to those who participated in the events. It tells us what these events meant in the lives of those who went through them, and from the point of view of their own concerns.

The temptation, and the achievement, of the philosophic historian is to see events in the large, to see the great themes, the embracing patterns of behavior, the ultimate and long-range values that were at stake. Thucydides saw all these—the class struggles, the slim economic foundation on which Athenian imperialism was based, the differences in ultimate values between Athens and Sparta, and, most of all, the slow, deadly and seemingly deliberate stupidity with which the Greek city-states were allowing their local rivalries to destroy a majestic civilization. He saw not only the great issues but smaller issues as well. Most of the time history goes on, as Hegel observed and Marx after him, behind men's backs. They do not see the wheels that are turning things, or the long-range values involved. But history does not go on only behind men's backs; it goes on under their skins, and the historian who can see only the embracing patterns of events may

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in the end never judge events where ultimately they must be judged—in the difference they make to the private and personal lives of those caught up in them. He may fail to remember the cost of history, or for how many human beings the ultimate meaning of great events has been, quite simply, that they never returned home. There is serenity and illumination in looking at history philosophically; but in any great historian's work there will also be a tension, a sense of pathos or irony, as he moves to the level on which he can see events through the eyes of those who took part in them. Philosophical history need not be callous or inhuman; but if it is not to be, it needs something that only the historian can bring it, and something philosophy cannot by itself give him —compassion, the story teller's eye, and the conviction that if we do not ever measure the meaning of events in terms of the actual, private, short-term values men have, then in the end nothing in history has any meaning at all.

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# THE SOVIET-JAPANESE PEACE DECLARATION

ON October 19, 1956 the governments of Japan and the Soviet Union signed a historic declaration. After six days of fighting, ten years of hostility, and two years of intermittent negotiations, the Soviet Union was at last willing to end the state of war and resume normal diplomatic relations with its former enemy; and Japan found the terms acceptable. The Soviet Union agreed to support Japan's entry into the United Nations, return many of Japan's nationals who had been detained as "war criminals" since 1945, abandon its reparations claims, and negotiate agreements on trade, fishery, and the northern boundary, with the promise to return the Shikotan and Habomai Islands when the final treaty was signed.[1]

Although this event was almost completely ignored by the American press and—at least in public—by American officials, it was widely heralded in Japan. With an extraordinary degree of unanimity every major political party praised it. The *Asahi* called it "the end of the post-war period in Japan." Premier Hatoyama announced that "a new era" had begun.

As far as the Peace Declaration goes, its provisions are certainly humane and may be expected to improve Japan's international position and possibly help to stabilize its economy. On the other hand, the remaining problems between the two countries, particularly those concerning trade, fishery, territory and "detainees", are thorny indeed. What is then the real significance of the Peace Declaration? Although few official sources are available, public information suggests that its importance is to be found in three changes which it reflects: (1) a change in the attitude of the USSR toward Japan, (2) a change in the forces controlling Japan's foreign policy, and (3) a change in Japan's relations with the United States and the rest of the world.

[1] Text in English translation, reported in Embassy of Japan, *Japan Report*, II, no. 20 (S) (October 31, 1956).

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## I. *The Change in Soviet Attitude*

To appreciate the extent to which Soviet policy toward Japan has changed, indeed reversed itself, during the past five years, one needs to recall the demands which Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. A. Gromyko, made on Japan at the San Francisco peace conference in 1951.[2] At the second plenary session on September 5, Gromyko presented thirteen amendments which he said were needed before the draft treaty would be acceptable. These amendments included demands that all territories formerly belonging to China should be handed over to the Communist government in Peking and all northern territories under Soviet occupation should be handed over to the Soviet Union, that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from Japan, that Japan should be forbidden to rearm beyond certain specified limits, that all straits providing entrance into the Japan Sea should be demilitarized on the Japanese coast and closed to the warships of all nations except those of the bordering states, and that restrictions should not be permitted on Japan's peacetime trade. Certain democratic safeguards were to be insisted upon, reparations were to be made the subject of a separate conference, and Communist China's approval was to be required before the treaty became effective. Gromyko's "revision plan" was clearly designed as a weapon in the Korean War and in the "cold war", its purpose being to neutralize Japan, weaken the free world, and strengthen the Soviet bloc.

Unable to win concessions from the Americans and the British, the Russians seem to have decided to wait until they could extract them from so-called "healthy elements" in Japan, whom they felt sure would rise to power as a result of the "economic contradictions" inherent in the San Francisco settlement. Even after the death of Stalin and the assumption of power by the Malenkov-Beria-Molotov triumvirate in March 1953, they continued their policy of hostile waiting.

Unfortunately for the Soviet plan, however, the so-called "healthy elements" were slow to develop. In fact, in the

[2] U. S. Department of State, *Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan: Record of Proceedings* (Washington, 1951), pp. 102-122.

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years following the San Francisco conference the Japanese conservatives consolidated their hold on the government and pursued a policy of gradual rearmament in alliance with the United States. This collapse of the hopes of the Soviet leaders led them in the summer of 1954 to make a fundamental revision in their policy: they would seek to restore relations with Japan as soon as possible. On September 11, 1954, Molotov used the occasion of a letter from a Japanese newspaper editor to announce that the Soviet Union was now "ready to normalize relations with Japan, provided that Japan shows the same readiness."[3] On October 12, 1954, a second invitation was issued in a joint communiqué with Communist China. And when Shigemitsu indicated on December 11 Japan's willingness to negotiate,[4] Molotov reassured him on December 17 that the Soviet Union too was indeed "ready".[5]

How great a reversal the Soviet leaders were prepared to make in their policy was not immediately evident. The draft peace treaty which Malik first presented when talks got under way in London in June 1955 is reported to have been "substantially the same" as the demands made by Gromyko in 1951.[6] It was not until these were refused by Matsumoto and counterdemands made by Japan that Malik offered the "new plan" on which the Soviets were really prepared to negotiate.[7] In brief, Malik is reported to have said, the Soviet Union was now prepared to drop its demands for the

[3] Molotov's reply to Suzuki Mitsuru, editor of the *Chūbu Nippon Shimbun* of Nagoya, September 11, 1954; in *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, September 13, 1954, p. 1.

[4] Embassy of Japan, *Japan Information*, Special issue No. 2 (December 13, 1954).

[5] *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, December 17, 1954, p. 3.

[6] Foreign Minister Shigemitsu's speech to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Diet (*Christian Science Monitor*, June 16, 1955) and to the Diet, reported in *Yomiuri*, June 18, 1956. Matsumoto told a reporter the same thing in April. *Asahi*, April 1, 1956. Reports of details of the Soviet proposal can be found also in *Mainichi*, September 15, 1955; and in *Yomiuri*, August 30 and September 14, 1955, and January 26, 1956. A summary of the reported items was presented by Robert Trumbull in *New York Times*, June 17, 1955; and in *Japan Quarterly* (October-December 1955), pp. 405-406.

[7] Interview with Matsumoto, *Asahi*, April 1, 1956; and *Jitsugyōno Nippon*, June 15, 1956.

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neutralization of Japan, the closing of the straits, the limitation on Japan's right to enter alliances—in short, it was now willing to acknowledge Japan's right to rearm and ally herself with the free world as provided in the San Francisco Treaty—and it was willing to give back to Japan the islands Japan attempted to reserve for herself at San Francisco, Shikotan and the Habomais, in exchange for which it demanded that Japan recognize the Soviet Union's sovereignty over those northern territories which Japan had given up at San Francisco, southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. A more complete reversal of policy is difficult to imagine.

On the other hand, three years had passed since San Francisco and the Japanese government and people were no longer willing to walk that humble road again; and when the talks were broken off, the Soviet leaders seem to have cast about for an alternative. They were not willing in any event to give up the territories Japan wanted, but they were convinced that they could not effectively influence the Japanese until relations were restored. This, of course, was precisely the situation they had faced with West Germany; the solution reached there in September 1955 naturally recommended itself to break the deadlock with Japan. Although the evidence is thin, it appears that when talks were resumed in January 1956, the possibility of following the "Adenauer formula", that is, of restoring diplomatic relations before the differences between the two countries were resolved, was explored.[8] That too represented a great departure from the Gromyko "revision plan" of 1951 and it was as far as the Soviet government was prepared to go.

It was in recognition of this fact that the Japanese premier, anxious to restore relations and anxious not to lose the ground already won, finally conceded to the unique formulation of the Peace Declaration on October 19, 1956. A careful examination of that document shows that it is essentially a combination of the "Adenauer formula" and the Malik "exchange plan". It follows the "Adenauer formula" in leaving several difficult issues for later negotia-

8 The unofficial Soviet representative in Tokyo, A. I. Domnitsky, is reported to have suggested the "Adenauer formula" to President Onishi of the Hokuyō Fishery Company. *Yomiuri,* January 29, 1956; and *Keizai Orai,* April 1956. Kōno was reported to be considering the "Adenauer formula" when he returned from the fishery negotiations in Moscow in May 1956. *Yomiuri,* May 20, 1956.

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tion; and, while it says nothing about south Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, it follows the "exchange plan" in providing for the eventual return of Shikotan and the Habomai Islands to Japan and in excluding any Soviet demand for a reversal of Japan's military and diplomatic policies.

Thus, in the last round of negotiations, Soviet policies essentially prevailed, but this should not obscure the more significant fact that these very policies represent a fundamental reversal in the attitude of the Soviet Union toward Japan. In a very real sense, the Soviet leaders returned to San Francisco.

## II. *The Change in Japanese Politics*

The change in Soviet policy alone, of course, cannot explain the Peace Declaration. It was the product also of a basic change in the forces controlling Japan's foreign policy. There were two shifts in Japan's attitude toward the Soviet Union which made the Declaration possible: the first was the decision taken in December 1954 to open negotiations; the second was the decision taken in October 1956 to make major concessions. Both of these decisions were taken under the influence of newly organized special interest groups in the public at large and of newly powerful political factions within the conservative political parties.

Among the special interest groups which played a prominent part in the Soviet-Japanese *rapprochement* were Communist-front organizations, like the Japan-Russia Friendship Association; humanitarian societies, like the Japan Red Cross and the National Council of Organizations of Detainees' Families; and certain large trading and shipbuilding corporations, among them the Eiwa Shōji, a successor to the former Mitsubishi Shōji, the Sōgō Bōeki and Tōhō Bussan, both successors to the former Mitsui Bussan, and Ōkura Shōji, the Shinten Jitsugyō, the Hakodate Shipyard, and the Hitachi Shipbuilding and Engineering Companies.[9] Most Japanese business men seem to have been inclined to "go slow" with any program which might threaten their ties with the free world; but the minority who favored concessions to Russia in order to develop the trade with Russia

[9] The first five of these corporations, all trading companies, negotiated barter contracts with the Soviet Union during the summer of 1954. *Sunday Mainichi*, February 20, 1955.

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organized effectively. On September 22, 1954, they formed the Japan International Trade Promotion Society, with such politically and economically powerful leaders as Murata Shōzō and Ishibashi Tanzan.[10] Other leaders worked through the Japan-USSR Trade Promotion Council. In addition, the fishery men were extremely active, particularly Hiratsuka Tsunejirō, president of the Dai Nippon Fishery Association, Onishi Rensaku, president of the Hokuyō Fishery Company, and Fukunaga Kazuomi, former chairman of the fishery committee in the House of Representatives.

Finally, all of these groups saw the value of coördinating their efforts. The result was the establishment of the National Conference for the Restoration of Relations with Communist China and the Soviet Union. On February 11, 1955, this conference secured for its presidency one of the patriarchs of Japanese business and politics, Kuhara Fusanosuke.[11]

There can be no doubt that these organizations were in part teased into being by the machinations of Soviet policy. On the other hand, the concerns these groups felt were real concerns; and one cannot help being impressed by the fact that in the main these people acted in a thoroughly responsible, democratic fashion. They saw their own interests and they organized to advance them, working partly through mass media, partly through various other nation-wide organizations, and partly through their friends and representatives in the government itself.

10 Other prominent leaders included Kitamura Tokutarō, Takasaki Tatsunosuke, Mukai Tadaharu, Fujiyama Aiichirō, and Yamamoto Kumaichi.

11 The promoters of the Conference included Kazami Akira, Hiratsuka Tsunejirō, Kitamura Tokutarō (president of the Shinwa Bank, former cabinet minister and powerful leader in the Minshūtō and Kaishintō parties), Murata Shōzō, Kanō Hisaakira (prominent international financier and president of the Hakodate Dock Company), Itō Kesaichi (chief secretary of the Japan-Soviet Trade Promotion Council), Kita Reikichi (managing editor of the *Nihon Shimbun* and one of the original organizers of the Jiyūtō), Yamamoto Kumaichi (former Foreign Ministry official, president of the Yamamoto Seisakujo Company, and active in the Japan International Trade Promotion Council), Hiranō Yoshitarō (managing director of the Nagoya Shipbuilding Company), and Majima Kan (pediatrician, one of the vice presidents of the Japan-Russia Friendship Association) as its secretary-general. Demaree Bess seems to have misunderstood the nature of this organization when he called it a "Communist front". Bess, "The New Red Peril in Japan", *Saturday Evening Post*, July 14, 1956, p. 71.

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The arguments of these and other groups and general considerations of foreign policy had earlier led the two wings of the split Socialist party to advocate a readjustment of relations with the Soviet Union; but it was the adoption of this attitude by the conservative politician, Hatoyama Ichiro, which brought action. Whether in consideration of the merits of the problem, the attractiveness of the issue to the voters, the support of the special interest groups, or perhaps all three, he came to agree that diplomatic relations should be restored. When he assumed leadership of the Nihon Minshūtō in November 1954, he made it one of the planks in his program; and when he succeeded in displacing Yoshido as premier in December of the same year, he immediately declared his readiness to accept the Soviet Union's invitation. Hatoyama's hope, and the hope of his "main stream" supporters, seems to have been to negotiate a "quick treaty";[12] but, even after the election of February 1955, the Minshūtō continued to be in a minority position in the Diet. Moreover, the position of the "main stream" faction within the party was too weak for it to work its will. It faced strong opposition from a "go slow" coalition, with which the foreign minister, Shigemitsu Mamoru, was closely identified. This "go slow" coalition within the Minshūtō had powerful allies for its Russian policy in senior circles in the Foreign Ministry, and the dominant cliques of the Jiyūtō and Right-wing Socialists. Hatoyama succeeded in opening the negotiations, but until just before the very end the "go slow" coalition controlled them. The result was the uncompromising counterdraft which Matsumoto presented in London in August 1955, and the refusal of the Japanese government for nearly a year and a half to consider serious compromises.[13]

In the course of the negotiations Hatoyama's position became even more precarious. His own illness made it difficult for him to lead; but, in addition, he was plagued with

[12] There are many evidences of this. See, for example, Gordon Walker's report in the *Christian Science Monitor*, March 21, 1956; and Hatoyama's proposal at a news conference that territorial questions be left for study after the signing of a treaty. *New York Times*, June 6, 1956.

[13] Reports of the terms of the Japanese counterdraft were published in various newspapers; for one convenient statement see the summary in *Japan Quarterly*, October-December 1955, pp. 405-406.

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even more opponents within his party following the merger of the Jiyūtō with the Minshūtō in November 1955,[14] and suffered a serious loss of support when Miki Bukichi died in July 1956. By the fall of 1956 Hatoyama's early resignation seemed certain.

In this situation his closest advisers, including especially the Agriculture and Forestry Minister, Mr. Kōno, seem to have urged him to take personal control of the negotiations with the Soviet Union and at all costs bring them to a conclusion. They hoped that this honoring of his public pledge would enable Hatoyama to retire honorably and to turn over the reins of the party to them. Other factions within the party might have been expected to oppose such a mission. At first they did, but finally, eager for Hatoyama's retirement and confident they could win control in the intra-party struggle to follow, many of them reversed their stand and urged Hatoyama to go. This Hatoyama did in October 1956. He went to Moscow, made the best settlement he could, and came home to resign. Clearly the rise of the Hatoyama faction to power, its response to certain special interest groups, and its handling of the problems of factional politics were major factors in the changes in the attitude of the Japanese government which made the Peace Declaration possible.

### III. *The Change in Japan's International Position*

Lastly, while available information does not permit a final estimate of the rôle played by the United States in these negotiations, it seems reasonable to assume that it exerted its influence in at least two ways. First of all, indirectly, its known hostility to the Soviet Union strongly inclined many Japanese people and political leaders to oppose a conciliatory settlement lest it weaken the trade and military support which Japan needed from the United States. Secondly, during the negotiations, American officials are reported on several occasions to have tried to discourage the Japanese from

[14] See, for example, the decision of the policy subcommittee of the Jiyūtō and Minshūtō on November 8, 1955, when the combined conservative party was being organized. *Mainichi,* November 9, 1955. The "go slow" policy was reaffirmed at the meeting of the Jiyū-Minshūtō's Foreign Affairs Research Committee with a group of elder ex-diplomats and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu on May 24, 1956. *Asahi,* May 25, 1956.

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making any compromise, particularly on territorial questions.

During the first round of talks in the summer of 1955 and repeatedly thereafter, American spokesmen are said to have advised the Japanese that while the fate of the northern territories was not finally settled at San Francisco, the United States would not favor calling an international conference to settle the question as Japan wished nor did it recognize that Japan had any right to make a further settlement herself.[15] In October 1955, after the first round of talks had been broken off, the United States is reported to have responded to another Japanese inquiry to say that it felt that sovereignty over the southern Kuriles could best be settled by referring the question to the International Court of Justice.[16] In May 1956, when Kōno returned from his fishery negotiations in Moscow talking of the "Adenauer formula", Dulles is said to have cautioned him in Washington that this would make settlement of the territorial problem more difficult.[17] In late August 1956, when even Shigemitsu began to talk of compromise, Secretary Dulles is reported to have gone so far, either directly or by implication, as to have pointed out to him that under Article 26 of the San Francisco Treaty, if Japan were to cede the northern territories to the Soviet Union, the United States would be free to revise its attitude toward the southern islands it was occupying.[18] Then apparently worried by the anti-Americanism these views aroused in Japan, the State Department issued on September 7, 1956, an *aide-mémoire* in which it supported Japan's rights to the southern Kuriles as well as to the Shikotan and Habomai Islands, but warned that Japan had no right to

15 *Nihon Keizai*, September 5, 1955; Shigemitsu later referred to these as the views of the United States in a report to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives (*Mainichi*, December 16, 1955); and Marguerite Higgins referred to the international conference idea as still current, in *Herald Tribune*, August 31, 1956.

16 London *Times*, August 27, 1956. This view, without any date for its expression, was reported also in the *Tokyo Times*, February 15, 1956.

17 *Yomiuri*, May 20, 1956.

18 Exactly what Secretary Dulles did or did not say has been the subject of dispute, but the interpretation here is in accord with that of most reporters; for example, *New York Times*, August 25 and 30, 1956; and London *Times*, August 27, 1956.

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cede any of the disputed territories to the Soviet Union.[19] It would seem that, while cautious about expressing its views lest anti-American elements in Japan charge it with interference, the United States sought to delay a *rapprochement* between Japan and the Soviet Union by discouraging Japan from acceding to any of the major proposals made by the Soviet Union for solving the territorial issue; and, by so doing, it gave strong international backing to the "go slow" factions in Japan. Hatoyama's decision to sign the Declaration was, then, also a decision to revolt from America's leadership.

This assertion of independence presages much for the future. Japan is going to be less tolerant of restrictions on her trade with the Western Powers. She is undoubtedly going to raise awkward issues with the United States, not only over trade, but also over Okinawa, American troops, assistance for Japanese rearmament, China policy and others. She is going to seek a new relationship with the Communist bloc and the neutrals, especially an expanded trade and eventually diplomatic relations with Communist China. She will no doubt take an increasingly dynamic part in world affairs as she is already doing in pressing her plea for banning atomic bomb tests.

On the other hand, unless these problems are badly boggled by the free world, there is no real reason to fear that Japan is heading into a period of pro-Communist or even neutralist policy. The conservative Jiyū-Minshūtō is too strongly entrenched for that and it is too deeply committed to free-world ties. Moreover, serious problems remain to be negotiated with the Soviet Union, and most competent observers agree that the dreams of a vastly expanded trade with the Soviet Union are illusory. It seems more likely that in the immediate future the relations between Japan and the Soviet Union will become again what they were before the war, the wary relations of uneasy neighbors, and that Japan's course in this new era which has begun will be characterized by greater independence, but continued coöperation with the free nations of the world.

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19 U. S. Department of State, press release, September 7, 1956.

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# THE SOCIAL COST OF CORPORATE MONOPOLY PROFITS

## I

PROBABLY no one subject has interested economists as much as the extent and effect of monopolistic influences on the economy. I believe that, as compared with competition, monopoly is feared for three main reasons: (1) profits may be excessive (reflecting higher prices and restricted output); (2) costs may be higher; and (3) technological progress may be slower. Because so much discussion of the matter gets bogged down in defining and measuring monopoly, I am not certain how students of the subject would weigh the relative importance of these three evils. But from the small scope of the professional literature devoted to the effect of monopoly on costs or technological progress—and also from the small extent of the literature dealing with monopoly outside the corporate area—it is my impression that the main concern has been with excessive corporate profits. It is the purpose of this note to suggest that worry on this score is largely unnecessary—that, in fact, if it were possible to eliminate the effect of monopolistic influences on corporate profits and prices by saying "abracadabra", consumers would hardly notice the over-all difference.

Excessive corporate profits, and the higher prices and lower output that make them possible, have two effects: they cause "maldistribution" of income—more for the monopolists and less for everyone else—and "misallocation" of resources. Resources (land, labor and capital) are "misallocated" because less resources are utilized in monopolized areas of the economy and more in competitive areas in comparison with the pattern of resource use that would emerge if competition prevailed and resources were distributed so as to maximize consumer satisfaction. The harm done by misallocation of resources is separate from, and in addition to, that which results from the maldistribution of income. If, for example, all industries were *uniformly* monopolistic, re-



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sources would not be misallocated but income would still be maldistributed. Vice versa, even if appropriate taxation of corporate income were to recapture all corporate monopoly profits and so eliminate income maldistribution, the harm done by misallocation of resources would nonetheless remain. But Arnold C. Harberger has examined the welfare loss involved in resource misallocation and concluded that it is quite small.[1] Our main task, therefore, will be to consider the harm caused by the maldistribution of income that results from excessive corporate profits. Then we shall summarize Harberger's discussion of the loss involved in resource misallocation, and reach the final conclusion that, even when both are added together, the total remains insignificant.

The main point to be made regarding maldistribution of income follows directly from the well-known fact that most corporate profits are either taken by corporate income taxes or retained in the business. In recent years such profits have amounted to about 12 per cent of the national income, with roughly half going to pay taxes, one quarter retained in the business, and one quarter paid out as dividends. There has, of course, been an extensive debate regarding the propriety of including corporate taxes in the national income (as is done by the Department of Commerce). To this debate I have no desire to add. Instead I propose to point out that, under present arrangements, consumers who do not own stock would not be much better off if corporate profits as a whole were eliminated and would therefore be even less benefited if monopolistic influences alone were removed. The argument proceeds in three steps: we shall first examine the *direct* effects likely to result if corporate prices were sufficiently reduced to eliminate corporate profits; next we shall consider possible *indirect* effects; and finally we shall speculate on the extent to which corporate profits are the result of monopolistic influences.

## II

Suppose corporate prices are lowered sufficiently to eliminate profits entirely. If we wish savings and government

[1] "Monopoly and Resource Allocation", *Proceedings of the American Economic Association*, May 1954.

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revenue to be maintained, then the consumption of non-owning consumers can *directly* increase only by the same amount that consumption out of corporate profits is reduced. For, obviously, if corporations do not pay taxes or save, then the taxes paid and the savings done by the rest of the economy must increase correspondingly. Such consumption as does result from corporate profits comes out of dividend payments, which amount to about 3 per cent of national income. But not all dividend payments are consumed. Although stock ownership is probably becoming more widespread, it remains highly concentrated, with about half of dividend payments going to the top 1 per cent of income recipients. Obviously the marginal rates of taxation and saving by those receiving dividends are high. There is little information on the matter, but I would be surprised if more than two thirds of such payments are spent on consumption. To the extent that this is correct, the direct benefit to non-owning consumers from the elimination of corporate profits would be in the order of 2 per cent of the national income—or rather less than 3 per cent of consumption.[2]

This estimate also seems to me to be a measure of the direct and immediate gain to those not owning common stock that would result from an uncompensated expropriation by the government of all owners of corporations.[3] We should not, however, think that the present situation—where the recipients of 12 per cent of the national income account for rather less than 3 per cent of national consumption—is in any sense inevitable. In a country such as Mexico, for example, profits have recently been estimated to have reached 45 per cent of the national income at a time when saving from all sources *and* the share of government *together* accounted for only 17 per cent of the gross national product.[4]

2 The relative *importance* of profits is perhaps best measured with reference to the private economy (national income less government), but *benefit* seems appropriately compared with national income.

3 The estimate may also throw light on why the mere fact of nationalization has solved so few problems abroad.

4 Adolph Sturmthal, "Economic Development, Income Distribution, and Capital Formation in Mexico", *Journal of Political Economy*, June 1955, pp. 194 and 196.

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In commerce, which accounts for 25 per cent of Mexican real domestic output, it is estimated that "No less than 80 per cent of income payments . . . go to capital." [5] Our own situation toward the end of the last century, though hardly as extreme, was very different from that which prevails today; the Sixteenth Amendment *has* made a difference.

But what of possible *indirect* benefits from the elimination of corporate profits? Let us start with taxes. No one can deny the possibility that the revenue which now flows to the government via higher prices and corporate taxes might be raised in a "better" fashion. But I doubt if it would be easy to get agreement on how this should be done in view of the fact that present tax-incidence theory is in more than a little difficulty. For excise taxes are currently being rehabilitated on the ground that income taxes distort the choice between work and leisure and the contention is put forth that part at least of corporate profit taxes are in reality passed along to be "borne" by consumers. Certainly our tax system is not perfect, but I do not see any a priori reason for believing that it would be much improved by the elimination of corporate taxation, given the concentration of corporate ownership and the probability that some at least of the "burden" remains on corporate owners.[6]

What of saving? The issue is topical in that liberals have answered the plea of business men that they need higher prices to finance expansion by asking why savings provided by the general public through the higher prices should redound to the exclusive benefit of corporate owners. Would not the general public benefit in the long run if prices were reduced sufficiently to eliminate the income retained by corporations even if the public were made to save an equivalent amount so that there was no initial increase in consumption? For in the long run the benefits of the saving would then be received by the general public rather than accrue solely to corporate owners. In essence this is the question, removed to the future, of why corporate owners are entitled to consume even 2 per cent of income—in other words, why we should have private ownership of capital. In a world where

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 198.

[6] Note that Russia continues to utilize her trusts as tax collectors—though chief reliance is on the turnover tax rather than the income tax.

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socialism is spreading and ownership of capital is perhaps more frequently the result of inheritance than abstinence, I believe that this is a question which deserves more explicit attention than it frequently receives. Note that a discussion of "marginal productivity" does not help, both because its meaning is not clear when prices are administered and income substantially redistributed by tax policy and, more basically, because a man is entitled to the marginal product of the capital he controls only under social arrangements which themselves have to be justified. My own answer, unargued here, is simply that 2 per cent of income is a cheap price to pay for the benefits flowing from private allocation of capital. So far as the immediate question of possible indirect benefits resulting from saving being done by other than corporate owners is concerned, it seems sufficient to contend that, if 2 per cent is acceptable compensation for the services currently rendered by corporate owners, then there appears to be no objection to their obtaining ownership of corporate saving provided that the consumption that they receive in return for their services in the future remains at an acceptable level.[7]

Let us turn to the remaining question of the quantitative importance of monopolistic influences on corporate profits. As we are interested in "abnormal" profits in excess of the "normal" profits which prevail in competitive industry, one approach which suggests itself is to allow, let us say, a 5 per cent return on net worth after taxes as an approximation of a "normal" return and consider the excess as "abnormal". But American corporations are currently earning after taxes only about 5 per cent on their net worth, so that this approach does not advance the matter. Further, when we look at actual statistics, we have to allow for more than "normal" profits in the sense of those which would prevail in a competitive industry *in the long run*. For the profits reported in any year include those resulting from innovation, changes in demand, and other short-run influences.

[7] There is no automatic reason why an acceptable level should prevail. The structure of claims arising from private corporate ownership permits consumption to behave quite differently from income, so that holding consumption to appropriate levels may not be easy. This British socialists have found out, leading to demands for an expenditure tax in place of the income tax. *Vide* Nicholas Kaldor, *An Expenditure Tax* (London, 1955).

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All in all I find it hard to believe that normal long-run profits and short-run profits resulting from influences other than monopoly do not between them account for at least two thirds of reported corporate profits.[8] But even if the figure is no more than half—so that half of all profits result from monopolistic influences—it follows that the direct benefit to non-owning consumers from saying abracadabra would amount to no more than 1 per cent of income—provided of course that our previous estimate is accepted that the direct benefit of non-owning consumers from the complete elimination of corporate profits would not be more than 2 per cent. As I am not inclined to put much weight on the possible indirect benefits, I am driven to conclude that 1 per cent is at most all that is involved.

Furthermore, it can be argued that our approach greatly overestimates the *welfare loss* that results from improper distribution. For we have concentrated entirely on the benefit that would accrue to those not owning corporations from the elimination of monopoly profits without making any allowance for the harm suffered by those who would lose income as a result of the elimination of such profits. Given the difficulty of making interpersonal comparisons of utility, there is no easy way of measuring the net social loss involved. In fact, there may be those who would argue that corporate owners are such superior "pleasure machines" that monopolies cause a net social gain rather than a loss. But whatever may be the capacity of monopolists for innocent enjoyment, it remains true that, provided monopolists have any such capacity whatsoever, there must be deducted from the benefit accruing to non-owning consumers, if they were to receive an additional 1 per cent of the national income, whatever loss we agree to attribute to the offsetting reduction in the income of monopolists. Thus saying abracadabra would appear to involve a welfare gain of significantly less than 1 per cent. How much less does not seem very important; *de minimis non curat lex.*

[8] Harberger concluded that "it is quite implausible that more than a third of our manufacturing profits should be monopoly profits; that is, profits which are above and beyond the normal return to capital and are obtained by exercise of monopoly power" (*op. cit.*, pp. 84-85). As manufacturing is probably more monopolistic than the rest of the economy, it would appear that in Harberger's judgment monopolistic influences would account for less than a third of total corporate profits.

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## III

What of the harm done by misallocation of resources? After examining the matter in detail Harberger reached the conclusion "that monopoly misallocations [in manufacturing industry] entail a welfare loss of no more than a thirteenth of a per cent of the national income." [9] His approach was to measure monopoly misallocations by calculating divergences from average profits in manufacturing industry, which are treated as providing the level to which profits (and hence resource allocation) should conform. The analysis leads to the conclusion that, even in the case of the industry (toilet preparations) with the highest rate of return, achievement of average profits would require an increase in output of less than 20 per cent.[10] In no other case was an expansion of more than 11 per cent required, while the largest restriction was a little over 7 per cent, with the average working out at 4 per cent.[11] But it seems reasonable to assume that close to the margin it cannot make much difference to consumers if they consume a little more cabbage and a little less spinach, so that the welfare loss involved in adjustments of this size cannot be large when viewed against manufacturing production as a whole. Harberger concentrated on manufacturing industry partly because information on manufacturing profits was readily available, but also because manufacturing is, in all probability, more monopolistic than the rest of the economy. But even if we were to assume that the rest of the economy is as monopolistic as manufacturing industry, the total welfare loss would still be less than 1/3 of 1 per cent of the national income.

Note again that Harberger estimates that 4 per cent of resources would have to be transferred to eliminate misallocation in manufacturing industry. The reason why the resulting welfare loss is so small is that, on plausible assumptions, it cannot make much difference to their welfare if people consume, to repeat the example, a little more cab-

[9] *Op. cit.*, p. 85.

[10] George J. Stigler, "The Statistics of Monopoly and Merger", *Journal of Political Economy*, February 1956, p. 34.

[11] Harberger, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-81.

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bage and a little less spinach. In the case of income maldistribution, on the other hand, the assumption that a little more income for monopolists and a little less for everyone else would not make much difference would hardly be acceptable. Hence our basic analysis was carried out without allowing *any credit whatsoever* for any benefit monopolists might have received from their enlarged incomes; only at the end of the analysis was the possible capacity of monopolists for the enjoyment of such income mentioned. It is this difference which explains why the estimate of the harm done by misallocation is relatively so much smaller than the estimate for maldistribution.

Suppose now we add both estimates together on the rather extreme assumption that the rest of the economy is as monopolistic as manufacturing industry. The total would still be only 1 1/3 per cent—hardly noticeable on any overall basis in an economy where productivity increases each year perhaps twice as fast!

## IV

My purpose in writing this note is not to argue that the Antitrust Division should be disbanded; actually I would be delighted to see its appropriations tripled. Rather my fundamental point is that we have concentrated far too heavily on the price, output, and profit aspects of monopoly. My guess is that, in terms of social waste, misallocation of resources as a result of consumer ignorance is a very much more serious problem than misallocation as a result of monopoly influences and that costs that are higher than socially necessary account for vastly greater waste than the excess consumption of monopolists. Above all I would like to know a great deal more regarding the effects of monopoly on technological progress. If monopolists must behave like monopolists and restrict something, I would not mind very much their trying to restrict prices and output—if only I were sure that they would be shot at sunrise for even thinking about restricting research expenditures!

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# THE DUBIOUS DEMOCRAT

## THOMAS JEFFERSON IN BOURBON FRANCE

THOMAS JEFFERSON, the second United States minister to France, remained in that country from 1784 until September of 1789, two months after the fall of the Bastille. The author of the Declaration of Independence saw at first hand the collapse of the monarchy by whose aid American independence had been established, and the revolutionary of 1776 was an eyewitness, and even a participant, in the greater revolution of 1789. These activities of Jefferson, inviting as they do a comparison of the American and French revolutions, and raising the whole conundrum of American relationships to Europe, have long offered an intriguing and now ancient subject, on which it yet always seems possible to say more. My own knowledge is more of Europe than of Jefferson. If the following impressions have any value or novelty, it is because the author is no Jefferson expert, but has simply sat down, with a point of view derived from the study of European history, to a fresh reading of Jefferson's letters from France—both his letters to personal friends, and his official communications to John Jay, the American Secretary of State under the Articles of Confederation. The new edition of the *Papers of Thomas Jefferson,* prepared by Julian P. Boyd and his aides with an abundance of useful annotation, is in fact just now approaching the year 1789.[1]

The title that I have ventured upon requires a word of explanation. To call Jefferson a "dubious democrat" is a

[1] Julian P. Boyd and others, eds., *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson,* vols. XI-XIII (Princeton, 1955-56). See also Dumas Malone, *Jefferson and the Rights of Man* (Boston, 1951), pp. 180-237; Gilbert Chinard, ed., *The Letters of Lafayette and Jefferson* (Baltimore and Paris, 1929); O. Vossler, *Die amerikanischen Revolutionsideale in ihrem Verhältnis zu den europäischen: Untersuch an Thomas Jefferson* (Munich, 1929), of which there is a digest in the *William and Mary Quarterly,* XII (July 1955), 462-71; Durand Echeverria, *Mirage in the West: A History of the French Image of American Society to 1815* (Princeton, 1957); and my article, "Notes on the Use of the Word 'Democracy', 1789-1799", POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, LXVIII (June 1953), 203-26. The present article originated as a paper delivered at the Society for French Historical Studies in February 1957.



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pretty alliteration, but "democrat" is an anachronism, and "dubious" is ambiguous. Jefferson did not call himself a democrat, and the word itself was then new, first coming into accepted use to describe some of the Dutch Patriots about 1787, a sense in which Jefferson employed it himself. If we nevertheless call Jefferson not only a democrat but a dubious one, at the time of his sojourn in France, we fall into a double meaning. We imply either that he was a questionable democrat or that he was a skeptical one. Either it is we who doubt the extent of his democratic principles, or it is he, a good enough democrat, who took a doubtful view of what he saw happening in France. There is a little of both these meanings in what I have to say.

* * * * *

One day in Paris, in February 1787, Jefferson wrote a letter to his old friend, John Adams, the American minister in London. They had been closely associated in the American Revolution, in which they had both been on the committee to write the Declaration of Independence, and their political ideas were still much alike, as may be seen in their opinions of the constitutions of Virginia and Massachusetts, their respective native states. The political estrangement of a few years later had not yet come. Jefferson had not yet been stigmatized as a Francophile nor Adams as an Anglomaniac; nor was Jefferson yet thought the preëminent father of American democracy, or Adams looked back upon, perhaps mistakenly, as a deep philosopher of conservatism.

Jefferson had two things to say in his letter. He told his colleague of what had happened at Versailles the day before, the meeting of the Assembly of Notables called by the minister Calonne to deal with the crisis of the French finances. He also commented on Adams' new book, *The Defense of the Constitutions of the United States,* of which Adams had sent him a copy, and which he had just finished reading, as he said, "with infinite satisfaction and improvement." He thought it would do "much good in America", and took immediate steps to have it translated into French. A few days later he went off on a three-months' tour of the South of France. His insatiable curiosity turned to the vine, the olive and the fig, to the mysteries of fossil sea shells, Roman ruins

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and the shifts in the Mediterranean coastline since the building of Aigues-Mortes, to the wages of farm laborers and the hardness or softness of peasants' beds, to the habits of nightingales in Touraine, the introduction of the steam engine at Nîmes, and the precise width of the Languedoc canal at the bottom. Meanwhile he was out of touch with Versailles, where the Assembly of Notables met during his absence.

The point is that when the King of France upon Calonne's advice convened the Assembly of Notables, and when John Adams wrote his *Defense of the Constitutions of the United States,* there was one idea that they had in common, and one that this acute and tireless observer, Thomas Jefferson, seems much less fully to have shared. This was the idea that a strong independent executive might be a good thing for the people.

The drift of Adams' book was to justify, by a survey of Europe, the separation and balance of governmental powers in America, that is of executive, judiciary, and upper and lower houses of legislation; and it was this separation and balance that won Jefferson's approval. For Adams, the main purpose of such separation was to preserve executive independence, and the purpose of executive independence was to prevent public bodies from degenerating into privileged oligarchies. "If there is one certain truth to be collected from the history of all ages," said Adams, "it is this: that the people's rights and liberties . . . can never be preserved without a strong executive." He saw what has become the commonplace of our history textbooks: that an alliance of kings with burghers and peasants, over the centuries, had put down the feudal classes. "What is the whole history of the barons' wars but one demonstration of this truth? What are all the standing armies in Europe, but another? These were all given to the kings by the people, to defend them against aristocracies." And he concluded, in modern vein, indeed disconcertingly like a latter-day Democrat, that the executive (whom he preferred to have popularly elected) was "the natural friend of the people, and the only defense which they or their representatives can have against the avarice and ambition of the rich and distinguished citizens." [2]

[2] John Adams, *Defense of the Constitutions of the United States,* in *Works* (Boston, 1851), IV, 290, 355, 585.

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It is a curious speculation to wonder what Adams would have thought of Calonne and the Assembly of Notables, if he rather than Jefferson had been the American minister to France. For Calonne called the Assembly because he believed that the rich and distinguished citizens were evading taxes. In his opening speech to the Assembly he denounced the "abuses of pecuniary privileges." [3] He proposed to use the executive authority of the French crown to impose a kind of equality before the law. In his complex program to save the French monarchy by reforming it, in what Miss Wilma Pugh once called Calonne's New Deal, there were two principal proposals: to introduce a new kind of land tax payable in proportion to income by persons of all legal classes alike, cleric, noble and commoner, without privilege or exception; and to introduce certain representative consultative bodies, called provincial assemblies, whose members should qualify as landowners, and be elected by landowners in general, with no regard to the legal system of three estates. Calonne was perfectly aware that he was attacking privilege and aristocracy at their foundation. His plan for provincial assemblies came directly from the thinking of Turgot, Mirabeau and Dupont de Nemours.[4] As for the tax reforms: "Privileges will be sacrificed, yes, as justice demands and as our needs require. Would anyone prefer to put an even heavier load on the unprivileged, the people?" [5] If there was ever a case of the executive defending the people against certain pretensions of aristocracy, in Adams' formula, this last effort of the expiring Bourbon monarchy was such a case.

But Calonne's program met with insuperable resistance in the Assembly of Notables. He and his successor had to abandon the land tax and the principle of equal representation in the new provincial assemblies. There presently fol-

[3] *Discours prononcés par S.M. Louis XVI, Msgr. l'archevêque de Narbonne et M. de Calonne à l'Assemblée des Notables le 22 fevrier, 1787* (Versailles, 1787), p. 23.

[4] P. Jolly, *Calonne, 1734-1802* (Paris, 1949), p. 166.

[5] *Collection des mémoires presentées à l'Assemblée des Notables. Première et seconde division* (Paris, 1787). Published by Calonne about March 30, 1787, and widely circulated, to strengthen his case in the Assembly of Notables by an appeal to public opinion. See an unpublished dissertation at Princeton University by Ralph W. Greenlaw, "The French Nobility on the Eve of the Revolution", pp. 22-23.

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lowed what we know as the aristocratic resurgence and the Revolt of the Nobles. On this phenomenon historians have come to agree. Albert Mathiez and Georges Lefebvre have described it, and all the great G's of contemporary learning on the French Revolution, Gottschalk and Gershoy in this country, Goodwin in England, Göhring in Germany, Godechot in France, agree in telling the same story, that the privileged classes in the Assembly of Notables blocked the plan for equality of taxation and equality of representation put forward by Calonne.

I do not know what John Adams would have thought of all this. He was in England, and in his letters and diary he made no significant comment on events in France. It seems likely that the crusty New Englander, who inveighed against the maneuvers of "aristocratical gentlemen" even at Geneva, would have had some sardonic reservations on the aristocracy of France. We do know what Jefferson thought. He thought very well of the Assembly of Notables. When the Assembly first met, he blamed the French for their levity toward it; [6] for a great many witticisms were in circulation, chiefly turning on the select composition of its membership, which, beginning with seven princes of the blood and thirty-six dukes and peers, proceeded through the whole array of legalized status to include, in 144 members, only four who were altogether of the Third Estate. Jefferson showed no disposition to be critical on this score. He thought the Notables "the most able and independent characters in the kingdom." [7]

Calonne had explicitly raised the question of privilege. The word "privilege" never occurs in Jefferson's letters until much later in the controversy, until December 1788. And when the provincial assemblies proposed by Calonne did meet, in altered form, a few months later, when, instead of being elected as landowners by landowners, they represented the three estates of clergy, nobility and commoner, with some of their membership designated by the king, and the rest co-

[6] To Abigail Adams, Feb. 22, 1787, *Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, XI, 174. "The people at large view every object only as it may furnish puns and bons mots. . . . When a measure so capable of doing good as the calling of the Notables is treated with so much ridicule, we may conclude the nation desperate. . . ."

[7] To John Jay, June 21, 1787, *ibid.*, p. 489.

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opted, Jefferson made no comment on the change that the plan for provincial assemblies had undergone. The assemblies "will be of the choice of the people," he wrote to John Jay, long enough after his return to Paris to have learned what had happened. And he told Adams that "the royal authority has lost, and the rights of the nation gained," as much in France in three months, by peaceable change of opinion only, as in England during all the civil wars under the Stuarts. He thought only old people opposed the change. The revolution, so to speak, was over.[8]

It is no news to report that Jefferson, while in France, took a fairly conservative view of the beginnings of the French Revolution. The problem is to examine the quality and content of this so-called conservatism. The problem is to explain why Thomas Jefferson, of all people, was so insensitive to the case for equality of taxation, equality of representation, and equality of citizenship in France.

It is possible that if he saw no issue of privilege, the politically conscious French public still saw no such issue either. It may be that the archbishops and *grands seigneurs* who led the attack on Calonne acted as the accepted leaders of the country, and in the country's interest. Many of the objections of the Notables to Calonne's tax program were perfectly valid. The Notables preferred a continuation of the old *vingtième* to his new land tax, but the *vingtième* was legally payable by both nobles and commoners; and if there were *de facto* inequalities in its incidence, arising from under-assessment, I am not sure that these were much greater than with the land tax in England—at least I would like to see some comparative research on this subject. The tax privileges most hotly defended by the Notables, and those which Calonne most vigorously attacked, were actually, as Ralph Greenlaw has pointed out, the privileges of certain provinces, by which provinces as a whole, and in theory all classes in those provinces, carried a lighter share of the national tax burden. To Jefferson such privileges or liberties, depending on old agreements, might well seem like states' rights within a kind of federal system, and as such perfectly defensible against the crown.

Before judging what he thought, we must ask what it was

[8] To Jay, *ibid.*, p. 490; to Adams, Aug. 30, 1787, *ibid.*, XII, 68.

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possible for him to know. We must distinguish between what could be seen by contemporaries and what can be seen by historians. The issue was not entirely invisible in 1787. In the past, to be sure, the Bourbon monarchy, in its frequent clashes with the privileged orders, had been highly secretive, and had yielded all the advantages of publicity to spokesmen for the aristocracy and the clergy. But in 1787 Calonne appealed to the public. He himself published, during the sessions of the Assembly, the main substance of his differences with it. Moreover, Dupont de Nemours, with whom Jefferson was in close contact, had been a secretary to the Assembly, and drew up a detailed report of one of its most critical sessions. Dupont was a partisan of Calonne's program, and, though his confidential report was not published, Jefferson could easily have learned from him what went on. Others of Jefferson's circle, Condorcet and Morellet as well as Dupont, friends and supporters of the late Turgot, were outspoken believers in equality of taxation and in provincial assemblies meeting without regard to legal estate. There were men in France in 1787 who distrusted the lead taken by the prelates and the great nobles. Jefferson was not one of them.[9]

The truth seems to be that Jefferson's idea of what was happening was taken almost entirely from his good friend the Marquis de Lafayette, who played an active part in the Assembly of Notables, as in other later events. Professor Gottschalk, in his great work on Lafayette, allows that his hero in the troubled months of 1787 was somewhat naïve, that he only very slowly came to see the character of the aristocratic resistance to proposed reforms, and that in his patriotic and idealistic outbursts he served as a cat's-paw for the privileged interests.[10] At any rate, when Calonne announced that the

[9] See notes 3 and 5 above. Dupont's report, written in June 1787, was published by P. Renouvin, *L'Assemblée des Notables de 1787: la conférence du mars, texte publié avec introduction et notes* (Paris, 1920). The abbé Morellet, who had translated Jefferson's *Notes on Virginia* the year before, observed in July 1787 to the Earl of Shelburne that the Parlement of Paris demanded "the Estates-General, the most false and vicious representation that any nation ever had, instead of letting us form and develop provincial administrations in which the deputies would become true and perfect representatives, much better than yours." *Lettres de l'abbé Morellet à Lord Shelburne* (Paris, 1898), p. 245. See also Jolly, *Calonne*, pp. 183, 205.

[10] L. R. Gottschalk, *Lafayette between the American and the French Revolution (1783-1789)* (Chicago, 1950), pp. 279, 297 *et seq.*

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monarchy was bankrupt, Lafayette and the Assembly refused to believe him. When he revealed the amount of the deficit, which was of old standing and greatly increased by the American war, they attributed it to his own maladministration, insisting that there had been no deficit in Necker's time a few years before. When Calonne desperately asserted that the government's income must be immediately raised, and that certain loopholes and privileges in the tax structure must be stopped, they retorted that economies in expenditure would suffice. They accused Calonne of scandalous waste, graft and corruption, and denounced the monstrous prodigality of the royal court. Lafayette, in high-minded indignation, did as much as any man to draw this red herring of alleged personal dishonesty and courtly extravagance across the trail marked out by Calonne for structural reform. The trouble in this view was not in the legal and social organization of France, but in the misconduct of an overgrown and arrogant government.

This was doctrine that a Virginia gentleman could readily understand. Powerful government was what Jefferson feared; monarchy was his bugaboo; it was resistance to tyrants that expressed the will of God. "You are afraid of the one—I, of the few. . . . You are apprehensive of Monarchy; I, of Aristocracy." [11] So John Adams wrote to him, diagnosing the difference between them. It is true that Jefferson shortly revised his opinion of Calonne, finding "him less wicked, and France less badly governed, than I had feared." [12] It was in the nuance, the emphasis, the first impulse, more than in the considered judgment, that he differed from Adams.

It does appear that Jefferson at the moment, in mid-1787, was not very apprehensive of aristocracy in France, or in Europe either. He was aware of the troubles then raging in Holland and Belgium. These, he said in August 1787, were the places where "we have at present two fires kindled in Europe." What we call the reforms of Joseph II in Belgium, which included religious toleration and reduction of the costs of justice, Jefferson described as innovations of a whim-

11 Adams to Jefferson, Dec. 6, 1787, *Jefferson Papers*, XII, 396.

12 E. M. Sowerby, *Catalogue of the Library of Thomas Jefferson*, II (1953), 425, citing a letter of Oct. 18, 1787; *Jefferson Papers*, XII, 247.

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sical sovereign.[13] He knew that the incipient Belgian revolution was led by nobles and priests, but was untroubled by this knowledge. In the Dutch provinces the attempted Patriot revolution had reached its climax and was soon to be suppressed by Great Britain and Prussia. Jefferson, who sympathized with the Patriots, described how they were composed of two groups, the Moderate Aristocrats and the Democrats. When the two disagreed, it was the Democrats that he blamed for their unreasonableness.[14] The Dutch Democrats were middle-class burghers who had formed themselves into militia companies, held a National Assembly of such companies, protested at the subservience of the House of Orange to Great Britain, talked of equality of rights for persons of diverse religions, protested at the hereditary monopolizing of office in certain families, repudiated the three-estates system in Utrecht, and believed that they were imitating the American Revolution. Jefferson thought them very immoderate.

At the same time he reported of France that "the constitutional reformations have gone on well," and that the provincial assemblies would probably soon bring "a revolution in the constitution."[15] Lafayette had been designated by the King as one of the noble members in the assembly of Auvergne; and this assembly had hardly met when it began, with Lafayette's enthusiastic agreement, to demand the revival of long obsolete liberties of the province, which is to say more powers for the clergy and nobility of Auvergne. In these demands, echoed by most of the other provincial assemblies, historians nowadays see signs of the aristocratic resurgence, the attempt of some in the privileged orders, as Göhring says, to turn France into a *Ständestaat,* a status state. For Jefferson they seemed to be a liberal movement to check the crown.

In the next year, 1788, we can detect a new dimension in Jefferson's ideas, corresponding to that "widening of political notions" which Gottschalk finds in Lafayette. The summer of 1788 saw the high tide of the aristocratic resurgence, or what we have learned to call the *révolte nobiliaire.* Jefferson's friends Dupont and Condorcet were becoming more

[13] *Jefferson Papers,* XI, 672, 679, 685.

[14] *Ibid.,* p. 696.

[15] *Ibid.,* pp. 697-98. To Jay, Aug. 6, 1787.

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radically anti-noble. So was another in Jefferson's circle, Philip Mazzei, an Italian whom Jefferson had known for years in Virginia, and of whom he was now seeing a good deal in Paris. Mazzei now made a living by writing bulletins to the King of Poland. That dignitary was receiving stronger medicine from Mazzei than the American Congress ever got from Jefferson. "Aristocratic tyranny is struggling against despotism and monarchy. The pretext is the good of the people, to which, however, the aristocracy here, as it is everywhere else, and always has been, is far more opposed than the monarchy is." [16] Jefferson never talked this way about aristocracy. At most, he thought the Parlement of Paris rather obstinately selfish.

He did now admit, in the middle of 1788, as Lafayette now did, that the royal reforms were good in substance, but bad in manner. If the king alone has power to reform France, he says, the government is a despotism.[17] He no longer simply sees liberty against tyranny, but a choice of values. Nor, incidentally, do I think that John Adams or any American at the time would have chosen otherwise than as Jefferson did: as between reforms, and even justice, at the hands of an irresponsible and bureaucratic monarchy, however well-intentioned, and a measure of political liberty through elective and representative bodies, even though unequal, Jefferson unhesitatingly chose the latter. We begin to read in his letters of a possible convocation of the Estates-General. Jefferson thinks this a promising step toward a fixed constitution, limitation of the crown and reduction of expense. Equality of representation seems not to enter his mind; he thinks it will be best if the Estates meet in two houses, one representing the people, the other made up of nobles elected by nobles, as, he observes, is done in Scotland.[18] If such a body meets, issues a bill of rights, puts the king on a civil list, and takes care that it shall meet periodically in the fu-

[16] R. Ciampini, ed., *Lettere di Filippo Mazzei alla corte di Polonia* (Bologna, 1937), I, 7. Despatch of July 28, 1788.

[17] Jefferson to Carmichael, June 3, 1788, *Papers*, XIII, 233; to Cutting, July 24, p. 405; to Madison, July 31, p. 441.

[18] To Washington, May 2, 1788, *ibid.*, p. 126. For Jefferson's persistent belief that the French would be wise to model their government on England rather than on America, see Malone, *op. cit.*, pp. 181, 220.

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ture, quite enough will be accomplished. "I think it probable", he wrote to James Monroe in August 1788, "this country will within two or three years be in the enjoyment of a tolerably free constitution, and that without its having cost them a drop of blood." [19]

His ideas continued to develop at deliberate speed, not an inch ahead of average opinion in France, and well behind a good deal of it. Like others, he was dismayed when the Parlement of Paris, in September, ruled that the coming Estates-General must meet as in 1614, in three separate houses—clergy, nobles and commoners. The Parlement, he said, here revealed "the cloven hoof".[20] Now for the first time he began to use the word "privilege", to tell his American correspondents that there were privileged classes in France, and that they paid less than their share of taxes—as Calonne had said publicly almost two years before.[21] But where others, sensing an aristocratic bid for power, moved on like the Abbé Sieyès to denounce the aristocracy in bitter terms, and to demand equality of representation in the sense of vote by head in a single chamber, Jefferson, still in agreement with Lafayette, hoped for a compromise between nobility and Third Estate. Sieyès, Condorcet and Mirabeau were already chiding Lafayette as an "aristocrat"; I see no reason why they should not have thought the same of Jefferson also.[22] Of the coming Estates-General Jefferson was content to expect very little. If they "do not aim at too much they may begin a good constitution," he told Madison in November. What he meant was that they should obtain, at their first session, only certain rights over taxation and rights to register laws but not take the initiative in legislation, in addition to the assurance of periodic future meeting.[23] The King himself a

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 489.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 642.

[21] Jefferson's first use of the term "privilege" seems to be in letters to Paine, Dec. 23, 1788, *Writings*, ed. by Lipscomb and Bergh (Washington, 1903), VII, 246; to Price, Jan. 8, 1789, p. 256; to Jay, Jan. 11, p. 264. The expression "privileged orders" was denounced as a neologism too much favored by the Third Estate in one of Louis XVI's messages of June 1789 to the Estates-General; see Mazzei's report in Ciampini, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

[22] See Gottschalk, *op. cit.*, p. 416; Ciampini, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-56.

[23] *Writings*, VII, 184. Same view expressed to Jay, Nov. 19, 1788, *ibid.*, p. 191; to Washington, Dec. 4, p. 227; to Price, Jan. 8, 1789, p. 258.

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few weeks later offered more than Jefferson thought the Estates could prudently ask. Nor did his talks with Lafayette about declarations of rights represent any very radical departure. "All the world is occupied at present in framing, every one his own plan, of a bill of rights," he wrote as early as December 1788.[24]

He remained confident for a while that a moderate constitutional "revolution" could be peaceably effected by men of good will, and by men, it must be admitted, occupying a fairly comfortable place in society—"all the honesty of the kingdom", as he put it, "sufficiently at its leisure to think; the men of letters, the easy bourgeois, the young nobility."[25] When a serious working-class riot broke out at a wallpaper factory, just at the moment to jeopardize the harmony of the Estates-General, Jefferson was thrown into an agitation most unusual with him; one is reminded of Luther excoriating the peasants. He called the rioters "wretches" bent only on mischief, "abandoned banditti", whose repression was "unpitied".[26] To the last possible moment he kept his faith in the moderation of the aristocracy, repeatedly declaring, in the first months of 1789, that the clergy would cause the trouble in the coming Estates-General, but that the majority of the nobility might reach an understanding with the Third Estate.[27] He still hoped, at the very opening of the Estates-General, on May 6, 1789, as a means of resolving all difficulties, that the two privileged classes might be persuaded to sit together in one house, the unprivileged in another.[28] This was by no means what was wanted by Frenchmen classified against their will as Third Estate.

His political education, like everyone else's, became dizzily

24 To Dr. Currie, Dec. 20, 1788, *ibid.*, p. 239; to Madison, Jan. 12, 1789, p. 268.

25 To Price, Jan. 8, 1789, *ibid.*, p. 254.

26 To Carmichael, May 8, 1789, *ibid.*, p. 336; to Jay, May 9, p. 342; to Madison, May 11, p. 354. Contrast the far more understanding account of these Reveillon riots given by Mazzei to the King of Poland, Ciampini, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-27, 136.

27 To the Count de Moustier, Mar. 13, 1789, *Writings*, VII, 304; to Madison, Mar. 15, p. 313; to Paine, Mar. 17, p. 316; to Humphreys, Mar. 18, p. 321.

28 To Lafayette, May 6, 1789, *ibid.*, p. 334.

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rapid in the next few weeks. He found that the bulk of the Catholic clergy, whom perhaps even ardent admirers of Jefferson would not claim that he well understood, were prepared to take sides with the Third Estate; and that the bulk of the nobles, in whom he had placed his hopes, were less enlightened than he had supposed. He now discovered, seemingly for the first time, that a great many country nobles did not share the affable liberality of the Marquis de Lafayette—that they still entertained, as he put it, "a disposition to keep distinct from the people, and even to tyrannize over them." [29] He readjusted his ideas with alacrity, but no faster than many others. In the very letter of May 6 in which he expressed the hope of compromise to Lafayette, he also urged him, should compromise fail, to repudiate the instructions of his noble constituency and join with the Third Estate before he lost their confidence. By May 20 he was agreeing with the radicals of the Third Estate, or rather with the predominant opinion forming in that body.[30]

On June 17, 1789, the Third Estate took its decisive revolutionary action, passing the point of no return. By a five-to-one majority it declared itself a National Assembly, the only competent representative body, representing not social orders but a nation; it again invited persons from the other two orders to come and merge into this single body; and it arrogated sovereign power to itself, to the extent of gratuitously authorizing all existing taxes, thus implying that it might withdraw authorization and instigate a taxpayers' rebellion. Two days later the clergy joined. The next day came the oath of the Tennis Court. The King mildly resisted, then appeared to accept, then began secretly to prepare the dissolution of the Assembly by armed force. The country trembled with excitement. There was rapturous praise for good King Louis, and an almost religious belief in the dawning of a new era.

Jefferson remained cool and collected. His mind moved with events, but his feelings were scarcely involved in his judgments. "A tremendous cloud hovers over this nation", he reported to Jay on June 17. He gave a sober analysis. If the King, he said, were to

[29] To Madison, May 11, 1789, *ibid.*, p. 355.

[30] To Crevecoeur, May 20, 1789, *ibid.*, p. 368.

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> side openly with the Commons, the revolution would be completed without a convulsion, by the establishment of a constitution, tolerably free, and in which the distinction of Noble and Commoner would be suppressed. But this is scarcely possible. The King is honest and wishes the good of his people; but the expediency of a hereditary aristocracy is too difficult a question for him.[31]

This is substantially the judgment of most historians today. Jefferson had moved a long way since 1787. He no longer saw a Whiggish clash between king and people. He now saw a clash between king and people because the King now supported the aristocracy. Hereditary legal aristocracy was revealed to him as the issue, the stumbling block, the one thing which the commons would not accept, and which the King would not and could not abandon. In short, this was the French Revolution, not the English Revolution of 1689.

Jefferson now felt an optimism qualified by prudent fears. The Assembly, he told Thomas Paine three days before the episode of the Bastille, had by their sagacity and fortitude come into "undisputed possession of sovereignty. The executive and aristocracy are at their feet; the mass of the nation, the mass of the clergy, and the army are with them; they have prostrated the old government, and are now beginning to build one from the foundation." [32] Now that all France seemed to want a radical rebuilding, Jefferson wanted it for them, too. Now that sweeping change seemed to be possible, with nation, clergy and army behind it, he thought it possible also, or at least worth trying. Materials were at hand for a "superb edifice", he said. But he had his doubts: the Assembly might be too large to do business; it was composed of Frenchmen, that is "more speakers than listeners"; bread shortages, by causing popular violence, might bring division among the leaders; trouble-makers of the Left might stir up an agitation around the Duke of Orleans; the discomfited aristocrats might organize counter-revolution.[33] All

[31] To Jay, June 17, 1789, *Writings*, VII, 379-80.

[32] To Paine, July 11, 1789, *ibid.*, p. 405.

[33] To Shippen, Mar. 11, 1789, *ibid.*, pp. 291-92; to Carmichael, Aug. 9, p. 434; to Jay, Aug. 27, p. 442; to Madison, Aug. 28, p. 447; to Rutledge, Sept. 18, p. 466.

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eventually happened much as he feared. Meanwhile, in September 1789 he went home.

* * * * *

What can we conclude? First of all, Jefferson was no visionary. He conducted no apostolate in Europe for the principles set forth in the Declaration of Independence. He engaged in no proselytism; when he gave advice, he was usually more conservative than those who sought his opinions. He had no idea, at this time, that America might be a model for Europe; it was the British government that he thought the French ought to imitate. The existence of the independent United States, simply as a fact, was a subversive influence on the old order in Europe, but Jefferson did nothing to make it more so. He saw Europe and America as quite different societies. Until events taught him otherwise, he accepted the social order in France, the legalized inequalities, as natural and permanent features of the French landscape, like old churches and chateaux. He had no feeling of impending revolution; he was much more concerned in 1787 with the probabilities of European war, and the fires which he saw kindled were in Holland and Belgium.

He was no optimist. Or, rather, he was optimistic because he expected little. He would have been satisfied if the political crises in France had stopped at any point after the middle of 1787. Repeatedly he predicted that all might turn out well, that the French would soon have a "tolerably free constitution" without bloodshed. He wanted for the French "as much liberty as they are capable of managing," but until June of 1789, if then, he did not think they could manage very much. As for equality, that is civil and legal equality, or equality of representation in elected bodies, he believed in it in principle, of course, and had tried to get more of it written into the constitution of Virginia in 1776; but even in Virginia he had failed, and he expected little from Europe. He lacked class-consciousness, being a gentleman rather than an aristocrat, and had little awareness of it in others. There is nothing in his writings of that angry irritability, that sense of downright outrage, or of having been imposed upon flagrantly, that runs through John Adams' account of European patriciates in his *Defense of the Constitu-*

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*tions,* or which animates the Abbé Sieyès' eloquent diatribe, *What Is the Third Estate?* This latter work, which created a stir at the end of 1788, seems to have made no impression on Jefferson. He could with difficulty think of revolution as something demanded from below, by the lower or even the middle classes, or those hitherto excluded from public life. He thought of revolution as something to be arranged by persons already active in political affairs.

Yet he could be realistic in his observations, and was certainly no enthusiast or doctrinaire. His reports are notable for their unimpassioned analysis, the reverse of the ideological, the work of a predominantly intellectual type of man, who sought calmly to weigh the forces at work, and to make reasonable forecasts of the future. It is this practical purpose that we must keep in mind when we speak of his political moderation. If he disapproved of the Dutch Democrats, and thought them dangerously extreme, it was largely because he thought that extremism would provoke reaction, weaken the Patriot coalition, and ruin the Patriot cause. If he thought the French would have a good constitution if they aimed at very little, if as late as the end of 1788 he thought the Estates-General should insist on nothing more than some control of taxation and a right to register proposed laws, it was because he thought that to ask more would consolidate the opposition to any change at all. We can comment on his moderation, if we like, and even on his timidity, at a time when many Frenchmen were getting into a mood to fight, but we cannot easily dismiss his judgment. He was perfectly right in foreseeing that conservative opposition, aroused by revolutionary demands, would make peaceable reformation impossible.

Jefferson's views before he left France must be described as tepid. When he embarked at Le Havre, in September 1789, he was well to the right of the majority in the National Assembly. His hopes for the future were troubled with forebodings. Why then, after his return home, in the great crisis of 1793, did Jefferson emerge as the leading sympathizer with the French Revolution—the great American "Jacobin"? That he was, as his enemies now said, a visionary, a doctrinaire, a facile optimist, a naïve enthusiast for human perfectibility, or even much of a democrat, as democracy was already understood in Europe, I do not believe.

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There may have been three reasons why our dubious democrat became the great American Jacobin. Indeed, the same three reasons may explain why many Frenchmen became Jacobins, properly so called. First, Jefferson did feel that liberty and equality, if and where possible, were desirable states of being. Second, it was his tendency, as with most people, to accept the accomplished fact, to adjust his ideas in correspondence with the rush of events, to doubt the feasibility of a thing before it occurred, and to accept and defend it after it had happened. Like Frenchmen, he thus accepted the French Republic: perhaps a measure of liberty and equality was possible, after all. Third, he saw the conflict in Europe in 1793 as a conflict of real forces. He did not see the issue, as conservatives then did and still do, as a choice between anarchy and order, or between political metaphysics and political wisdom, or between godless human presumption and Christian civilization. He had learned the hard way himself, and even against his natural inclinations, that hereditary aristocracy was the ultimate issue in the French Revolution. He had found France virtually unanimous—nation, clergy and army—against the claims of the nobility in July of 1789. He thought that in 1793 the Revolution was simply opposed by Counter-Revolution, and that the Counter-Revolution consisted of elements of the old French aristocracy, the Continental monarchies, the European nobilities and patriciates, the wealthy and privileged classes everywhere, the ecclesiastical hierarchies and the Parliamentary oligarchy of Great Britain. No one who has read Jefferson's letters from France could imagine that he thought all the measures taken during the French Revolution to be wise, even those taken at the very beginning. But he compared the wisdom or unwisdom of the French, not with perfect wisdom, but with the wisdom then exhibited by living and actual opponents of developments in France. Given the choice as he saw it, he chose to take sides with the Revolution.

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# NOTES ON ROOSEVELT'S "QUARANTINE" SPEECH

THE "quarantine" speech which President Roosevelt made at Chicago on October 5, 1937, is generally assumed to have been a landmark in our foreign policy, showing the point at which the President made a definite decision to take a strong stand against the Axis Powers. It is also widely supposed that, because of evidence at every hand of the country's hostility to the speech, Mr. Roosevelt, quite justifiably, felt compelled to relinquish his determination to deal firmly with the totalitarian states. Yet the further one examines these assumptions, the more they seem to invite rethinking.

## I

Turning to the speech itself, the most popular interpretations are that the President was announcing that he had decided: to reverse his foreign policy, abandoning the isolationism of our neutrality legislation for a Wilsonian type of collective security; or to use sanctions against Japan to stop the hostilities in China; or to initiate forthwith a program for the application of sanctions against future aggressors—meaning the Axis Powers. However, a consideration of the events surrounding the speech, and of its text, suggests that the President was probably only engaging in a groping and intermittent effort, which he had been making for some time, to find some sort of a plan which would avert war between the dictatorships and the democracies. If so, the "quarantine" speech should not be regarded as an indication that, in the autumn of 1937, Mr. Roosevelt resolved to embark upon some strong and specific policy toward the Axis countries but rather as indicating that he was still pursuing a variety of nebulous schemes for warding off catastrophe.

In order to discuss further both the popular interpretations of the speech and the interpretation just advanced, it is necessary first to look at the two areas where the material lies which make more detailed discussion possible: the Presi-



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dent's search for a program to avoid war and the story of the writing of the Chicago address.

As the international crisis deepened in the 1930s, Mr. Roosevelt was intensely concerned over the aggression of the Axis nations. In keeping with a pattern he tended to follow almost instinctively, he seems to have felt that, if he advanced notions of his own about possible means of meeting the crisis, he might stimulate others to build on his suggestions until a solution was found. His first great effort to dramatize the concept of searching for a program to stabilize the world situation was made in connection with the Buenos Aires Conference of 1936. It will be recalled that this conference was convened at his suggestion to strengthen the Inter-American peace system. However, both the President and Secretary Hull proclaimed over and over again that the purpose of the conference was not just to work out a scheme for the maintenance of peace in the Americas but to evolve a program which, speaking in general terms, could be copied by the rest of the world. And it was precisely to draw the attention of as many people as possible to the universal significance of the proceedings at Buenos Aires that Mr. Roosevelt made his own dramatic trip to the conference.

Two features of the developments at Buenos Aires have a special significance in connection with later efforts to formulate a program to deal with the problem of war and peace.[1] One was the over-all character of the Buenos Aires agreements. The sixty-seven agreements arrived at by the Conference constituted a comprehensive plan divorced from any commitments to sanctions. They emphasized the value of a so-called constructive approach to peace, by which was meant an attempt to settle the underlying causes of friction that give rise to wars. They also emphasized the need to develop machinery to adjust disputes by peaceful means or, if this proved impossible, to limit hostilities once they occurred.

The second significant factor was the discussion about plans for organizing, in wartime, the countries that were not

[1] Stenographic report of the conference in *The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, Proceedings* (Buenos Aires, 1937); *Report of Delegation of the United States to the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace* (Washington, 1937), Department of State Conference Series 33.

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parties to the dispute. One idea was that an arrangement should be made so that these nations would adopt a collective neutrality that went further than anything as yet embodied in the Inter-American peace system. This view was vigorously pushed by Secretary Hull in his famous Eight Pillars of Peace speech delivered at the outset of the Conference.[2] It was incorporated in the draft convention presented to the Conference by the United States Delegation; for the convention would have committed neutral American countries, in case of war between two or more American republics, to apply laws comparable to the neutrality legislation existing in the United States.[3] While the United States proposal was not adopted, the determination to develop the concept of collective neutrality in the Americas remained a fixed part of our policy.

Another idea was that there should be what, for lack of a better term, may be called a collective nonbelligerency. This concept became a center of discussion at Buenos Aires because the Central American nations introduced a draft treaty based on a plan, advanced by Uruguay during the First World War, for the creation by the American states of a moral front which would adopt measures, such as the severance of diplomatic relations, that were noncoercive but not neutral.[4] In the process of watering down the Central American draft the closeness of this type of a collective nonbelligerency and a common neutrality was underscored. The purpose of both was to have the nations, not parties to the conflict, form a community for their own protection and to influence the course of the hostilities. (It was thought that a collective neutrality could, if necessary, be manipulated to favor one side or the other, as was indeed done after the outbreak of war in Europe.)[5] Moreover both the ideas of col-

2 *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-41* (Washington, 1943), p. 342; *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York, 1948), I, 498.

3 *Documents on International Affairs, 1936* (London, 1937), p. 77.

4 Martin, Percy Alvin, *Latin America and the War* (Baltimore, 1925), pp. 361 *et seq.*, 381. *Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, Proceedings*, pp. 138, 221, 739.

5 Bemis, Samuel Flagg, *The Latin American Policy of the United States* (New York, 1943), p. 287, chapter xxi. Welles, Sumner, *The Time for Decision* (New York, 1944), p. 204.

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lective neutrality and of collective nonbelligerency were regarded as preventive in that, if either were incorporated in an agreement, they would serve to deter would-be aggressors.

Following the Buenos Aires Conference, the President continued to look for a program to relieve the international tension, suggesting frequently that the nations of the world might get together to work out something comparable to the achievements reached at Buenos Aires. Secretary Hull spoke similarly, both men often stressing the noncoercive character of the Buenos Aires agreements. When, for example, Prime Minister King of Canada visited Washington in the spring of 1937, Mr. Hull told him that, in his estimation, the only way of stopping the drift toward war was for England to seek the coöperation of other European countries in developing a constructive and comprehensive scheme for the stabilization of peace like the Buenos Aires program.[6] The President himself discussed at length with Mr. King the possibility of calling an international conference to set up a new world organization which would seek to maintain peace by peaceful means rather than by economic or military sanctions.[7] He suggested that new methods of achieving peace be tried such as "going after the root causes of war" so as to establish a "collective security based on the removal of war causes." Also wars should be prevented or cured by "public opinion" not by "penalty". A few weeks later the President talked along similar lines to Norman Davis, who was about to leave on a mission to Europe, indicating that Mr. Davis might explore some of these ideas with European statesmen informally.[8]

At the same time the President was groping for other

[6] The memorandum of this conversation was an unusually comprehensive statement of Mr. Hull's views and was sent to the President. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937*, I, 641, and Hull, *Memoirs*, I, 546. Even after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, Mr. Hull was urging Japan to join the United States in the leadership of a peace movement based on the Buenos Aires agreements. See *Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931-41*, p. 331.

[7] *F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1928-45* (New York, 1947), I, 664. Based on notes of their discussion written by Mr. King while talking with the President and shown to the latter.

[8] Memorandum by Mr. Davis on telephone conversation with the President on March 19. Davis files.

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means of getting the dictatorships and the democracies to make a concerted effort to ensure peace. Even before the Buenos Aires Conference, Mr. Roosevelt had spoken to friends of the possibility of stopping the trend toward war by some dramatic action such as inviting the heads of the big European nations to a meeting on board a battleship at sea where they would evolve some plan for a "lasting peace" to be achieved without commitments to coercion.[9] Word of the President's scheme reached the *New York Times* which printed a front-page article under a streaming headline: "ROOSEVELT IF ELECTED MAY CALL KINGS, DICTATORSHIPS AND PRESIDENTS TO GREAT POWER CONFERENCE".[10]

The net result of all this talk of a program to resolve the existing crisis was that, by the spring of 1937, there were repercussions even in the European dictatorships. Mussolini, in a highly publicized interview, virtually invited the President to take the initiative in bringing the statesmen of the world together to settle some of the outstanding causes of tension.[11] Hitler was rumored to have said that he would attend a conference for the improvement of the international situation if Mr. Roosevelt convened it.[12]

Perhaps encouraged by signs of possible coöperation from the Axis nations, Mr. Roosevelt, in the spring and summer of 1937, tried to take some concrete steps toward a general international agreement that would make for peace.[13] Norman Davis, on his trip to Europe in May, had long conversations on this subject with various European statesmen, primarily British and French—conversations of which he kept detailed records that have turned up in his files.[14] Mr. Davis spoke first with Mr. Spinasse, then French Minister of Na-

9 Hull, *Memoirs*, I, 546.

10 August 26, 1936, story by Arthur Krock.

11 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937*, I, 655.

12 *Ibid.*, pp. 29, 638, 640, 649.

13 Apparently in March, Secretary Morgenthau told Mr. Chamberlain that the United States wanted to help in finding some way of preventing the outbreak of war. For correspondence on this see *ibid.*, I, 98-106.

14 The following accounts of Mr. Davis' conversations are all based upon his memoranda.

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tional Economy, and with Anthony Eden. All agreed that a comprehensive program should be developed that would tackle the three most important sources of the growing international crisis: political and economic conditions and the race in armaments. It was assumed that the United States would have to take the initiative in starting such a program but that President Roosevelt would want to limit himself to economic and disarmament problems, leaving the European Powers to settle their political controversies among themselves. In the end it was agreed that some plan might be launched, probably by calling a large international conference, in a few months—possibly September.

When Mr. Davis approached Neville Chamberlain, the latter proved to be more than sympathetic to the idea that the dictatorships and the democracies should try to adjust their differences but considerably less interested in the American concept of bringing this about through a comprehensive program undertaken by many nations. Mr. Chamberlain thought it impractical "to do everything at once" and declared that, in his opinion, political appeasement would have to precede economic appeasement and the limitation of armaments. He told Mr. Davis that the British government was doing what it could toward a "beginning of political appeasement" and had just instructed its Ambassador in Berlin to impress upon Hitler that the British wanted to establish "more friendly relations and a sound basis for peace" as soon as they were convinced that Germany genuinely desired the same thing. Mr. Davis indicated that he was quite in favor of England's trying to reach an understanding with Germany; he only wondered whether tackling the problem of peace on a wider scale could await the outcome of Britain's efforts. In addition Mr. Davis raised the question of the possibility of Mr. Chamberlain's coming to the United States to talk with the President directly.

The President decided, after Mr. Davis' return home, to go on from where the latter had left off. Early in June, Mr. Davis wrote the Prime Minister, in the strictest secrecy, that Mr. Roosevelt would like him to visit the White House around late September.[15] The President, he explained, was

[15] Davis files. Draft in Roosevelt files, P. S. F. Great Britain, 1933-38, Box 7.

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ready to make arrangements immediately to have an agenda drawn up for their meeting. Mr. Davis stated also that he thought England and America should pave the way for a "broader move" to ensure peace and hoped that, within a few months, it would be possible to start a "concerted and comprehensive effort to achieve economic rehabilitation, financial stability, a limitation of armaments and peace." The Prime Minister replied that he did not believe the time ripe for a meeting with the President.[16] The British government was, he asserted, still trying to open talks with the Germans and these might provide a "valuable indication" of the direction in which it might be possible to advance, thereby serving as a useful preliminary to discussions between himself and Mr. Roosevelt.

The President was, however, too intent upon his course to drop matters here. At the end of July he wrote personally to the Prime Minister saying that he appreciated his desire to make such progress as was possible along other lines but nevertheless would like suggestions for steps that might be taken to expedite their meeting.[17] Mr. Chamberlain did not answer until two months later when he informed Mr. Roosevelt that he had no suggestions to make.[18] The international situation, he declared, was changing so quickly that any plans were likely to be obsolete almost as soon as they were made. While the tension in Europe was easing somewhat, things were still a "long way from the resumption of cordial relations between the totalitarian states and the democracies."

It was precisely at the time that the Prime Minister rejected the President's second invitation to open discussions that Mr. Roosevelt delivered the "quarantine" speech. Presumably he felt that, if an advance toward peace was to be made, he would have to try some method less dependent upon Mr. Chamberlain's initiative. Perhaps it was to encourage others to supply the necessary impetus that the President renewed his efforts to dramatize publicly the idea of searching for a plan to avert war. Parts of the "quaran-

16 *Ibid.*

17 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937* I, 113.

18 *Ibid.*, p. 131.

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tine " speech (for reasons that will be clearer later) appear to have constituted one of these efforts. Another effort was started on the day following the " quarantine " speech when Sumner Welles wrote a memorandum for the President outlining a new peace program.

So much has been written about Mr. Welles's scheme that it does not seem necessary to do more than recall its essentials.[19] Mr. Welles believed that it would be easier to get the democracies and dictatorships together to seek a solution of political, economic and armament problems if they first succeeded in reaching an understanding on less explosive issues. He therefore suggested trying to achieve a general agreement on questions such as the fundamental rules which ought to govern international behavior. The President himself proposed holding a dramatic meeting of diplomatic representatives accredited to Washington, in the White House on Armistice Day, at which he would read a message designed to set in motion procedures leading to an agreement of the kind Mr. Welles envisaged. Mr. Welles thereupon put his scheme into more concrete form but the entire matter was dropped before Armistice Day because of Secretary Hull's objections. It was revived, however, in early January 1938 when it was hoped that it would, among other matters, lend support to Great Britain's continued attempt to arrive at an understanding with Germany.[20] Perhaps the best-known part of the story is that which deals with the submission of the Welles plan to Mr. Chamberlain; the latter's rejection of it during Mr. Eden's absence from England; and Mr. Eden's successful efforts to get the Prime Minister to reverse his stand around the middle of January. In the end the matter was dropped for a number of reasons but in the Hyde Park files there are revised drafts with notations by Mr. Roosevelt which show that the President and Mr. Welles continued working on the scheme until at least mid-February.[21]

It would seem therefore that the President was searching

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 665-670. Mr. Welles's own accounts of his plan are in *The Time for Decision*, p. 64, and *Seven Decisions That Shaped History* (New York, 1950), chapter i. See also discussion in *The Challenge to Isolation* by William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason (New York, 1952), p. 22.

[20] *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1938*, I, 115-126.

[21] Roosevelt files, P. S. F. State—1938.

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for a program to reduce the danger of war over a period which started considerably before and continued for some time after the "quarantine" speech. The programs that Mr. Roosevelt acted upon differed in many respects but all aimed at getting the various conflicting nations to coöperate in the interests of peace at the least by entering into some sort of initial agreement. The emphasis was mainly on a constructive approach to maintain peace. But it was also on arrangements which were designed: to prevent the outbreak of war by providing for a collective neutrality or nonbelligerency, the mere threat of which would act as a restraint upon aggression; or to make possible the use of pressure, through such a neutrality or nonbelligerency, in case hostilities could not be averted.

This then was Mr. Roosevelt's search for a plan which could be used to cope with the international situation. The story of the writing of the speech starts with Mr. Hull. The Secretary, on learning that the President was to make an extensive trip in late September, urged him to deliver an address, in some large mid-western city, for the purpose—according to Mr. Hull's own account—of counteracting the growing trend toward isolationism throughout the country.[22] One may take for granted that Mr. Hull also believed that an expression of the moral outrage felt in the United States against the Axis nations would be welcome at home and have a salutary effect abroad. Mr. Roosevelt, no doubt wholly in sympathy with the Secretary's views on this matter, at once agreed and asked Mr. Hull and Norman Davis to furnish him with the necessary material.

The record—pieced together from the Hyde Park files and what has recently emerged from the Davis files—shows that Mr. Davis sent the President four separate memoranda.[23] Two were mailed from Washington where, judging by a statement in Mr. Hull's *Memoirs,* the Secretary and Mr. Davis wrote them jointly.[24] Mr. Davis appears to have written

22 Hull, *Memoirs,* I, 544-545.

23 The four memoranda are in both the Roosevelt and the Davis files. There is one difference in the texts (noted below) and some differences in the accompanying letters and notations.

24 Hull, *Memoirs,* I, 544.

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the other two in New York and read them over the telephone to Mr. Dunn in the State Department before mailing them to the President. It is these four memoranda which the President took on his western tour and, during the course of his journey, put together to make up the "quarantine" speech.

The first two memoranda (those in which the Secretary must have had a hand) contained the familiar opening passages of the speech. Without naming the Axis Powers, but obviously referring to them, they described with great forcefulness the brutal chaos being created in parts of the world by certain nations. They went on to make two points repetitiously: that disorder in any segment of the globe could not fail to affect every country; and that peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort to maintain peace. Among the statements in the original draft were:

> There is a solidarity and interdependence about the modern world, both technically and morally, which makes it impossible for any nation to isolate itself from what goes on in the rest of the world or to secure itself through indifference, isolation, or neutrality from economic and political upheavals in the rest of the world. . . .
>
> An overwhelming majority of the peoples and nations of the world today want to be left alone to live in peace. Nevertheless, the peace, the freedom and the security of these peoples and nations are being jeopardized by the remaining ten per cent, who are threatening a breakdown of international order and law. Surely the ninety per cent who want to live in peace under law and according to moral standards that have received universal acceptance can and must find some way to make their will prevail. . . .
>
> If we are to have a world in which it is possible to breathe freely and live in amity, the peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort to uphold laws and principles on which alone peace can exist.

The President used the whole of the first two memoranda with the exception of one paragraph which will be referred to later.[25] In places, he altered some of the wording and freely rearranged the sentences. One gets the impression that Mr. Roosevelt was trying to edit the text to conform to his

[25] *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt* (New York, 1941), *1937*, p. 406.

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usual terse and brilliantly vivid style of writing. But this is only an impression and certain changes may have been designed to convey a stronger meaning. The only additions Mr. Roosevelt made were a few relatively brief passages apparently inserted to supply either color or clarity.[26]

The other two memoranda, which must have been written by Mr. Davis alone, proclaimed at the outset:

> It is my determination to pursue a policy of peace. . . . We recognize, however, that if we are unable to or unwilling to defend our rights and interests we will lose the respect of other nations and we will also lose our own self-respect.
>
> This nation was dedicated to certain principles which our forebears considered to be of greater value than life itself and without which life would not be worth living. If the time ever comes when we are no longer willing or able to defend to the utmost of our ability the principles which are the foundation of freedom and progress we will sacrifice our great national heritage and will cease to have the vitality and stamina to keep this nation alive.

The President omitted these paragraphs and in their place wrote the famous "quarantine" passage:

> It seems to be unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading.
>
> When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease.

The remainder of the Davis draft featured the sentence, "War is a contagion"—a sentence which may have suggested the word "quarantine" to the President[27]—and emphasized

[26] The paraphrase of a recent author is from James Hilton's *Lost Horizon;* the quotation from a Bishop was taken from a letter written to the President by Bishop Frank W. Sterrett (Roosevelt files); the paragraph beginning "the situation is definitely of universal concern" is quoted from the State Department's instructions to the Minister in Switzerland in regard to the League's consideration of the Far Eastern crisis, September, 28. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937,* IV, 43.

[27] There are various stories about the President's use of the word "quarantine". Mr. Ickes thought the President took it from a talk in which he (the Secretary) said that neighbors had a right to "quarantine" themselves against the spread of infection such as existed in the international situation. See *The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes* (New York, 1954), II, 221. Mr.

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that "There must be positive endeavors to preserve peace." It closed with a moving statement that there was a tendency in the welter of conflicting ideologies battling for control of the modern world to overlook one basic truth: that "man, the human being is . . . the supreme end of society." But, despite its eloquence, the President discarded this passage and wrote the following ending:

> There must be positive endeavors to preserve peace.
> America hates war. America hopes for peace. Therefore, America actively engages in the search for peace.

No doubt some of the reasons for thinking that the popular interpretations of the "quarantine" speech should be reconsidered are already evident. Nevertheless it seems desirable to discuss briefly these interpretations and the conclusion advanced here, one by one.

1. Those who believe the President planned the speech as an announcement of a decision to revert to the type of collective security embodied in the League Covenant rely mainly on two arguments: that the tone of the address was so threatening it must have been designed to indicate a drastic move of this kind; that the speech conspicuously emphasized the idea of nations maintaining peace by a "concerted effort".

But the tone of the speech existed in the original memoranda where it was clearly not meant to go beyond fulfilling Mr. Hull's purpose of awakening the American people to the dangers of isolationism and voicing moral indignation at the destructiveness of the Axis countries. It might be argued, as already suggested, that Mr. Roosevelt strengthened the meaning of the original in places but he does not seem to have sharpened the tone of the draft as a whole and, in one very important instance, he moderated it. The passage of the Davis text which Mr. Roosevelt discarded and replaced with his "quarantine" statement could certainly be construed as a warning that, if pushed too far, the United States would

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Welles has stated that the President used the word "quarantine" in talking to him about the possibility of drawing a line in the Pacific to form a quasi blockade against Japan. See Rosenman, Samuel I., *Working with Roosevelt* (New York, 1952), p. 164. For an account by William Phillips see footnote 34.

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fight. The first version was even stronger, for it included, "We recognize, however, that a policy of peace at any price will not ensure peace. . . . This nation was born fighting for certain principles which our forebears considered to be of greater value than life itself. . . ." President Roosevelt may have seen the intial draft but, even if he did not, the interpretation to which the revision opened itself could scarcely have escaped him and it seems probable that he omitted it as too menacing.[28] This thesis is further supported by the fact that the one paragraph (referred to earlier) which the President did not use out of the memoranda sent from Washington had similar overtones.

The reference to a "concerted effort" was also in the drafts forwarded from Washington and, read in context, clearly meant that peace-loving nations should coöperate to arouse the conscience of the world to ensure the maintenance of high moral standards in the conduct of international relations. The presence of this theme is indeed not surprising, for, of all themes, it was most frequently used by Mr. Hull at this time and was also often employed by the President.

2. The idea that the "quarantine" speech was an advance notice of a declaration of sanctions against Japan resulted, to a large extent, from the circumstances under which the speech was given. The day after Mr. Roosevelt's appearance at Chicago, the League of Nations blamed Japan for the hostilities which had started in China in July and called for a conference of the Nine Power Treaty nations. Within a matter of hours, the State Department endorsed the League's position. The fact that these events happened hard upon each other gave rise to the belief that they were all part of one piece of political strategy which would culminate in the Nine Power nations adopting sanctions against Japan. However, we know today that there was no such direct connection between the President's Chicago address and the League's actions. And there is no convincing evidence to suggest that the President had decided to use coercive measures against Japan.

[28] The original version of this memorandum is in the Davis files and is marked "N.Y. September 17, 1937" with a further notation "Phoned to Mr. Dunn." Presumably the State Department suggested the changes which appeared in the revised version in the Roosevelt files.

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Sumner Welles, writing in the 1950s, seemed indeed to supply such evidence.[29] He said that in the summer of 1937 the President was far more preoccupied with the Far East than with Europe and that Mr. Roosevelt had, on several occasions, talked to him about the possibility of stationing units of the American and British navies at certain points in the Pacific to enforce an embargo against Japan. Mr. Welles stated further that, as he was in Europe during most of September 1937, he knew little about the writing of the "quarantine" speech but believed the President had in mind the embargo and quasi blockade he had mentioned earlier.

However, on further inspection, it would seem that Mr. Welles's recollections (in common with those of many others) had altered over the years; for in 1944 he had written:

> Partly because of the issues involved in the Spanish war, and partly because the real nature of Hitlerism was becoming increasingly apparent, the President determined to make a vigorous effort to persuade public opinion that in its own interest the United States should propose some constructive plan for international action to check the forces of aggression before they succeeded in engulfing the world. For this effort he selected the very heart of isolationism—the city of Chicago.[30]

Mr. Welles then went on to quote the "quarantine" speech. His recollection closer to the event does not therefore bear out the thesis that the Chicago address reflected Mr. Roosevelt's determination to use sanctions against Japan but instead supports the interpretation that the President was thinking of some program to stabilize the world situation.

3. There is a contemporary record which suggests that the President planned the "quarantine" speech to introduce a program involving sanctions against future aggressors (meaning the Axis states) which he expected to launch immediately after his return from Chicago. Secretary Ickes, in his diary entry of September 19, 1937, described a talk with the President in which the latter said he was considering addressing a

29 Welles, *Seven Decisions That Shaped History*, pp. 8, 13-14, 70-75, 91-93; Rosenman, *op. cit.*, p. 164, has letter from Mr. Welles on the "quarantine" speech.

30 Welles, *The Time for Decision*, p. 61.

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letter to all the countries of the world, except possibly the "three bandit nations", proposing that all peace-loving peoples isolate those who invaded the rights of others. "What he had in mind", Mr. Ickes wrote, "is to cut off all trade with any such nation." [31] According to the Secretary, Mr. Roosevelt said further that his proposal would not apply to the current situations in Spain and China, as what had been done could not be undone; that he wanted to "evolve a new policy for the future." Mr. Ickes himself commented that "of course, if he should do this, it would be a warning to the nations that are today running amuck." The Secretary wrote further that Mr. Roosevelt asked him whether he should send this letter before or after his trip out west, to which Mr. Ickes replied that he should wait until his return.

It would seem, however, that Mr. Roosevelt could not have settled upon this plan more than momentarily, for he appears to have been considering a variety of other schemes with equal seriousness. Just before his talk with Secretary Ickes, the President told two other members of the Cabinet—Hull and Morgenthau—that he was thinking of publicly declaring his readiness to act as a clearing house for peace—a suggestion which on the surface does not sound the same as the one discussed with Mr. Ickes. Further, the day after his talk with Mr. Ickes, the President told Mr. Morgenthau that he had dropped the idea of making such a public declaration and had decided to do nothing that would call for any response or action from any quarter, the whole thing being a matter of long-term education. It should also be recalled that at this time the President was considering still another course, not having as yet received a response from Prime Minister Chamberlain to his proposal for opening discussions which were partly intended to lead to an agreement between the democracies and the Axis countries. Moreover it is clear that he did not abandon the desire to get the democracies and totalitarian states together, for he started working on the Welles plan only three days after his Chicago speech.

[31] This statement leaves open to question whether Mr. Roosevelt actually stated he had in mind cutting off all trade with the aggressor or whether Mr. Ickes thought that was what the President had in mind. The document which indicates most clearly that one of the President's ideas was to find some means of using coöperative economic pressures is cited in footnote 34.

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4. The theory that the "quarantine" speech was not a vital landmark in Mr. Roosevelt's foreign policy but part of a groping attempt to find some means of forestalling war is based on various pieces of evidence (some already mentioned) including Mr. Roosevelt's own statements.

Immediately after the delivery of the "quarantine" speech, Mr. Roosevelt went to Cardinal Mundelein's house in Chicago where they had a long talk which was—and has remained—confidential. However, there appears in the Roosevelt files a letter written, on the following day, by Cardinal Mundelein to the Apostolic Delegate to the United States which says in part:

> Yesterday the President of the United States delivered here in Chicago a strong and important address which may affect the future peace and tranquillity of the world. Afterwards, in my own house, he continued discussion of the subject to which he had given considerable thought. He asked me whether he might invite participation of the Holy See in the movement and, as it is for the purpose of establishing permanent peace in a war-torn world, I answered him that I thought he should. . . .
>
> His plan does not contemplate either military or naval action against the unjust aggressor nation, nor does it involve "sanctions" as generally understood but rather a policy of isolation, severance of ordinary communications in a united manner by all the governments of the pact.[32]

The rest of the letter indicated that the President hoped such a movement for the creation of a "permanent peace" would arrest the wave of lawlessness already submerging parts of the world.

About two weeks after the "quarantine" speech, Norman Davis, who was about to leave for the Brussels Conference where he was to represent the United States, went to see the President for oral instructions.[33] Mr. Davis' notes show that Mr. Roosevelt used language similar to that of the "quarantine" speech and of his talk with Cardinal Mundelein. They state that the President remarked that, if all other procedures failed at Brussels, the countries wanting to stop the

[32] Roosevelt files.

[33] Davis files.

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Sino-Japanese conflict and safeguard themselves from its consequences—"or in other words the so-called neutral nations"—should "band together for their own protection against this contagion." The other Powers might, for example, give China every facility for acquiring arms; or an alternative might be for "the neutrals to ostracize Japan, break off relations."

Side by side with his notes on this interview, there is, in Mr. Davis' files, a paper marked: "Handed to me by President as of possible use". This contains what must be an excerpt from an article or book which says, in substance, that the Inter-American principle of neutral coöperation, short of force, would seem to offer a useful formula for the United States in the existing situation; and it urges the President to apply this formula so as to develop a "constructive program" in which a group of neutrals, acting in common, might make their influence felt.

It would seem therefore that, immediately after delivering his address at Chicago, Mr. Roosevelt spoke to Cardinal Mundelein, not as though he had just proclaimed some drastic policy, but as though, as in the past, he were throwing out the germ of an idea with the hope that it might grow. From the tenor of his remarks and the paper he gave Mr. Davis, it appears likely that the President thought the Inter-American concepts of collective neutrality or nonbelligerency contained the seeds of some method for dealing with the world-wide situation. He suggested that "so-called neutrals" might develop a common program but he seems to have been very vague about the nature of that program. It was not to involve military action nor "'sanctions' as generally understood". But it might include, among other matters, the "severance of ordinary communications in a united manner" or a "break off" of relations. Perhaps in talking to Cardinal Mundelein, Mr. Roosevelt had in mind the possibility of developing a plan which would provide for the creation, under certain circumstances, of a moral front limited to such matters as the severance of diplomatic relations—a plan which, it might be added, would seem to furnish appropriate grounds for an appeal to the Pope. Or perhaps he was looking for a scheme which would, if necessary, permit the extension of the concepts of collective neutrality or non-

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belligerency so that they might embrace a wide range of pressures up to and including economic pressures.[34] The mere existence of arrangements of this character was, as stated earlier, regarded as likely to discourage aggression so that they might be considered as a sound basis for the establishment of a "permanent peace". It is just possible that the President also thought some technique might be developed whereby if "neutrals" exercised pressures, which were not regarded as sanctions in the ordinary sense but as measures taken for their own protection against the contagion of war, they would avoid the risk of having to resort to military action inherent in systems like that of the League.[35]

Somewhat curiously, in addition to Cardinal Mundelein's letter and Mr. Davis' notes, a document which has long been familiar to historians seems to support the idea that the Presi-

[34] The President must have mentioned a plan including economic pressures to Clark Eichelberger in early July 1937. In mid-July Mr. Eichelberger sent the President a memorandum based on a talk which they had had some two weeks earlier. The discussion seems to have centered on the possibility of evolving a comprehensive international program which would provide for far-reaching economic measures, drastic disarmament, and a renovation of the existing peace machinery. In connection with the last, Mr. Eichelberger, evidently recapitulating some of the points which had been made during the course of the conversation, wrote that the principle of consultation among nonbelligerents embodied in the Buenos Aires agreements might be extended to the entire world. Once the world had adopted such principles, he continued, the American people would be willing to accept the idea of denying trade to the aggressor. "Instead of sanctions being voted piecemeal, they would take the form of a denial of the economic benefits of the more nearly just international society to the nation that would make war." Also at some point during this meeting, the President intimated that he might someday make a dramatic speech which—to quote Mr. Eichelberger—would "lead the world on the upward path." Roosevelt files, O.F. 20 State Department, Box 6.

One further account of a conversation with the President at this time should be mentioned, though the whole tenor of the talk, in addition to the vagueness of the language, makes it hard to evaluate. William Phillips, in his autobiography, describes a visit with Mr. Roosevelt on October 6, and states that he asked the President what he meant in using the word "quarantine" in his speech the day before. The President replied that he had searched for a word which was not "sanctions" and had settled on "quarantine" as a "drawing away from someone". Mr. Phillips adds that as the discussion proceeded, Mr. Roosevelt indicated his willingness to "go very far in drawing away." See *Ventures in Diplomacy* (Boston, 1952), pp. 206-207.

[35] Based partly on a remark to this effect said to have been made by Mr. Roosevelt some months later. (Talks with John M. Blum who is working on a book with Mr. Morgenthau based on the latter's diaries.)

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dent had no definite policy at this stage but was contemplating a variety of possibilities including ways of embroidering on the Inter-American system. This document is a transcript of the off-the-record press conference he held the day after he spoke at Chicago.[36] It is usually assumed that Mr. Roosevelt, anxious to avoid being questioned, was deliberately confusing in his answers to the correspondents; but it seems quite possible that the President's replies were meant to be taken at their face value.

The reporters, over and over again, asked the President to define the meaning of his Chicago address and especially of the word "quarantine". The President stuck to the following explanation of the speech as whole:

> P: . . . the lead is in the last line, "America actively engages in the search for peace." I can't tell you what the methods will be. We are looking for some way to peace. . . .
>
> Q: Foreign papers put it as an attitude without a program. . . .
>
> P: It is an attitude and it does not outline a program; but it says we are looking for a program.

At the outset a reporter had asked the President whether he would not admit that a "quarantine" must involve a repudiation of our neutrality legislation. Mr. Roosevelt declared, "Not for a minute. It may be an expansion." The correspondent asked, "Doesn't that mean economic sanctions anyway?" to which the President answered, "No, not necessarily." Later the President remarked that there were many methods of attaining peace which had as yet never been tried. A correspondent asserted that, in his opinion, to quarantine aggressors was no longer neutrality. The President stated that "On the contrary, it might be a stronger neutrality." The conference ended with this exchange:

> Q: Do you agree . . . that sanctions mean war?
>
> P: No. Don't talk about sanctions. Never suggested it. . . . don't get off on the sanction route.
>
> Q: I meant that in general terms; going further than moral denunciation.
>
> P: That is not a definition of "sanctions".

[36] *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1937*, pp. 414-425.

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Q: Is a "quarantine" a sanction?
P: No.
Q: Are you excluding any coercive action? Sanctions are coercive.
P: That is exactly the difference.
Q: Better, then, to keep it in a moral sphere?
P: No, it can be a very practical sphere.

For whatever reasons, Mr. Roosevelt seems thereafter to have shunned entering into any explanations of the "quarantine" speech. But in a Fireside Chat, on October 12, he referred to his remarks at Chicago, saying in part that it was the duty of a president to think in terms of peace not only for one but for many generations.[37] Peace, he declared, must be "sound and permanent", built on a "cooperative search" for peace by all nations desiring this end.

To me it would seem that throughout the period, before and after the "quarantine" speech, Mr. Roosevelt was moved by a deep inner feeling that it must be possible to find a formula which would avoid as unthinkable a catastrophe as another world war. In retrospect it may look to many as though nothing could have averted tragedy short of a clear-cut and determined policy against the Axis. But the chances are that the Chicago speech reflected no such policy. What governed Mr. Roosevelt's behavior could be fully understood only by a grasp of the whole history of the times illuminated by that rarest of things, a wise and informed feeling for the President's personality. Nevertheless one influence is blatantly obvious, namely, the political situation in the United States, a matter which prompted the rest of these notes.

## II

The second assumption referred to at that outset is that Mr. Roosevelt, with full justification, felt that the American people wholly repudiated the "quarantine" speech and that he therefore abandoned his decision to adopt a firm policy against the Axis Powers. If Mr. Roosevelt made no such decision, obviously he did not abandon it. But this does not rule out the possibility that the President, Mr. Hull, and others in the Administration believed that the country

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 429.

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almost uniformly rejected the speech and were influenced by their belief. Indeed there is a good deal to suggest that this was the case. Sumner Welles has described the President as "dismayed by the widespread violence of the attacks" following his appearance at Chicago.[38] Mr. Hull has stated in his *Memoirs* that the "reaction against the quarantine idea was quick and violent" and set back by many months the Administration's efforts to educate public opinion away from isolationism.[39] Judge Rosenman has likewise spoken of the nation's response to the speech as "quick and violent—and nearly unanimous."[40] The effect of this evaluation of the country's attitude upon the Administration's policy is inevitably an elusive matter. But certainly during the main international event that followed—that is, the Brussels Conference—the Administration's policy was exceedingly cautious, and cables from Washington to Norman Davis, during his conduct of the negotiations at Brussels, are marked by a worried preoccupation with public opinion at home.[41] As will be seen later, Mr. Roosevelt himself introduced this note of concern in his original instructions to Mr. Davis.

However, even a limited look (such as that which follows) at the kind of material—mainly leading newspapers and weeklies—which the Administration must have used to assess the popular reaction to the "quarantine" speech raises a question which may well be worth more intensive study.[42]

[38] Welles, *Seven Decisions That Shaped History*, p. 13. See also p. 73 and Welles, *The Time for Decision*, p. 63.

[39] Hull, *Memoirs*, I, 545. One cannot help wondering whether the severely critical attitude which Mr. Hull is known to have developed toward the "quarantine" speech did not arise only after he saw the attacks in the isolationist press. Pierrepont Moffat recorded in his diary on October 5, 1937, that a meeting of State Department officials was being held on that day in the Secretary's office when the ticker service brought in the text of the President's Chicago address. "The Secretary was delighted at the speech," Mr. Moffat wrote, "and the majority thought it would be strongly approved by the public." See *The Moffat Papers* (Cambridge, 1956), p. 153.

[40] Rosenman, *op. cit.*

[41] Statement based on a study of our Far Eastern policy during this period which the writer is making.

[42] There do not seem to be any polls that show any particular shift in opinion right after the "quarantine" speech. See *Public Opinion, 1935-1946* (Princeton, 1951) which includes exact dates on which polls were issued.

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Were the President and those around him, in fact, justified in concluding that the country reacted with speed, vehemence and solidarity against the speech; or were they perhaps so responsive to the criticisms of certain isolationists that they equated these with the opinions of the country as a whole?

A reading of a group of leading publications, of the type that members of the Administration must have seen, shows that the controversy over the "quarantine" speech lasted until the end of the Brussels Conference in late November. Because the speech was immediately followed by the League's denunciation of Japan and its call for a Nine Power Conference, and because we supported the League's action, many believed that these events had been planned to introduce a new, forceful foreign policy which would be fully revealed at Brussels.

In this group of publications, estimates of the country's reaction to the speech went through two phases. Pierrepont Moffat, writing in his diary, described the initial phase—the immediate response to the speech—as a "burst of applause".[43] A similar impression was recorded in comment after comment in the publications surveyed. On October 6, the *New York Times* printed excerpts from sixteen editorials from all parts of the country and indicated their trend in its headline: "ROOSEVELT SPEECH WIDELY APPROVED".[44] The *Christian Science Monitor,* on the 7th, declared that observers were surprised at the degree of enthusiasm evoked by the speech, with even papers hostile to the Administration finding words of praise.[45] In a review of the week on Sunday

Some of the evidence Mr. Hull cites in his *Memoirs* (p. 545) to prove that the country reacted against the "quarantine idea" is unconvincing. He states, for example, that the A. F. of L. passed a resolution, following the speech, to the effect that "American labor does not wish to be involved in European or Asiatic wars." But he fails to mention that the day after the "quarantine" speech William Green at a convention of the A. F. of L. proposed a boycott of Japanese goods and was, according to all press accounts, overwhelmingly applauded. Moreover about a week later the A. F. of L. and the C.I.O. both passed resolutions to boycott Japan.

43 *The Moffat Papers,* p. 155.

44 P. 17.

45 P. 1. Article by the Washington Bureau of the *Monitor.*

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(the 10th), the *San Francisco Chronicle* wrote that the average citizen had responded to the President's message like a "cavalry horse to a bugle call".[46] It said that Roosevelt had appealed to the nation much as Wilson had taken the case for the League to the country to "whip a little group of Senators"—only, where Wilson failed, Roosevelt succeeded. *Time* magazine stated at about the same time that the Chicago address had elicited more words of approval, ranging from enthusiastic to tempered, than anything Mr. Roosevelt had done in many a month.[47] He had regained the support of many whom he had alienated earlier and provided himself with an active peace issue which promised to remain popular unless it threatened to involve us in war. Meanwhile he kept the country guessing whether his proposed "quarantine" meant diplomatic pressures, voluntary boycotts, or economic sanctions.

The marked tendency to agree that the initial response to the speech was positive disappeared in the second phase. Fundamentally, the question was whether the American people were initially enthusiastic about the speech largely because they were glad to have the President openly express disapproval of the Axis Powers; and, if so, whether their enthusiasm had changed after the idea became widespread that the "quarantine" speech would be translated into strong action against Japan at the Brussels Conference. Publications, such as *Newsweek,* felt that, influenced by increasing cries of alarm from leading isolationists, the tide of opinion soon began to turn.[48] Publications like *Time,* on the other hand, believed that popular sentiment remained firmly behind the President.[49] Most of the comments in other publications ranged between these extremes. In general they agreed that the original enthusiasm for the speech had been tempered by anxiety that, at the Brussels Confer-

[46] Magazine section, p. 3.

[47] October 18, p. 19. The article was obviously written before the Fireside Chat of October 12.

[48] December 20, p. 11.

[49] November 1, p. 17.

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ence, Mr. Roosevelt's new foreign policy would not stop short of war. This was by no means intended, however, to imply that the country would not support punitive measures against Japan, including economic sanctions. For the view was constantly expressed that boycotts, embargoes, etc. against the Japanese would not involve military action. In short, it would seem that the feeling in this group of journals was that the "quick" reaction to the "quarantine" speech, far from being hostile, was decidedly favorable, and it would seem that, in the long run, their opinions differed too widely to justify any definite conclusion.

Turning to the question of editorial policies, an expansion of a study by Lawrence Kramer of eight newspapers, selected to represent different parts of the country and different political convictions, shows six approving the speech and two opposing.[50]

Among the favorable papers were two published on the west coast: the *San Francisco Chronicle* and the *Los Angeles Times*. The *Chronicle* at the outset welcomed Mr. Roosevelt's statements at Chicago as meaning that he had decided to join in coöperative economic sanctions against Japan. It believed the Navy would have to be held in readiness but that there would be no necessity to use it. But, even before the Brussels Conference, the *Chronicle* stated with considerable bitterness that the hopes placed in Mr. Roosevelt's declarations were apparently unjustified. The President had spoken "brave" words at Chicago but there was no indication that he himself knew what he meant by them.[51] The *Times* went through a similar process of expectation and disillusionment. It first supported the "quarantine" speech on the assumption that it foreshadowed the adoption at Brussels of economic and financial measures against the Japanese; but when no such measures materialized, it asked sharply why the speech had ever been made. What originally looked like

[50] Lawrence I. Kramer, Jr., then at Harvard, wrote a long manuscript summarizing all the editorials in these papers dealing with the major developments in our Far Eastern policy from 1933 to 1937. The above is based on the section on the "quarantine" speech with additions and analyses made entirely on my own responsibility.

[51] November 5. The editorials in each newspaper are too numerous to cite except where reference is made to a specific editorial.

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a statesmanlike utterance, it said, appeared very different in the light of the lack of any effort to implement it.[52]

In the middle of the country, the *Milwaukee Journal* expressed itself, at the close of the Nine Power Conference, with even greater vehemence. It scathingly described the delegates departing from Brussels utterly beaten, their tails between their legs. "Where do we go from here?" it asked, and declared, "Nowhere. There wasn't any bright new dream when the President spoke at Chicago . . . only rhetoric." [53]

The *Cleveland Press,* a Scripps-Howard paper, while hailing the "quarantine" speech and believing it implied more than moral pressure, pursued a cautious policy, never definitely advocating any course.

On the east coast, the *Christian Science Monitor* at the beginning expected the warm response to the President's message to lead to an arms embargo or possibly economic sanctions. But ultimately it, too, became disappointed and concluded that Mr. Roosevelt had grown more afraid than ever of his isolationist critics. The *New York Times,* on its part, saw in the "quarantine" speech and subsequent events the need for reconsidering its editorial position. While applauding the speech as ushering in a more internationalist foreign policy, the *Times* took no definite stand throughout the Brussels Conference. At the end of November, however, it attracted widespread attention by calling on the Administration to overcome its fear of isolationist groups, in and out of Congress, whom it held responsible for undermining our leadership in world affairs and turning the Brussels Conference into a fiasco. A few weeks later the *Times,* in a dramatic editorial, came out in favor of withholding raw materials and credits from Japan.[54]

While these six papers seem sufficiently representative to assume that their views, or equivalent ones in similar publications, came to the attention of the Administration, it may be well to mention the editorial policies of the Washing-

52 November 26.

53 November 26.

54 These two editorials appeared respectively on November 30 and December 24.

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ton papers which Mr. Roosevelt seems to have frequently scanned.[55] The *News,* being a Scripps-Howard publication, followed the cautious policy already noted. The *Post* issued a sensational front-page editorial on October 6 endorsing the "quarantine" speech as a first step toward economic measures against Japan. The *Star* not only advocated such measures but declared that, unless they were boldly applied, the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty would deserve nothing better than the contempt which they would certainly get from the Axis countries.[56] The *Times* and *Herald,* both Patterson papers, were in favor of a long-range, Anglo-American blockade of the Japanese.[57] It cannot be stated too often, however, that no matter what actions were recommended it was believed, with few exceptions, that they would not and must not lead to war.

If the editorial opinions of the above newspapers suggest considerable evidence of support for the "quarantine" speech, so, it should be added, did the President's mail. The great majority of the letters on the Chicago address, which fill several boxes in the Hyde Park files, are messages of appreciation, often written with deep emotion.

The other side of the coin is the nature of the opposition to the speech and its influence upon the Administration including the President. The two hostile papers in Mr. Kramer's study were the *Chicago Tribune* and a Hearst publication. Nothing demonstrated the attitude of the *Tribune* better than its account of Mr. Roosevelt's appearance at Chicago on October 5. It described thousands of Chicagoans turning out to greet the President, expecting to hear a message of peace, and being plunged by his words into a "world-hurricane of war fright". Throughout October and Novem-

[55] Mr. Roosevelt's scrapbook at Hyde Park is full of clippings from the Washington press. Grace Tully lists eleven newspapers which the President looked through customarily for editorial opinion. Of these, four opposed the "quarantine" speech: *The Chicago Tribune,* a Hearst paper, the *New York Herald Tribune,* and the *New York Sun.* See *F.D.R.: My Boss* (New York, 1949), p. 76.

[56] October 7.

[57] October 10 and 12 respectively. The *New York Daily News,* also a Patterson paper, had come out on October 3 for such a blockade (magazine section, p. 6).

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ber the *Tribune* harped upon two themes: that a "quarantine" must mean economic sanctions and economic sanctions must mean war; that we were merely puppets of the British, serving as saviors of their Empire in the Far East.

The same themes were emphasized by the Hearst press. But Mr. Hearst went much further. He issued a questionnaire to members of Congress which, leading off from the "quarantine" speech, asked whether we should take sides in the Sino-Japanese conflict or steer clear of all wars. The answers were published in a series of articles which began on October 17 and ran for about two weeks. The introduction stated that Congressmen from the "Atlantic to the Pacific, from Canada to the Gulf" had "roared back their determination for today, to-morrow, and forever to keep the United States out of foreign wars."

Many of the published replies came from important political leaders, mainly well-known isolationists.[58] Senator Borah said he was utterly opposed to the United States participating in sanctions against Japan which would be "just the same as initiating war". Senator Vandenberg declared that any move toward naming aggressors, using sanctions, etc., would lead us in the direction of entangling alliances—the one thing we were determined to avoid. Senator George of Georgia wrote that he would not, under any circumstances, favor action which might risk war with Japan. Senator Richard Russell asserted that, instead of policing the world to maintain peace, we should rely upon our neutrality legislation to "quarantine" us against war. Senator La Follette stated that he was opposed to anything which, by implication or otherwise, might ultimately require the United States to use force.

The statement which received the widest publicity was that issued by Hiram Johnson on October 19, the eve of Norman Davis' departure for Brussels.[59] Speaking of the coming conference, the Senator said, "We want no union with welching nations who will . . . tell us we must lead mankind to save the world." Mr. Davis, he insisted, would not be going to Europe unless an agreement had been reached in

[58] The references in this paragraph are to articles printed on October 17 and 18.

[59] *San Francisco Examiner*, October 20, p. 1.

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advance between England and the United States. Mr. Roosevelt had no right to make a mystery of what he meant by a "quarantine" and, unless he intended nothing but words, the inevitable result would be war.

Even a cursory look at the record shows that the Administration observed Mr. Hearst's tactics closely from the outset. At his press conference on October 6, Mr. Roosevelt made some remarks about excerpts from editorials around the country, presumably those in the *New York Times*. He failed, however, to mention that they were mostly in his favor but concentrated instead upon the editorial written by—to use his own words—"the old man of the seas—old man Hearst." This, he declared, was "the silliest ever . . . perfectly terrible—awful. Says it means this is getting us into war and a lot more of that." A few days later, Mr. Ickes recorded in his diary that the Hearst press was after Mr. Roosevelt "full cry" for his Chicago address and that the President had said he wanted to remind Hearst that he had been responsible for an absolutely unjustifiable war with Spain.[60] At about the same time, Pierrepont Moffat noted in his diary that Hearst was "alleged to be about to start a campaign against the idea of a 'quarantine'".[61] When the campaign got underway, Mr. Roosevelt clearly showed his concern. On the day Norman Davis sailed, the President issued a statement which was generally accepted as a reply to Senator Johnson's attack.[62] Obviously addressing himself to the accusation that we had an understanding with the British, Mr. Roosevelt asserted that we were "of course" entering the Nine Power Conference without any prior commitments. He also emphasized that the purpose of the meeting was to seek a *peaceable* solution of the Sino-Japanese conflict. Off the record, the President dictated some instructions to guide Mr. Davis in his relations with the British.[63] The British

[60] Ickes, *Secret Diary*, II, 227.

[61] *The Moffat Papers*, p. 155.

[62] *New York Times*, October 20, p. 15.

[63] *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937*, IV, 85. The memorandum was also sent to Ambassador Bingham in London who conveyed its contents to Mr. Eden (*ibid.*, p. 114).

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Cabinet, these said, must recognize that there was such a thing as American public opinion. Mr. Davis must make clear, " at every step ", that the United States would neither take the lead at Brussels nor be made a "tail to the British kite as is now being charged by the Hearst press and others."

There can be little doubt therefore that the " quarantine " speech provoked a barrage from prominent isolationists and that this barrage had its effect upon the Administration. There can also be little doubt that considerable evidence of approval of the speech came to the attention of the Administration but was not accepted as weighing substantially in the balance. Perhaps an extensive study would reveal a wider tide of opinion against the address to support the Administration's view. But until such a study is made, it seems pertinent to continue asking whether the Administration's judgment was not unduly governed by its sensitivity to the attacks of leading isolationists.

DOROTHY BORG

NEW YORK, N. Y.

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# REVIEWS

*Wilson: The New Freedom.* By ARTHUR S. LINK. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1956.—xiii, 504 pp. $7.50.

Woodrow Wilson has been one of the most widely studied and interpreted of American presidential leaders; some of the keenest-minded historical scholars have produced brilliant critiques of him and his times. Yet Link, in this second volume of his truly monumental biography, marshaling strong evidence to substantiate new theses, effectively reshapes many previous conceptions of Wilson and the New Freedom. Some mystery about certain elements in Wilson's character remains, but, thanks to Link's painstaking research and thoughtful analysis, there can be little doubt what that character was. The Wilson of the triumphs and tragedies of the First World War and the Versailles Treaty logically follows from the Wilson that Link has portrayed in his first two volumes.

As for the New Freedom from the fall of 1912 through that of 1914, which is the scope of the present volume, there Link's lucid presentation penetrates almost every shadow, and brings lines previously hazy into dramatically sharp focus. In main outline it is a familiar story: Wilson's organization of his cabinet, his assumption of command over the Democratic party and majority in Congress, and the enactment of the Underwood Tariff, Federal Reserve Act, and trust legislation. In foreign policy, there were the complex maneuvers involving the Orient and Latin America. To most of these, Link brings a new, significant and interesting outlook.

Among Progressives, those who supported the New Freedom were clearly well to the right. To them, progressivism meant a limited, negative intervention on the part of the government to restore the free market for small enterprisers. Theirs was the classic Democratic position before the Civil War: states' rights, low tariffs, and as few restraints as possible on individuals. It is consistent enough that a generation later so many of the advocates of the New Freedom became Liberty Leaguers, while one of Wilson's warm admirers, Herbert Hoover, led the ideological onslaught against the New Deal.

There were significant divergences from these principles. Wil-



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son's conservative Secretary of Agriculture, David F. Houston, no advocate of federal aid to farmers, nevertheless was responsible for basic grant-in-aid legislation through which he impressed high federal standards upon the states. It was a fundamental move away from states' rights and toward the welfare state, although surely neither Wilson nor Houston saw it that way. Further, in his first two years as President, Wilson made at least limited concessions to more advanced Progressives and organized labor. That seemed to be as far as he would go, for by the fall of 1914, with depression threatening, he considered his New Freedom program at an end, resisted further reforms, and was conciliatory toward business. It was not the end, for in 1916, as Link has pointed out in his *Wilson and the Progressive Era,* Wilson gave in to pressures from the advanced Progressives, so that much of the New Nationalism as well as the New Freedom became law during his first administration.

This demonstrates that Wilson was politically rather more resilient than Link's generalizations would indicate. Wilson's high-minded and high-flying oratorical rhetoric (his "political poetry"), his tendency to act as though he had a monopoly upon truth and righteousness, and his intolerance of critics were all there. In addition, as Link points out: "He was interested in ideas chiefly to the degree to which they could be put to practical use and hardly at all for their own sake. Thus because his thinking was pragmatic rather than philosophical, he . . . tended to judge public men, both historical and contemporary, not by their thought but by their actions; he was rarely an original thinker." This might be damning in a scholar, but is a redeeming component of success in a presidential leader.

Wilson seemed to be pragmatic mainly in domestic policy, while in foreign affairs he was singularly naïve and impractical. His quixotic adventures in Mexico seem to have been an almost endless pursuit of an ideological will-o'-the-wisp: democratization of the Mexicans. Part of the trouble with his policies toward Latin America and Asia grew out of his firm racist beliefs, which, together with his religious benevolence, led him to dabble in what Link aptly labels "missionary diplomacy". Toward Europe, Wilson fared better. House's mission in 1914 to try to end the armaments race, far from being foolish, Link feels, might have prevented the First World War if it had come a year earlier.

Link has been indefatigable in his research. He has examined some thirty-nine manuscript collections, numerous periodicals, and newspapers from Budapest to Buenos Aires to Tokyo. His work incidentally provides a firmly affirmative answer to the

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question, "Can multi-volumed biographies be really justified?" The details he provides are so vivid and convincing that *Wilson: The New Freedom* is both more valuable and more readable than his condensed *Wilson: The Progressive Era.*

FRANK FREIDEL

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

*Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power.* By HOWARD K. BEALE. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956.—xxiii, 600 pp. $6.00.

This book, the latest in the distinguished series of Albert Shaw Lectures on Diplomatic History, does not pretend to cover all the episodes attending the emergence of the United States to world power during Theodore Roosevelt's presidency. There is no account of the Panama episode, and there are only incidental references to the activities of the new world power in the Caribbean area when these illuminate relations with Great Britain or Germany. After a brief introductory chapter about Roosevelt the man, there are two chapters dealing first with Roosevelt and expansion prior to 1897, and second with his views and actions on the subject of imperialism and power politics between 1897 and his entry into the White House. Although there are many new facts presented from the Roosevelt, Lodge, Henry White and many other collections of manuscripts, they do not compel any significant changes in the presently accepted story unless it be the great influence attributed to Brooks Adams. They do supply new data in support of it. The third long chapter of ninety pages is the most valuable in the book. It is concerned with the growth of friendship and of an informal partnership between Britain and the United States and shows that Roosevelt strongly favored and aided the process, always, of course, with the expectation that Britain should go much more than half way in settling any dispute between the partners. The tremendous importance of the good relations and working coöperation between these two Powers has been recognized by every writer, but there is yet no adequate history of the affair. Mr. Beale makes a large contribution toward filling that gap. The fourth chapter, almost equally long, tells of Roosevelt and China, of Roosevelt's attitude toward the Boxer troubles and the presence of the Russians in Manchuria, toward the unsuccessful American China Development Company, and toward the Chinese boycott of American goods induced by the exclusion policy of the United States. The fifth chapter, also long, gives an account of Roosevelt and the

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balance of power in the Far East. The chief subjects treated are Roosevelt's policies and activities in ending the Russo-Japanese war. The last and longest chapter covers the Algeciras Conference and relations with Germany. It also includes Mr. Beale's conclusions about Roosevelt's rôle in international relations.

The first impression anyone must receive in reading the book is to be awed by the prodigious amount of research that has been done. The imposing list of sources in the preface is more than substantiated by the footnotes. There are 1997 footnotes occupying 116 pages in the back of the book. In addition there is a sprinkling of footnotes at the bottom of pages in the text. Many of the footnotes refer not to one but to fifteen or twenty sources. So great has been the collection of materials that portions of the book read like a string of notes, as if Mr. Beale had been overwhelmed by his own notes instead of melting them down and molding them into a work of art.

The very mass of Roosevelt material may account for what seems to be an exaggerated view of the rôle he played. Thus Roosevelt, Lodge, Mahan and other associates are pictured (p. 57) as responsible for the decision to annex Hawaii in 1897. Actually, the Republican party was committed to annexation, as their platform of 1896 shows, and if anyone had to persuade McKinley to carry out the party's program, a good case could be made that John W. Foster and others were more influential than the Assistant Secretary of the Navy and his friends. Again Roosevelt is given a more decisive part in the Russo-Japanese negotiations at Portsmouth and especially in the Algeciras Conference than the facts would seem to justify. Not many scholars will accept Mr. Beale's conclusion that Roosevelt by understanding and sympathy could have changed the course of Chinese history in the twentieth century (pp. 248-252). Because he attributes such vast power to Roosevelt, Mr. Beale holds him responsible for the later and present disasters in world affairs (pp. 456-458).

Neither will many scholars accept Mr. Beale's conclusions on the accuracy of Roosevelt's letter to Thayer regarding the ultimatum to Germany during the second Venezuelan affair. Mr. Beale says Roosevelt's reputation for veracity depends on this decision and he devotes many pages (pp. 393-431) to an analysis of the evidence, although earlier (p. 154) he merely asserted, without analysis, that Roosevelt's story of the warning he claimed to have given Germany and France in 1904 is unsupported by any evidence. Mr. Beale concludes that the letter to Thayer is essentially correct and that at least a firm warning backed by force was given to Germany. To the argument that no records

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have ever been found, Mr. Beale says that Roosevelt frequently engaged in personal negotiations outside the State Department so that the absence of a record is not strange. Granted, but what seems so convincing to many is the absence of records from the German archives, which have been completely open and thoroughly searched and about which Mr. Beale says nothing. The only possible way in which the ultimatum or firm warning could have reached the German government and have had any effect on German policy, as Mr. Beale believes it had, would be by means of a cable from the German Ambassador. No record of any has ever been found, nor has any document been located which indicates that any of the German officials, who would have been compelled to communicate with each other by other than verbal means, recognized any such warning as Roosevelt described. Mr. Beale's other arguments on this subject are also not convincing.

One serious error of fact should be noted. Mr. Beale says (p. 322), "... the United States was the first nation to recognize this destruction of Korean freedom, which she was by solemn treaty obligated to guarantee." There was no such guarantee.

W. STULL HOLT

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

*La Follette and the Rise of the Progressives in Wisconsin.* By ROBERT S. MAXWELL. Madison, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1956.—viii, 271 pp. $4.50.

The key to an understanding of national trends can often best be discovered through the study of local trends; this is a time-honored generalization among historians. Anyone who questions it should read this study of progressivism in Wisconsin by Robert S. Maxwell, for his book is a fine example of the value of monographs on individual states in expanding our understanding of the national scene. Wisconsin, of course, was not a typical state during the Progressive era. It was rather the clearly recognized leader of the reform movement of the early twentieth century. Yet this book brings out time and again both the relationships between the reforms of Wisconsin and those worked out in other states, and the origins of those reforms in earlier history, state and national. Thus it is truly a history of progressivism in microcosm.

Maxwell describes the reforms instituted in Wisconsin between 1900 and 1914 and the political maneuvering that accompanied their enactment. His account of the laws and of the administrative boards that supervised their operation is much superior to

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his discussion of political developments, which leaves many questions unanswered, but since the reforms are more important than the details of local squabbles, this is a minor weakness. He portrays the period as marked by an expansion of the functions of the state into new areas and by a firm belief in the theory that the evils of a democratic system can be cured by more democracy. The really unique aspects of Wisconsin reforms, he argues, were neither their originality nor their radical nature. It was their comprehensiveness and practicality, and the way they were administered by the boards of experts set up to execute them, that gave these reforms their distinctiveness. The experts, particularly men like Tax Commissioner Nils P. Haugen, and Balthasar H. Meyer of the Railroad Commission, are the real heroes of Maxwell's book. Since so many of them were professors at the University of Wisconsin, his account of their activities will be particularly interesting to all members of university faculties. Indeed, the chapter on "The State and the University", in which are described the contributions to the progressive movement of the University of Wisconsin, then at one of the high points in its distinguished history, is one of Maxwell's best.

La Follette is the dominant figure of this book, but Maxwell makes clear that he was only one among many who were responsible for the "Wisconsin Idea". As a matter of fact, the author's interpretation of "Fighting Bob" is rather unfriendly. Although he grants that La Follette was a great statesman and "the conscience of the Republican Party", he pictures him as consumed by ambition, intolerant of opposition, long-winded, sometimes neglectful of his pledges, cynically ruthless in his use of patronage (as in the case of his notoriously political game wardens, who spent their time "hunting for men who will vote for La Follette"), and, in general, as a cold-blooded and extremely adept politician. La Follette's success, Maxwell intimates, was due quite as much to his ability to raise money, to select, and then to oversimplify, a few key issues on which his foes were vulnerable, to build up a powerful machine, and to ride to power over the political corpses of former friends, as it was due to his zeal for the common man.

Everyone will not agree with this picture, and many will quarrel with some of Maxwell's comments on other Wisconsin figures of the progressive era. But this remains an excellent book. Clear, brief, and well written, it is neither more nor less than what it pretends to be: a sound and important monograph.

JOHN A. GARRATY

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

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*The Colonial American in Britain.* By WILLIAM L. SACHSE. Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1956.—ix, 290 pp. $5.50.

In this readable and informative book Mr. Sachse has undertaken "to bring into focus the manifold activities of hundreds of Americans who set sail for a British destination, during the seventeen decades of our colonial era, by examining the motives which drew them across the Atlantic and the business or pleasure which engaged them while abroad." His definition of an American includes the immigrant who had found some fixed identification with the colonial community. Notice is given the not inconsiderable number of misfits who from the earliest days of settlement returned home in disappointment soon after their arrival in America, but the author is primarily concerned with those travelers who represented the "more dynamic aspects of colonial society." Although the study ranges over the entire colonial period, the emphasis in point of time naturally falls on the eighteenth century.

The book might be described as an essay, or series of essays, on the subject of colonial dependency. Whether the reader follows here the New England Puritan who in Cromwell's day had returned to share the triumph of his party in England, the young Virginian who later sought ordination as an Anglican clergyman, the American student at Eton, Oxford, Edinburgh, or the Inns of Court, the merchant or planter in London on business, the emissary for colony or college, or the ambitious seeker after political preferment, the discussion draws attention to some area of colonial life that was marked by a significant dependence upon the connection with Britain. The volume is topical in its arrangement and very largely factual in its content. Who had occasion to go to England? What colonies and what social groups did they represent? What were the costs, and how were the arrangements for the trip made? And what did the colonist do once he reached England? These are the kinds of questions the author has sought to answer.

His method is very largely descriptive. It must be said that the text adds little to our understanding of the institutional ties joining the new world to the old and that its conclusions provide few surprises. Nevertheless, the book adds significantly to the documentation we have on a signficant relationship. Those who do not find time to read the full text will mark it as a reference work to which they may have repeated occasion to return.

The colonists who undertook the journey to England were almost exclusively British in their origins, and more commonly

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English. Even on the eve of the Revolution, the voyage was viewed as a trip to the homeland. But that visit might sharpen the colonist's sense of his identification with America. Not only did he often find in England an offensive ignorance of provincial distinctions which encouraged him to accept designation simply as an American, but in the shortcomings of British society and politics he frequently saw cause for pride in that designation. The notion among Americans that England was decadent and that the future belonged to the new world, Mr. Sachse makes clear, owed much to those Americans who in the years before the Revolution had visited England.

WESLEY FRANK CRAVEN

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

*The Chatham Administration, 1766-1768.* By JOHN BROOKE. London, Macmillan & Co Ltd; New York, St Martin's Press, 1956.—xiv, 400 pp. $6.50.

This is a very detailed study of the parliamentary groups that followed prominent English politicians during the short period when William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, then mentally and physically ill, was the nominal head of a ministry which Burke, in one of his famous parliamentary speeches, described as "an Administration, so checkered and speckled . . . such a piece of diversified mosaic . . . that it was, indeed, a very curious show, but utterly unsafe to touch, and unsure to stand on." It is the author's contention that the Chatham administration, while admittedly diversified, was not uniquely so, that Burke's animadversions could be applied to every administration at a time when no single party could hope to govern by its own parliamentary strength alone. An administration, he tells us, was built up around "the court party", i.e., those members of parliament who looked to the king as their political head, "with one or more of the political groups added, and with the goodwill of the independents," i.e., those members not connected with any group, notably the country gentlemen. He calls these groups "parties" for want of a better term, but he shows that the word party, as applied to them, had few of the implications that it has today. A party such as the Rockinghams, the Bedfords, the Grenvilles, the Chathamites—and it is with these that he is especially concerned, not with Whigs and Tories, names that have no place in a realistic discussion of English parties at this time—was a coalition of smaller parliamentary groups interconnected by the friendship of their leaders with the party leader, upon whom

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the party depended for such unity and coherence as it possessed. Burke's definition of party as "a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed" does not fit any of the political groups that existed when he wrote it, not even the Rockinghams, in whose interests he labored and to whom he gave, by his speeches and writings, a posthumous reputation for political wisdom and purity which the author deems undeserved.

Mr. Brooke, a disciple of Sir Lewis Namier and his closest collaborator in the monumental History of Parliament now in course of preparation, bases his study avowedly on foundations laid by Namier. It is the first volume to appear in a projected series on "England in the Age of the American Revolution", the title of a book of Namier's published more than twenty-five years ago. It presents a great amount of contemporary source material, especially private correspondence, which shows how anachronistic and oversimplified were the older ideas about English parties at a time when the history of parties is to be sought for in the history of men, "their friendships, their connections, their ambitions, their interests." This book is not easy reading. Historians who work on the principle of exposition by excerption are never easy reading. But it is a book that scholars in the field will study, and for which they will be grateful.

ROBERT LIVINGSTON SCHUYLER

NEW YORK, N. Y.

*Mirage in the West: A History of the French Image of American Society to 1815.* By DURAND ECHEVERRIA. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957.—xvii, 300 pp. $5.00.

This sane and scholarly study is not a work of exploration but one of detailed critical evaluation. Franco-American relations have provoked a large but fragmentary literature. The long hostility of the colonial era was followed by a romantic interlude (c. 1765-94), an estrangement (1795-99), and a cautious, complex and sometimes strained friendship from 1799 to 1815. Since 1815 Franco-American friendship has had its vicissitudes but it has been more realistic and comprehensible.

Durand Echeverria, who is associate professor of French at Brown University, has performed a valuable service by analyzing the shifting image of America and American society that prevailed in France from the eve of the War of Independence to the fall of Napoleon. The image helped not only to shape international developments but to shape events in France itself during

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that critical half-century. The author is justified in calling this image a mirage, for it was often most persuasive when most illusory. As De Tocqueville later admitted in *L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution* (Book III, ch. 1), "*Les Américains semblant ne faire qu'exécuter ce que nos écrivains avaient conçu: ils donnaient la substance de la réalite à ce que nous étions en train de rever.*"

Mr. Echeverria substantiates the compulsion of the French in that romantic age to vindicate their surmises about America. In his opinion, "They always saw not what was there, but what, consciously or unconsciously, they were compelled to see. They discovered each time only a reflection of their own aspirations or of their own fears and prejudices" (p. 281).

To dissect a dream, assess the impulses that inspired it, and compare it at each step to the existing actualities calls for an exceptional blend of prudence and sensitivity. Gilbert Chinard, in a perceptive Foreword, pays tribute to the value and relevance of Mr. Echeverria's well-documented analysis. "This account of the rise and fall of an ideal", Chinard observes, "presents a striking dramatic unity; it is also very timely" (p. vii). The timeliness is obvious today when it is so urgent that nations learn to view one another with saner insight and fewer illusions.

The flattering image of America that took form in France after the middle of the eighteenth century was largely a creation of the *philosophes*. During the War of Independence it became an important asset to the rebellious colonists, and sour reports from disenchanted French officers who saw American society at first hand did little to modify it. Franklin's personality and attainments fostered the faith in American religious tolerance, civil liberty, social equality and intellectual progress that spread through French literary circles. Yet there was also, as Echeverria notes, a non-literary, an unrecorded pragmatic influence, that supplemented the ideational enthusiasm. In the French Revolution popular resentment against feudal rights was invariably strongest in "those areas which contained the largest number of peasant veterans of the American War" (p. 115).

"The American Dream" reached its culmination in the years 1784-94 and then disintegrated at the same moment as Robespierre's syllogistic paradise. Under the Consulate and Empire the dream was still popular with a limited group of Ideologues who admired Jefferson, and Napoleon utilized it with pragmatic caution. But it never recovered its pristine splendor.

It may be that the author, through his dependence on printed sources, has overestimated the influence of ideas on decisions and actions. But he has re-created and evaluated a temporary cli-

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mate of opinion with admirable understanding and objectivity, and with a minimum of errors. Two lines have been transposed (p. 28), Joseph Napoleon should be Joseph Bonaparte (p. 226) and Hohenlinder, Hohenlinden (p. 237).

GEOFFREY BRUUN

ITHACA, NEW YORK

*France, 1940-1955.* By ALEXANDER WERTH. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1956.—xxxii, 764 pp. $6.00.

*Diversity of Worlds: France and the United States Look at Their Common Problems.* By RAYMOND ARON and AUGUST HECKSCHER. New York, Reynal & Company, 1957.—xiii, 178 pp. $3.50.

It was Marshal Smuts who, in 1940, felt prompted to deliver the verdict that "France is gone in our day and perhaps for many a day." Yet, even in defeat, the French fleet, the French Empire, and the perennial of French collaboration with Germany were sources of not a little importance and concern to the belligerents, especially to the Allies. Once these had achieved victory, the inclusion of France among the Big Five was doubtless the result of courtesy rather than a measure of France's actual contribution to that outcome; but it was also recognition of the place that France would inevitably fill. Since then, France has wrecked EDC, been involved in war in Indochina, more lately in a seeming North African impasse and in the Middle Eastern imbroglio, all matters of significance to far more than France alone.

From the American point of view, France has been the most recalcitrant ally, and the picture is widespread of her domestic management as inextricable confusion combined with appalling ineffectiveness. They manage things so much better in Germany or even in Britain. When not dismissing France with impatience as an inescapable nuisance, there remains the problem of explaining this seeming mystery. Toward an attempt at understanding, the two books under review may be regarded as contributions of quite different sorts.

Alexander Werth is concerned with an analysis of the French record since the collapse of 1940. His credentials for such an undertaking are of the best, for he has long observed the French milieu; his writings of the pre-war period are among the best analyses of a contemporary nature. This new attempt is very full and lengthy—perhaps too lengthy—and will remain of usefulness to the student of French affairs during this troubled period. Werth is at home in the confusion of French politics; while he

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can be a harsh critic of French deficiencies and of the folly of certain French actions and policies, he seeks to penetrate beneath the often bewildering surface manifestations to an understanding of fundamental forces and tendencies. There emerges from his book a picture of an entity striving to adapt itself to circumstances largely beyond its control.

If it would be unfair to criticize Werth for an excessive accent on the political aspects of the scene, the relative lack of attention to economics nevertheless constitutes a shortcoming. Merely to charge the Fourth Republic with "neglecting her capital investment" (p. 386) is an oversimplification amounting to distortion.

At the level of international politics the position is defensible that France has played a useful moderating rôle in the face of certain perhaps rash American initiatives. It is quite understandable that for France, as for other European countries, the desirability of avoiding war should have priority over that of checking the evils of communism, and France has shown that it is possible to operate with the handicap of a large Communist vote in the body politic. But here we come to the most serious limitation of Werth's book, which puts it in a category inferior to that of his earlier writings on France, an observation that holds for the general style and manner of presentation as well. One may grant that his sympathy for the plight of French workers and his dislike of those (mainly Right-wingers) who extricated themselves with greater skill than scruple are warranted; this does not constitute adequate justification for the bias of presentation. This bias distorts the treatment of Léon Blum for instance; Blum was not a strong man and made many mistakes, but the choice of epithets connected with his name reminds one that in Communist eyes Socialists are worse enemies of the workers than outright conservatives. (This, in turn, should not be read as a charge of Communist affiliation leveled at Mr. Werth.) By contrast, the relative exoneration of Laval, though warranted, is all the more interesting.

In view of this approach, it should not be surprising that the United States and its policies receive generally unsympathetic treatment. There is little difficulty in pointing to many American blunders, but when a collection of blunders adds up to a policy that has been, on the whole, neither ungenerous nor ineffectual, the reader feels inclined to ask for further explanation. To assert that, after the American election of 1952, France was given a free hand for a policy of repression in North Africa would be worthy of more dependable documentation (pp. 567 *et seq.*). The book, therefore, is in some degree disappointing; but, to

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repeat, Mr. Werth knows his subject and his account remains of significance, though it should be used with open and critical eyes.

The very considerable differences that obtain between France and the United States are the special concern of the second book, subtitled "The United States and France Look at Their Joint Problems". It is the report of a conference; sponsored by the World Peace Foundation, that gathered a group of Americans and of Frenchmen at Arden House in the spring of 1956. There may be some to question the value of such gatherings of people who, because they are generally well informed, may have relatively little to say to each other. The report is of interest nonetheless for its analysis of those differences and the placing of them in their proper perspective, where it appears that the area of agreement remains substantial.

The differences stem in large part from the undeniable fact that, to put it in simplest form, America is the mainstay and far the greatest portion of the West, especially in terms of power, whereas France is essentially a dependent. But the result of divergent historic experience and the legacy of distinct cultural patterns are of no less importance. This was recognized in the discussions, but perhaps more should have been made of the part played by the educational patterns of the two countries: French education remains directed to a relatively restricted élite and stresses abstract ideas in a way that stands in sharp contrast with the American practice.

Not a little mutual misunderstanding ensues, greater on the whole on the French side of the equation. When we come to concrete issues of the moment, differences are most pronounced in the cases of the German, the Russian, and the imperial problems. This last, to which considerable attention was given, is perhaps the one over which the divergence is most difficult of reconciliation; for, taken at their best and leaving aside substantial deviations in practice in both cases, the unqualified American espousal of self-determination is as difficult for the French to understand as is the French universalistic approach for Americans.

Only good, however little of it, can come of discussions conducted at such a high level as these were. But if Mr. Aron is right in pointing out the value of agreeing to disagree that results from acknowledging and understanding differences, Mr. Heckscher is no less sound in reminding us that such agreement is essentially negative and leaves unanswered the all important issue of how to decide upon action when there is call for such.

RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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*Fighting Warsaw: The Story of the Polish Underground State, 1939-1945.* By STEFAN KORBONSKI. Translated by F. B. Czarnomski. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1957.—495 pp. $6.75.

Modern war is far more than an *ultima ratio regis.* Waged by the world's peoples, whose extremists inevitably come to the fore, no civilization can emerge from it unshaken, whether in victory or in defeat. In our time, subversion and the *coup d'état* have accordingly been recognized as accepted modes of warfare. Moreover, actual military occupation by an enemy army can be resisted, for by night the disinherited can ply garrotte and printing press. Many may bewail this truly "popular" form of warfare, but no one can turn back the clock past the time for which Napoleon and Clausewitz set it.

The resistance movement, defined as a fully developed apparatus for carrying on irregular warfare, reached its most advanced state during the Second World War. As each successive European nationality was flattened by the Nazi behemoth, it began to seek ways in which to retaliate. Some chose passive means—whispering campaigns and industrial slow-downs. Others chose force—the bomb, the knife, and the machine pistol. And in the history of this period the most striking experience belonged to the Poles. Willing to use any and every effective weapon, despite its cost in the blood of hostages, they successfully contrived an underground state that survived Nazi rule only to succumb to that of the Soviets.

It is extremely unfortunate that a detailed analysis of the Polish experiment in this type of warfare has not as yet been written, either in English or in any other language. Nor is the available literature extensive, for the only major studies that have appeared heretofore are Bor-Komorowski's *The Secret Army,* Karski's *Story of a Secret State,* Stypułkowski's *Invitation to Moscow,* and the volume *Armia Krajowa,* third in a series published by the General Sikorski Historical Institute in London on the history of the Polish Armed Forces during the Second World War. Korbonski's memoirs are therefore most welcome. However, despite the publisher's blurb ("In these adventures is mirrored the entire organization, strategy, tactics and inside story of the Polish underground . . . ."), the contents of *Fighting Warsaw* are best described in the author's own words (p. 30): ". . . the whole story has not yet been written, and it is difficult to draw any final deductions from history when the last chapter is still missing."

The personality of Korbonski, a young lawyer and a minor leader in the Peasant Party before the war, emerges clearly from

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these pages. Enterprising and strong-willed, energetic and conscientious, he is a realist, though coated with the romantic tendencies so deeply embedded in the Polish temperament. In the first careless, naïve, often almost silly efforts that were made to form the underground, he assisted Rataj and Niedziałkowski, General Tokarzewski and Colonel (later General) Grot-Rowecki, the men who gave it initial form and substance. After successfully establishing radio communications between the Government-in-Exile and the underground's political administration, he was transferred to the High Command of the Home Army and appointed the Commander-in-Chief's Plenipotentiary for Civil Resistance. As chief of Civil Resistance and director of the Department of Internal Affairs, he remained throughout the war at the inner core of the movement, and became in its last phase the Government Plenipotentiary and Deputy Prime Minister following the arrest of Jankowski by the Soviets.

*Fighting Warsaw* is therefore a most valuable book, and the author's abilities as an observer contribute heavily to its merit. Unlike several other writers on the same subject, he has chosen frankly to portray the asperity which so frequently characterized relations between the Government-in-Exile and Warsaw, the civil and the military authorities, and the leaders of the various political parties. Unity was achieved through force—Nazi force. He also deftly sketches in the atmosphere of conspiracy—constant, yet low-keyed tension. Hence this book will fascinate the general reader, and prove most useful to the historian. But the latter will deeply regret the publisher's failure to supply an index, and, despite the excellence of the translation, the occasional misspelling of place and organizational names.

WILLIAM WISELEY

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

*German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945: A Study of Occupation Policies.* By ALEXANDER DALLIN. London, Macmillan & Co Ltd; New York, St Martin's Press, 1957.—xx, 700 pp. 60*s.*; $10.00.

In the preface Mr. Dallin states his objective: to render an account of German policy in the invasion, occupation, and retreat from Russia. He has skillfully mastered this immense subject. A good style and enough liveliness of caption and comment make for bearable reading of this monstrous chapter in German history. Few will enjoy reading the dreadful story. Most will admire the capacity and dexterity with which the author handles the many complicated details of this vast Nazi undertaking.

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The book is divided into four major sections. Part I gives the historical setting for the invasion of 1941, describes the motivations of Nazi leadership, and outlines the organization of occupation government. It was clear from the outset that the German *Herrenvolk* would subjugate the East European *Untermensch*. If life appeared to be a bit more bearable under army rule before the civilians arrived, it was not because of any basic differences in occupation philosophy. The difference was that the army hardly got a chance to settle down before new calls to glory or the greedy civilians moved it on. Then arrived the new viceroys with their supercilious behavior and their yellow-brown uniforms—the "golden pheasants" of Rosenberg's *Ostministerium*.

Part II unfolds the vast scene of occupied Russia, from the Baltic States into the recesses of the Caucasus. Each area reflected a different set of German premises, practices and personalities. Dallin describes a fantastic panorama of struggle for power among the major Nazi agencies and personalities. Those who would describe the functioning of bureaucracy in political and sociological generalities will be brought to earth by the record of ruthless competition and intrigues involving Himmler, Rosenberg, Bormann, Goebbels, Ribbentrop, assorted generals, and a host of lesser aspirants. Here, as elsewhere, the narrative strikes an effective balance between political analysis and succinct personality sketches. A chapter on "Masters and Serfs", describing the Nazi scale of liquidation and survival, reads like a bad dream until one recalls the numerous instances where often the same peoples were subjected to similar treatment by other totalitarian régimes after the Nazi collapse.

Part III is a painstaking balance sheet of German objectives and accomplishments in various functional areas. From the natives' point of view the possible advantages of freedom from economic communism were quite overshadowed by German plans to make Eastern Europe a gigantic colony and by the ruthless methods employed to achieve that aim. The total industrial-agricultural contribution of the entire eastern area to the Reich was only a seventh of what was obtained from France alone. POW's and forced labor suffered atrociously from a combination of the fortunes of war and the full practical implications of the *Untermensch* philosophy. Nazi *Kulturpolitik* was futile; "afraid of rearing its own enemies, Germany failed to support the most articulate enemies of Bolshevism" (p. 471). German religious policy was the only area in which there was substantial improvement over Soviet conditions, paradoxically resulting from a kind of local tolerance deriving from a broader program of *divide et impera* among the various nationalities.

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Part IV deals with political warfare. This was an area shunned by the Nazi leaders until desperation in the last year of the war drove them to various expedients. Now recurred the tale of intrigue played among the majors (Himmler, Bormann, Goebbels), with Rosenberg a sad loser and Ribbentrop tolerated on the sidelines. Hitler accepted the whole business only with the clear understanding that it was to be propaganda and nothing else—these slogans of freedom, national autonomy, and opportunities for a better life in collaboration for German victory. Himmler did a complete about-face, hauled General Vlasov in from limbo (where he had been kept during years of inter-bureau jungle warfare), and unleashed him for a few fitful interludes of fighting before the collapse. Dallin concludes: "In the three years from the invasion of Russia to the crisis of 1944 German *Ostpolitik* suffered a complete shipwreck. The stubbornness with which Nazi Germany clung to its dogma [of inferior non-German peoples] against all empirical evidence, the determined bitterness with which the Nazi leaders fought each other, and the frenzy with which they sought a way out of the impasse which had been aggravated by the effects of *Ostpolitik,* revealed a fundamental deficiency in the totalitarian organism" (p. 677).

Nazi eastern policy was motivated primarily neither by military nor by economic considerations. It was pure aggression, brutal and callous, for the purpose of political and racial domination. Some moderation in the form of decency and sensibility did occur in certain localities and under certain conditions, but the basic philosophic assumptions were never altered to the final day. And all who swept along with the Nazi juggernaut by conviction or momentum remain more or less tainted by the "Hitler in themselves" they unwittingly revealed.

Mr. Dallin's book is the standard work on this subject. There will be protests and more apologies, but few can seriously quarrel with the extensive, massive documentation that underlies his study. One question comes from this reviewer. Mr. Dallin makes some scattered references to German *Ostpolitik* during World War I. Ideologically and politically Ludendorff *did* put Germans on the beginning of the journey that culminated in the later *Ostpolitik,* but it would have been profitable to know something more of that venture and the degree to which it did or did not anticipate the later events.

HENRY CORD MEYER

POMONA COLLEGE

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*A History of Soviet Russia.* By GEORG VON RAUCH. Translated by Peter and Annette Jacobsohn. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1957.—xiii, 493 pp. $6.75.

Although the literature on Soviet Russia is voluminous, there have been very few attempts at a general historical survey of the period. Therefore, the appearance of this volume, published originally in German and translated into English by Peter and Annette Jacobsohn, has been awaited with interest in the hope that it could be recommended as a general introduction to the subject and used as a college text.

Professor von Rauch begins his account with a Prologue which briefly sketches the background to 1917, largely in terms of the revolutionary movement in Russia. This is followed by nine chapters, a Bibliography, a Chronology and an Index of Names. Within each of the chapters, which present the material chronologically, the author has included a great variety of information on a wide range of subjects without overwhelming the reader with excessive detail. The Chronology is helpful, though it contains several inaccuracies, and the Bibliography is useful despite a few omissions and the inclusion of the spurious *My Uncle Joe* by Budu Svanidze.

With the exception of an unexpected religious-philosophical flight at the conclusion of the book, the text is straightforward, generally objective and restrained. But the author quite properly states his theses in the Preface and Prologue. He emphatically rejects the view that Bolshevism was inevitable in Russia and the frequently expressed assumption that her people are somehow inherently incapable of developing democratic institutions. While recognizing the existence of certain oriental influences in Russian history and of periods of " isolation and alienation ", he emphasizes the " indissoluble bond between the culture of Russia and that of the west since the days of Vladimir the Saint and Yaroslav the Wise." He believes that the leading motifs since 1917 are the interaction of nationalism and internationalism and the discrepancies between theory and practice, the latter making the era " one of the greatest mockeries of world history."

Unfortunately, the positive qualities of presentation and approach are considerably offset by the lack of balance and precision in a number of descriptions and discussions. The sections on Soviet relations with the Chinese Nationalists before 1927 and on the purges of 1936-1938 may be cited as illustrations. In his account of the ill-fated Communist-Kuomintang alliance von

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Rauch does not make clear the peculiar position of the Sun Yat-sen régime in China, neglecting to mention the contemporary existence of the officially recognized Nanking government and the important treaty of 1924 which Moscow concluded with it. As a result his history of this significant episode in Soviet foreign relations is badly out of focus. In the case of the purges, the reader is apt to be misled and confused by the internal contradictions in the narrative and the failure of the author to differentiate between well-substantiated material and questionable interpretations based on unsupported testimony.

Equally distressing are the many errors which appear despite an apparent effort to eliminate the inaccuracies in the original German text. Space permits only a few examples. In a number of places in Chapter I, new-style dates are given as old style, thus advancing by thirteen days the time of many crucial events of 1917. The number of Japanese troops in Siberia was more than four times the 17,000 figure cited (p. 92). The American Relief Administration can scarcely be termed a "great international aid organization" (p. 130). The Soviet government had no accredited diplomatic representative in Washington in 1918 (p. 96). Despite the continued presence of Allied diplomats in Russia after the Bolshevik coup, there is no justification for writing of *de facto* diplomatic relations between their governments and the Soviet régime (pp. 96, 145). The Left Social Revolutionaries were included in the Sovnarkom some two months before the meeting of the Constituent Assembly and not, as the author states, afterwards because of their support of the Bolsheviks in that body (p. 93). The statement that concern over the "liberation" policy advocated by the Republicans in the campaign of 1952 was partly responsible for the October convocation of the Nineteenth Party Congress (which was announced in the summer) is indeed startling (p. 419) and is only one instance of assertions of improbable causation.

In view of these defects, the book should be recommended and used with great caution. It is to be hoped that a second revised and corrected edition will soon be forthcoming so that the potential value of the volume may be realized.

ROBERT PAUL BROWDER

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO

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*Moscow-Peking Axis: Strengths and Strains.* By HOWARD L. BOORMAN, ALEXANDER ECKSTEIN, PHILIP E. MOSELY, BENJAMIN SCHWARTZ. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1957.—xxi, 227 pp. $3.50; text, $2.75.

This book is the outgrowth of a Council on Foreign Relations study group which during 1955 and 1956 examined the Sino-Soviet alliance.

In the opening chapter, Howard L. Boorman skillfully places the Moscow-Peking axis in its historical context, analyzes its foreign policies and evaluates its international impact. His sober conclusions are: The alliance rests on common interests and reciprocal practical benefits. The price Moscow is paying for this useful arrangement is not exorbitant. On the other hand, the alliance allows Peking to pursue its present national goals and international objectives.

Boorman concedes Communist China's growing influence in Moscow, but sees no evidence of direct political influence there or among Communists in Europe (p. 51). The reviewer recalls a conversation he had in 1954 in Belgrade where a high Communist official told him that the Yugoslav leaders were keenly interested in Maoist literature. The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and recent developments in Moscow and Eastern Europe further suggest that the author perhaps underestimates the impact of Mao on the non-Chinese Communist world.

An analysis of China's economy is an arduous task because of the lack of reliable data. Under the circumstances Alexander Eckstein's contribution is all the more impressive. Making effective use of modern economic analysis, he reaches a number of important conclusions: Communist China will face increasing difficulties in meeting its export commitments during the coming years; on purely economic grounds the basis for trade between China and the Soviet Union appears quite modest; a high level of trade between the two countries is disadvantageous for both; Soviet export commitments to China are directly competitive with domestic demands although they do not constitute a critical drain upon Soviet resources. Eckstein found no sign of Soviet "exploitation" in China nor of integration plans for the two economies—further evidence of Moscow's cautious China policy. Western strategic embargoes impose no critical strains upon the communist economies although they do increase the interdependence between China and the Soviet Union. The author points out, however, that such dependence is not necessarily detrimental to the interests of the United States since a China left to her own devices may be an even more serious threat to peace than one allied with the Soviet Union.

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Benjamin Schwartz, concerned with ideology, stresses its continuing crucial importance in Soviet-Chinese relations. He sees one of the main problems in the "constant wearing away of the core of shared beliefs". This weakening of the ideological link—so conspicuous in 1957—places the alliance increasingly on the "shifting sands of power interests". It is disappointing, however, that Schwartz's lucid analysis concentrates so heavily on a review of the past, for he is among the few Westerners qualified to assess the significance of the recent perplexing developments in Moscow and Peking.

The vast borderlands between China and the Soviet Union are the subject of Boorman's pioneer study, "The Borderlands and the Sino-Soviet Alliance". He discovers definite signs of Moscow-Peking coöperation but also a gradual reduction of Soviet influence in these areas.

Philip E. Mosely's "The Moscow-Peking Axis in World Politics" reviews the whole range of Peking's targets as well as the policy alternatives open to the Chinese Communists. Alone among the contributors he outlines some effective United States responses to Peking's strategy. While a discussion of his suggestions is outside the scope of this review, it should be pointed out that their adoption would result in important modifications of American strategy and certainly tend to free our Far Eastern policy from its present defensive posture.

The authors offer no ground for easy optimism: irrespective of anything this country might do (or not do), a significant weakening of the Moscow-Peking axis is unlikely to occur in the near future. On the other hand, the reviewer finds that the book confirms his conviction regarding Japan's tremendous potential to cushion or to aggravate the axis' impact on Asia.

A map of the Sino-Soviet borderlands and an index would have further increased the usefulness of this important study.

PAUL F. LANGER

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

*Korea: A Study of U. S. Policy in the United Nations.* By LELAND M. GOODRICH. New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1956.—xi, 235 pp. $3.25.

This little book tells how the United States tried to handle the Korean question through the United Nations from 1947 to 1953. Most of the facts are familiar, for Professor Goodrich deals mainly with the public record, and rarely tries to go behind the scenes. But when set down in order, the known facts seem even more

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significant than they did at the time. Worked together as they are in this volume, they provide an interesting case study in the relationship of the United States to international organization.

It began almost by accident. American officials could not reach agreement with the Russians as to Korean unification in the two years after World War II. Nor could we call our occupation of South Korea really successful, either from the standpoint of efficiency or as an effort to teach democratic doctrine. Discouraged or indifferent, American policy-makers decided to unload the whole Korean question on the United Nations.

This 1947 decision reflected a desire to reduce American commitments in the Far East—a desire shared by many American military and diplomatic officials, congressmen and private citizens. Actually, however, the United States never did pull out. The new, still-feeble United Nations organization simply lacked the strength to assume the full military-economic-diplomatic burden in Korea. So the United Nations came into the picture, and the United States stayed in, as a sort of reluctant partner of the international organization. One product of this partnership was the Republic of Korea, set up chiefly by the United Nations, but with United States assistance. A second product was wartime coöperation during the Korean War from 1950 to 1953, with the United States carrying the main responsibility, but obtaining assistance from other members of the United Nations, and from the organization itself.

As Professor Goodrich shows, the partnership was not altogether a success. From 1947 to 1950 most Americans seemed more interested in pulling out than in helping the United Nations solve the Korean question. When the United States took the lead, after June 1950, many of the coöperating countries in the United Nations disapproved of policies pursued by the United States. There was never any basic understanding as to United States–United Nations goals in Korea. Was the main goal unification? Or a better life for the Koreans? Or resistance to Communist expansion? Or prevention or termination of armed conflict? And what was the best way to achieve each or all of these goals?

Still, there *was* coöperation. The United States did try to solve a major problem by working through the United Nations, even though this meant making many concessions to other Powers. Other nations did work with the United States through the United Nations despite their doubts as to American policies. Perhaps the United States should not have given the United Nations so big a problem so soon. But by doing so, we added to our world prestige, and strengthened the United Nations.

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Such are Professor Goodrich's conclusions. He is of course a warm believer in the United Nations, and a strong advocate of international organization. So is the Council on Foreign Relations, which published this volume and sponsored the research out of which it grew. One may, therefore, label this a "viewpoint" book. So it is; but Professor Goodrich has tried to state the facts objectively, and has phrased his conclusions in careful language.

This is not the end of books on our Korean troubles. Professor Goodrich has mentioned, but has not given much attention to, popular and Congressional attitudes in the United States. There is need for study of on-the-ground coöperation (and lack of it) between American officials in Korea and representatives of other UN governments. We could use much more on the background of policy-making for Korea in the United States and other nations. And when the archives open we will learn much more. But for now we can be pleased to have so useful and interesting a study as this one.

FRED HARVEY HARRINGTON

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

*Social Implications of Industrialization and Urbanization in Africa South of the Sahara.* Prepared under the auspices of UNESCO by the International African Institute, London. Paris, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1956. Distributed in the United States by UNESCO Publication Center, New York.—743 pp. $9.00; 45/–.

Fifth in the UNESCO series entitled "Tensions and Technology", this volume results from a contract made by that organization with the International African Institute in 1950. The aim was to extend and coördinate studies of the social conditions and trends among urbanized and industrialized African populations. This was to be achieved by the preparation of two papers surveying the existent literature, by conducting an inter-disciplinary study on approved lines of a selected urban community, and, lastly, by bringing together a group of experts who would appraise the results so far achieved in the study of social impact of industrialization and urbanization and who might formulate proposals regarding future research needs. Clearly reflecting this over-all plan, the book is divided into four major parts: an introductory survey by Daryll Forde, Director of the I.A.I.; one of the two surveys of current literature; preliminary reports of the urban study; and the papers delivered at the culminating conference, held in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, in September-October 1954.

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In Part One, Forde not only summarizes the general approach of the study and the broad conclusions that were reached, but fills in important background material concerned with population distribution and densities, occupational patterns and the rôle of non-African populations. He also presents briefly the wide variance in the character of industrial development and of urban populations in different parts of Africa. This section of the book may profitably be read as both introduction and conclusion to the study. The value of the demographic information, however, is reduced by the facts that most data are for 1949 and that those for Portuguese territories are before World War II. Developments in the large Portuguese territories are, in fact, covered very cursorily, nor was there a Portuguese representative at the final conference. But this is a common fault of symposia on Africa and is not entirely the fault of those associated with the other territories.

Part Two, about one quarter of the book, is a survey of recent and current field studies on the social effects of economic development in inter-tropical Africa. The other background survey prepared by the I.A.I. has been published separately under the title *Industrialization in Africa: A Report by the International African Institute for Unesco.* Both surveys were written by Meran McCulloch. About thirty investigations are summarized in the present volume, particular attention being paid to objectives, techniques of collecting information, and methods of presentation. In the summaries of results only those conclusions which are more directly relevant to economic change are included. In the final section of the survey McCulloch notes that the studies reveal that industrialization has had certain broadly similar results wherever it has taken place: migration to towns, growth of urban population characterized in the early stages by a preponderance of youth and men over women, overcrowding and slums, emergence of a laboring class with certain characteristic attitudes and problems, and formation of new types of association. But he also calls attention to important variants between urbanization in Africa and in early industrial Europe and among the several African areas. He concludes that racial tension is roughly proportional to the extent of economic competition. Finally, the factors complicating an analysis of industrialization and urbanization in Africa are noted: the nearly contemporaneous introduction of new political systems, of Christianity, of schools, and of European attitudes and customs. Parts One and Two of the book are probably the most valuable contributions. But it is already time for a supplementary survey of current studies as McCulloch's summary was prepared in early 1952 and included

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a number of studies in progress at the time for which results are now available. The bibliography given at the end of Part Two does include sixteen references which became available between completion of the survey and holding of the Abidjan conference.

The shortcomings of the studies reviewed apparently led the I.A.I. to decide upon a field program combining sampling surveys with more intensive studies of social structure and of underlying attitudes, and a team of three specialists consequently made a two-year study of a selected community, Stanleyville in the Belgian Congo. It is not clear from the three preliminary papers, which were presented by this team at Abidjan and which comprise Part Three of the volume, whether the study may be considered as a model for similar examinations. The advance character of the reports gives them a somewhat disjointed and incomplete character. Nor was it possible for each of the participants to avoid some of the pitfalls noted in earlier surveys.

Part Four, one third of the volume, consists of fifteen papers delivered at Abidjan. Some are concerned with techniques of investigation and statistical analysis of field data, others illustrate and interpret for one area social conditions that are believed to be prevalent in many centers. Many of them contain valuable insights into the processes and problems of urbanization in Africa.

UNESCO and the I.A.I. are to be congratulated for bringing out this multi-faceted study. It may be hoped that it will be followed by new summaries at regular and not too infrequent intervals. The aims of the project have largely been met, except that there was little agreement regarding the desired methods and focus of future studies, the conference finally adopting an extremely broad resolution recommending that such studies "be mainly focused on the analysis of social processes and of individual and collective behaviour with reference to the restructuring of urban life."

WILLIAM A. HANCE

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

*Central Banking after Bagehot.* By R. S. SAYERS. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press; New York, Oxford University Press, 1957.—149 pp. 18*s.*; $2.90.

In this volume, Professor Sayers has collected ten essays on central banking developments since the beginning of the century. Most of them had been published previously, but some were not available in English. A few are "period pieces", which are of

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interest today only in that they show how central banking was regarded during the earlier post-war years. Many, however, will remain a lasting contribution to the understanding of the evolution of central banking in the last fifty years—in particular, the discussions of the theoretical basis of central banking, of the bank rate in the twentieth century, and of open market operations in English central banking.

Three dominant conclusions may, I think, be drawn from the wealth of ideas and observations in these essays. First, there is no standard pattern of central banking, as banks differ from country to country and are continually evolving; although the experience of some may offer guidance to others, there are no rules applicable to all times and all places. As the author expresses it succinctly, "we have central banks for the very reason that there are no such rules." The second conclusion is that central banking is an empirical process, since the banks, in dealing with day-to-day problems, must discover where, and by what means, they can touch the economy and the monetary and banking system at sensitive spots, which of course are continually changing. Finally, the essence of central banking is the exercising of discretionary control over the monetary system; "automatic" monetary system is the very negation of central banking. The central banks may fail to develop deep enough insights into the working of the economy and of the monetary and banking system to enable them to act in the light of given circumstances; but, in Professor Sayers' view, such inherent weaknesses of central banking can, in most countries, be kept within manageable bounds. "Certainly the economic history of this century encourages the view that central bankers can be found to diagnose reasonably accurately, to act quickly, and to maintain for themselves the desirable half-way house between ivory towers and the hurly-burly of the marketplace. And as experience in central banking accumulates, it is reasonable to expect that the inherent weaknesses will be kept increasingly under control." The great inflations are, to be sure, disquieting episodes of recent monetary history; but they have been marked "by the subjection of central bankers to overriding political pressures, against which no 'fixed rules' could have stood." These, and other, views presented by Professor Sayers are illustrated by reference to actual situations.

M. A. Kriz

New York, N. Y.

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*The Sterling Area in the Postwar World: Internal Mechanism and Cohesion, 1946-1952.* By PHILIP W. BELL. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press; New York, Oxford University Press, 1956.—xxvi, 478 pp. 63*s.*; $10.10.

This study, originally undertaken as a doctoral dissertation at Princeton University, is, beyond doubt, the most comprehensive account yet written of the internal mechanism and cohesion of the sterling area between 1946 and 1952. The study is divided into three parts. The first contains a detailed but routine description of the nature of the post-war sterling area system. The second part considers the functioning of the sterling exchange standard from the vantage points of the United Kingdom, the monetarily dependent countries and the monetarily independent countries. The third and last section is concerned with an appraisal of the cohesive elements of the system.

Bell's analysis of the nature of the post-war sterling area system and the functioning of the sterling exchange standard between 1946 and 1952 contributes little to what is already known. Following Paish, and more recently Meade, he distinguishes three automatic factors of adjustment to balance-of-payments disequilibria—changes in money income and demand, changes in money supply and bank policy, and shifts in relative price levels—and proceeds to examine the extent to which adjustment to balance-of-payments disequilibria within the sterling area was effected by each. The absence of crucial data, however, precludes the possibility of coming up with significant results. This section, through no fault of the author, thus fails to measure up to the standards we have come to expect in empirical studies dealing with the adjustment problem.

If Bell's section on the sterling exchange standard is somewhat disappointing, his analysis of the factors of cohesion more than compensates for it. Much, of course, has been written about this aspect of the sterling area. Nowhere, however, have the cohesive elements—both real and alleged—been subjected to an examination as searching and penetrating. Placing heavy reliance on statistical evidence, Bell concludes that sterling area trade is overwhelmingly important only for Ireland and New Zealand; that, in so far as the Far Eastern members of the sterling area are concerned, trade with the overseas members is much more significant than trade with the United Kingdom, the importance of which, moreover, is steadily declining; that alternative markets are available for a large number of overseas sterling area exports, should the costs of membership in the sterling area become too

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high, while at the same time alternative sources of supply for Britain are not too promising; that the types of goods the overseas sterling area countries are likely to demand in increasing quantities in the future could probably be more readily obtained from the United States than from the United Kingdom; that the tie of multilateral settlements within the area is of considerably less importance than is frequently alleged and is likely to become even less so with the return to convertible currencies; and that, on the basis of post-war experience, it is not probable that Britain will be in a position, in the foreseeable future, to supply the overseas sterling area countries with large sums of development capital.

These conclusions, though disquieting for sterling area adherents, are firmly based and it would be difficult for anyone familiar with post-war developments to dispute them. It is not too much to hope that this careful analysis will do much to dispel the all too frequent tendency to attribute strength where in fact it does not exist. As Bell points out in his concluding chapter, "The present [sterling area] structure is built upon bargaining power, and the future course of the area will depend primarily upon shifts in bargaining strength and upon the utilization of positions of strength by Great Britain and individual overseas sterling area members, or overseas sterling area members acting in groups" (p. 399). It is wise to bear this in mind when assessing the future of sterling area arrangements.

ELLIOT ZUPNICK

CITY COLLEGE OF NEW YORK

*Financial Policy, 1939-45.* By R. S. SAYERS. *History of the Second World War,* United Kingdom Civil Series. Edited by Sir Keith Hancock. London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office and Longmans, Green and Company, 1956. American Agents: British Information Services, New York.—xv, 608 pp. $6.98; Library price, $5.40.

This book, the eighteenth of the Civil Histories published by the British on the Second World War, deals with the rôle of finance; however, unlike the other volumes of the series, which sum up the experience with war production, allocation of materials, rationing, etc., it is of more general interest in that monetary and fiscal policies and techniques, as well as international financial policy and economic diplomacy, are matters of war and peace alike. Even more important, Professor Sayers' subject is the formation of policy, and since he has departed from the

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principle followed in other books of this series that the names of government officials must not be publicly attached to the advice they give, his record of the views of Lord Keynes, Lord Catto, Lord Norman, Sir Hubert Henderson and Sir Dennis Robertson —to name but a few of the handful of men who formulated Britain's wartime financial policies—is truly fascinating. Keynes wrote more copiously than other advisers, and Professor Sayers had "extreme difficulty" in limiting his references to him; "great though his influence became, it never matched his brilliance on paper", notes the author, but the problem of comparing Keynes's influences with that of other minds is "insoluble".

The structure of the book is simple. Following a brief but "straight" economic analysis of the problems of war finance, Professor Sayers reviews Britain's fiscal, monetary and debt-management policies. Internal policies, however, occupy less than half of the book, the remainder being devoted to external finance —particularly financial relations with India, the Middle East, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Canada and the United States, each with its own problems and negotiations, but interlinked as policy at one point affected policies elsewhere.

In these various areas much is familiar, but a great deal also is brought to the public knowledge for the first time. For instance, the decision on the "Three Per Cent War" was made as early as October 1939, the Governor of the Bank of England having taken the lead in the matter. The gravity of the problem of wartime inflation was fully appreciated well before Keynes published his famous articles on "How to Pay for the War" and arrived at the Treasury; this was due partly to Professors Henderson and Robertson, but principally to the "forthright advice" of the Governor of the Bank of England. Keynes's "national income arithmetic" was regarded with much skepticism, and those in authority never came to impute precision to the "inflationary gap", the amount of the required taxation being determined by collective judgment of a few men "depending in quite large measure upon common sense and the 'hunch' that eludes analysis."

In his record of Britain's external financial relations, Professor Sayers deals with developments in other countries as they were understood by the British policy-makers at the time; he is not attempting an objective international view. As much as one fourth of the book is devoted to negotiations with the United States, principally over Lend-Lease. Here, too, a great deal is known about "the strange mixture of Rooseveltian largeness and Congressional politics", but much is also told for the first time,

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at least in such detail. Professor Sayers' story is not that of the Lend-Lease goods to sustain war production and civilian life in England, which is one of "unexampled generosity" of the American nation, but of interminable arguments, misunderstandings and irritations that arose in connection with it in the hurly-burly of war. The harsh limitations on British exports imposed by the Lend-Lease administration are a case in point; so is the lack of American appreciation of Britain's proportionately large contribution under the reciprocal aid and of her need to reconstitute her gold and dollar reserves exhausted in the early years of the war. On the other hand, the author is also critical of the lack of understanding of American positions on the part of the British negotiators, as well as of British shortcomings in providing information. In spite of all the misunderstandings, however, the long years of arguments between the American and British officials did in the end yield a net balance of mutual confidence and respect, not to mention personal friendship.

The importance of Professor Sayers' book for historians and economists is obvious; but to my mind, its greatest contribution consists in its fresh insights about the making of monetary and financial policy, domestic as well as international. As a study of what it is possible for a few men with vision and drive to accomplish in policy formation, it transcends the particular circumstances of wartime Britain and deserves to be read, and pondered, by all those who have policy as a center of interest.

M. A. Kriz

New York, N. Y.

*History of the Standard Oil Company (New Jersey). The Resurgent Years, 1911-1927.* By George Sweet Gibb and Evelyn H. Knowlton. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1956.—xxix, 754 pp. $7.50.

This is the second volume in a three-volume history of the Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) being prepared under the auspices of the Business History Foundation, Inc. The first volume, *Pioneering in Big Business* (1955), by Ralph W. Hidy and Muriel E. Hidy, is a history of the formation and growth of the Standard Oil group to the point of its dissolution by the Supreme Court in 1911. The present volume, written by Professor George S. Gibb of the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration and Evelyn H. Knowlton, an Associate of the Business History Foundation, traces the course of Jersey Standard from the dismemberment of the Standard combination in 1911 to the ad-

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ministrative reorganization in 1927. A third volume, now in preparation, will deal with the period since 1927. The Business History Foundation plans to have a series that will eventually include a study of at least one major corporation in each segment of industry.

After giving a brief account of predissolution developments, the authors show how the decree of 1911 was carried out and how Jersey Standard functioned as an operating entity and as an administrative organization during the years 1911-1917. Then follow chapters on domestic and foreign supplies of crude oil, refining, labor relations, the transportation network, and marketing during this period. Two chapters deal with the company in World War I and during the transitional years 1918-1919, after which there is a lengthy treatment of the quest for crude oil in the Middle East, Europe, the tropics, and North America between 1919 and 1927. The authors also examine the changing transportation pattern, the rising tide of competition, the drive to new performance levels in the refineries, labor policies, and the evolution of administrative functions at 26 Broadway in this period. The volume contains a wealth of statistical data on all phases of the company's operations, a large number of superb illustrations, and a good index. Some easily read maps would have enhanced the book's usefulness.

Jersey Standard was more than a holding company during these middle years; it was also an operating company, owning and operating in its own name a great number of refineries, tank wagons, storage tanks, and marketing stations. The company's dual rôle made its historians' task the more difficult, for they had to differentiate between the activities of the concern as an operator and its increasingly complicated functions as a holding company. While they were forced to forego the opportunity of examining routine operations in many branches of the business and while they were necessarily limited in their treatment of administration at the lower levels, Professor Gibb and Mrs. Knowlton have been successful in their effort to write a good history of administration and management at the highest company level. Moreover, they have done an excellent job in relating the story of Jersey Standard to the broader history of the petroleum industry and to vital political and diplomatic developments.

The company's progress between 1911 and 1927 was impressive. The Supreme Court decree disrupted the wonderfully integrated empire that Standard Oil had created before 1911, leaving the New Jersey concern with a hard task of reconstruction to be accomplished in an unfriendly political atmosphere and against

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growing competition at home and abroad. But Jersey Standard came back strong. It enjoyed a fourfold expansion between 1912 and 1927 and earned net profits of more than a billion dollars. By the end of this period it was possible—indeed, necessary—to divorce the policy-making function from that of management. Thus, in August 1927, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey was incorporated in Delaware to take over the manufacturing and marketing functions and assets of its parent. After certain other corporate changes had been completed, Jersey Standard stood as a holding company alone.

This book is a valuable case study of one of the leading American businesses. The reviewer has only one real caveat. The authors are probably correct when they write that Jersey Standard's managers demonstrated a large measure of responsibility and business statesmanship during this period, but they are perhaps too much inclined to take Standard men at their own words in analyzing motivations, methods and accomplishments. On the other hand, they tend to be rather critical of Jersey's adversaries and quite suspicious of political figures.

DEWEY W. GRANTHAM, JR.
VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

*The Economic Consequences of Automation.* By PAUL EINZIG. New York, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1957.—255 pp. $3.95.

Automation must proceed haste-post-haste in the free world and, for it to be successful, excessive inflation or deflation in the new technological era must be avoided even at some temporary sacrifice of profit-takers and labor. This urgent plea is vigorously and brilliantly set forward by the Political Correspondent of the *Financial Times* and London Correspondent of the *Commercial and Financial Chronicle.*

Dr. Einzig moves in giant strides across the vast yet poorly charted terrain of the subject. Neatly sidestepping the pitfalls of definition, the author speaks of automation as all forms of advanced mechanization designed to reduce current production costs in terms of man-hours per unit of output. He examines the effects of automation on changes in employment, costs of production, output, prices, wages, profits, and its indirect effects on money, taxation, trade, national and world economy. His observations are not limited to economics. This highly readable volume also touches upon automation's social, military and political effects. Yet he puts automation itself in proper perspec-

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tive by stating that those directly affected in the *production* processes "will never be more than a small proportion of the total population."

Obviously Dr. Einzig draws heavily on the report and records of the 1955 Congressional hearings and on writers such as Drucker and Diebold. He brings in almost no new empirical data. Not much is available. What is new is the arrangement and interpretation of what others have said about automation. Traditional economic theory, for example, states that supply and demand are brought into equilibrium as a function of fluctuations in prices and fluctuations in output. The author points out that automated industries, because of initial installation costs and of the need to operate around the clock, cannot reduce output to meet falling demands. They must reduce prices in order to keep demand up. He contends that automation will help to reduce wide fluctuations in demands for capital because, unlike the past when entrepreneurs added or withdrew units of production facilities according to market conditions, automated facilities cannot be installed piecemeal or slowed down. His thesis is logical but apparently Dr. Einzig has not visited many modern plants. Automated facilities are going in piecemeal. Moreover, much production flexibility to meet changes in consumption is being achieved in some automated operations, particularly in small-parts machining.

The author frequently and forcefully tackles the recurring question of technological unemployment under automation. In his judgment if the economy continues to expand without excessive inflation there will be no serious unemployment. Automation is creating new industries and new jobs. Also with shorter hours and more leisure time there will come about a substantial increase in employment in the service industries. It is unfortunate that at many key points in his plea to get on with automation Dr. Einzig resorts to unrealistic suggestions or unproved analogies. For example, he says that workers who are put out of work because of automation "could pursue a tolerable existence taking up farm labor" (p. 79). At another point he comments, "The inflationary trend is not inherent in automation but is due to the weakness of human nature" (p. 84). Again in buttressing his argument against slowing down automation he reverts to an interesting but hardly relevant analogy, "All military experts agree that casualties are usually much heavier during a retreat than during an advance" (p. 240). Hence, automation, forward march!

Dr. Einzig trains his guns on organized labor as the one element

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in society which more than any other will determine whether automation will or will not proceed with proper dispatch. He disagrees sharply with Reuther's thesis that automation, by reducing the labor force, will reduce purchasing power and hence head us toward depression unless remedial steps are taken by the government or through collective bargaining. He claims that a constant increase in the national aggregate cost of production under automation will assure greater national income and volume of purchasing power.

The author is never at a loss for ideas. He strongly advocates further extension of the guaranteed annual wage. Tax concessions should be granted in the form of "post-boom" credits to those who would save in boom times. The same holds true for undistributed or distributed profits. He goes even further in suggesting the issuance of securities with guaranteed purchasing power for the benefit of small savers. Middle-income groups, engineers and skilled workers, should also be granted tax relief in order to attract more people into automation. He decries equalitarianism and argues for greater income differentials. Small businesses, those pioneering in automation devices, should get favorable tax treatment. Indeed, it should be federal fiscal policy deliberately to encourage automation and make it difficult for companies to increase production merely through more manpower and more non-automated plant facilities.

On the international level Dr. Einzig says that backward countries will be saved only if they can automate quickly or if the advanced countries supply them with finished goods through automation. To maintain balance of payments the underdeveloped countries must supply the raw materials. The political implications of failure are clear particularly with respect to the Soviet Union.

To sum up, Paul Einzig has performed a real service for the uninitiated reader interested in automation. His discussions of business cycles and automation are exceptionally well done and brief. The serious student will admire his logic but quarrel with many conclusions because they are not based on first-hand evidence. Without being pedantic the least the author could have done was to have given us just one footnote to back up a statement of "fact".

ROBERT H. GUEST

YALE UNIVERSITY

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*Labor Union Monopoly: A Clear and Present Danger.* By DONALD R. RICHBERG. Chicago, Henry Regnery Company, 1957.—xi, 175 pp. $3.50.

*Labor Union Monopoly* is a historical document of some importance, and a reform tract. As the attorney for the non-operating railway unions, Mr. Richberg helped to draft two significant pieces of federal legislation, the Railway Labor Act of 1926, and the Norris-LaGuardia Act which limited the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes in the federal courts. He adds to our knowledge by describing the campaigns which brought these laws into being. Even more interesting is his description of the events which led to the Myron C. Taylor–John L. Lewis agreement in the steel industry, even though his recital of the events and his rôle in them remove some of the romance which had grown around this important episode in labor-management relations. Mr. Richberg was opposed to the Wagner Act, and there is evidence—memoranda in the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library—that even during the NRA days he was becoming disenchanted with the continual demands of labor.

Once Mr. Richberg leaves history for analysis or argument, his sense of fairness falters. To refer to Walter Reuther as "a Moscow-trained socialist" is unfair and untrue. A trip through Russia does not make one "Moscow-trained". Moreover, many leaders of American labor had been at some time in their life socialists, and Mr. Richberg knows the labor movement well enough to recognize that a man's current policies and attitudes are more important than his youthful views. He, of course, has a right to criticize and differ with Mr. Reuther, but it ought to be on a substantive basis. Mr. Richberg is much concerned with the drive of labor union leaders for political power, but he does not discuss the issue in specific terms. He is, moreover, mistaken when he declares that under "union security" agreements workers who are expelled from unions "are subject to discharge on demand of the union officials." Under the Taft-Hartley law, discharge under the above agreements is legal only when the worker refuses to pay his union dues.

Mr. Richberg does not like strikes, as who does? The question is always whether the ends of justice and equity are better served by one imperfect method than another. His discussion of union finances is not too illuminating; unions cannot normally accumulate enough funds to compensate their members for more than a fractional part of the wage loss arising from a strike. Mr. Richberg argues that a union can use all of its funds to impose its will upon an employer. There is no evidence for such a view, and

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even the largest union, the Teamsters, has less than fifty cents per member of surplus in its national treasury. The statement, "assessments are a method of raising money which is most effective and productive in a strongly disciplined union—especially in which compulsory unionism makes it impossible for a potential rebel to refuse to pay without losing his job", is not true. Unions have never found assessments either desirable or productive, and, except under unusual circumstances, avoid utilizing this means to raise revenue.

The union shop or compulsory unionism, as Mr. Richberg calls it, does not give the union any additional power over the worker. It compels a worker, sometimes unwillingly, to support the union financially. But the worker can still refuse, if he so chooses, to violate the regulations and orders of the union. Mr. Richberg may find such compulsion undesirable, but it is not clear why it gives the union greater power over the worker than it formerly had. The discussion, the "Prospect of a Labor Government", only shows that Mr. Richberg disapproves of certain trends. His declaration that there is danger in the United States of creeping and disguised "dictatorship of the Proletariat" cannot be taken too seriously. It is obvious that, as soon as Mr. Richberg gets away from "personal" history, he engages in a series of unproved assertions. One can present arguments against the growing power of unions but he will not find them well stated in this book.

PHILIP TAFT

BROWN UNIVERSITY

*Intellectuals in Labor Unions: Organizational Pressures on Professional Roles.* By HAROLD L. WILENSKY. Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1957.—xiii, 336 pp. $6.00.

Mr. Wilensky terms his study "the relation of the 'man of knowledge' to the 'man of power.'" More than two hundred professional employees of unions were interviewed, and studies by others have also been used. The heads of organizations or the men of power are not men without knowledge; in fact they usually have a much more complete command and knowledge of the total economic and political environment in which the union operates and the arts of steering the union successfully, than the so-called men of knowledge, the specialists who can work up a brief, arrange a table of figures, or write an editorial.

Mr. Wilensky tries very hard to infuse his commonplace obser-

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vations with an air of mystery. This is attempted by calling an economist or statistician "the facts and figures man", the editor and educational director, the "internal communications specialist". The style of this volume is a combination of the half-portentous and half-ironic, neither of which really comes off, largely because the author has nothing important to convey. The most obvious commonplace is stated as if it were a great revelation. Certainly, in this year of our Lord, we do not have to be instructed by an elaborate statistical investigation, that an economist employed by a union will assemble data to prove the union's case. What other function might he perform? Much of the material reminds one of the physiologist who described walking in great detail as the "pushing of one foot in front of the other while the subject remained in an upright position." One can ask himself just what Mr. Wilensky thought, before his investigation, an economist in a union did. Mr. Wilensky shows the same surprise at the work of the editor, and the union educational director, the "internal communications specialist". He believes that there is something revealing in the statement of a union officer that he hired an editor so that the bulletins from headquarters would be more readable and comprehensible.

Most of the other material that Mr. Wilensky gathers is of the same order. Why is it worth mentioning that a professional whose heart is not in his work, because his analysis leads to conclusions unfavorable to the union's position, would not be popular with union officers? After all, unions are not universities and their research departments have limited goals. Much of the material collected by Mr. Wilensky seems irrelevant and frequently overdrawn. There is no test of political reliability applied by unions, but, certainly, unions no more than employer associations can hire experts who are not in sympathy with their practices and goals. This would be like a defendant in a suit hiring a lawyer who will argue his opponent's case. Those who believe that the union's policies are undesirable have no reason or right to seek employment from them. Unions are engaged in the promotion of certain interests and their technical staffs are hired for the purpose of improving the methods and procedures by which these goals can be attained. While Mr. Wilensky is conscientious, earnest and a master of sociological jargon, his study appears to be pointless and wasteful of the talents he displays.

PHILIP TAFT

BROWN UNIVERSITY

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*The War Potential of Nations.* By KLAUS KNORR. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1956.—viii, 310 pp. $5.00.

Klaus Knorr's first book, published in 1944, dealt with British colonial theories from 1570 to 1850. His recent writings on contemporary war potential, culminating in the present book, seem to have carried him far afield. But there is, in fact, a certain similarity in theme, for colonial theorists were concerned with the problem of power: how was relative strength to be measured? how could a nation, by its colonial policies, increase its power in relation to others? Although colonies, in the strict sense, are no longer involved in these issues, the questions themselves survive. *The War Potential of Nations* is intended as a partial answer to them, its objects being " to explore and clarify the underlying bases of military power, to facilitate estimates of the comparative war potential of nations, and to identify some of the conditions which nations can manipulate in order to bolster their war potential."

War potential can be defined, Dr. Knorr contends, under three headings. The first, economic capacity, is relatively simple, even though it includes not only factors like population and natural resources, which are easily computed, but more difficult elements like agricultural output potential, manufacturing strength, and ratio of probable civil to military consumption. The second, administrative capacity, involves not only the supply of administrators, but also the nation's institutional resiliency, the availability of planning information, and like intangibles. The third, motivation for war or " the will to fight ", involves individual and group identification with the nation and willingness to bear sacrifices.

A brief summary cannot do justice to the erudition or analytical power with which these concepts are developed. Knorr draws on the most sophisticated ideas of economists and sociologists. He makes much use of historical examples, especially from the two World Wars, yet never loses sight of the fact that historical moments are never truly comparable. *The War Potential of Nations* is a book that needs and deserves to be read slowly and intently.

It cannot be said, however, that it is a complete success. The object of providing a tool for government planners is achieved. Officials in agencies like the Office of Defense Mobilization can put Knorr's ideas to work. It is in its other goal that it falls short, for a grasp of the concepts of war potential does not enable a detached observer to make precise calculations as to the relative strength of Major Powers. Whether one nation has greater

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administrative capacity or will to fight than another must remain a guess, even though it can be subdivided into component guesses.

Even this failure is, nevertheless, a brilliant failure, for the measuring tools that Knorr supplies are much better calibrated than those we have been using. One need only compare his concepts with those employed only fifteen years ago in Spykman's *America's Strategy in World Politics* or ten years ago in the Sprouts' *Foundations of National Power* to see the progress it represents. The latter volumes showed, by comparison, relatively little advance over Pierre d'Avity's *Estats, empires et principautez du monde* of 1614. Yet, despite his analytical keenness, Knorr reminds us that, absorbed in studying power politics, we are still unsure about the nature of power.

ERNEST R. MAY

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

*The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.* By SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON. Cambridge, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957.—xiii, 534 pp. $7.50.

Since the Second World War there have been, aside from books on wartime military-diplomatic affairs, operational histories, and war memoirs, a number of books on civil-military relations in the societies of America, Europe and Asia. This volume is an addition to that literature. It is an attempt to appraise the military profession as a social phenomenon and to discover a fundamental principle—or perhaps theory—upon which the relations between the civil and military authority in an essentially civil society might be regulated. A fitting companion piece to books by Wheeler-Bennett, Millis, Huzar, Schuddekopf, Vagts, Beaverbrook, and others, this one lays emphasis on the problem in the United States. In one very important respect, however, this volume is quite different from the rest, in that it makes a special plea for a type of civil-military relationship which to many people reared in the capitalist-liberal tradition must appear rather morbid, to say the least. One should have no trouble at all discerning in the author's major theses proposals that are out of keeping with the political, economic, social and cultural history—and tastes—of the main body of the American people.

Undeniably provocative, though far from brilliant, as the publishers claim, the book is at its best in its historical sections, dealing with the growth of the military profession since 1789, education in the service academies, the literary contributions of Army

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and Navy intellectuals, and civil-military relations during World War II and the political rôle of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is not quite so good, in this reviewer's opinion, as an attempt at finding a solution to a difficult problem in the "cold war" age.

The author, currently serving on the Harvard University faculty, holds that the capitalist-liberal society of the United States (which, by the way, has nurtured and maintained the military profession since the founding of the republic) and military power are incompatible in the present century. He believes that the socio-political-economic ethic of this society is not only harmful to the further development of military professionalism but dangerous to the nation's safety. He considers the capitalist-liberal tradition "inadequate" and "obsolete" (p. vii) and "the greatest domestic threat to American military security" (p. 457). His solution, since he has already concluded that the country's heritage is out of date, is for the United States to adopt the organic or corporate pattern of society in which the defense services (probably meaning their general staffs) would occupy a position impliedly like that of the Church in Spain or Vichy France. His ideology is a social *mystique,* although presented as objective realism, of the United States conceived as a planned community more or less solidly established on the compromise of the four great pillars of society—church, government, army, college. Individual existence and the capitalist-liberal tradition are to be submitted to a collectivism of a mystical and military kind. Only the organic-corporate state can provide the military profession with the freedom it needs to grow professionally so as to give the nation the maximum security, which is the military profession's mission. The "garish individualism of Main Street" (p. 466) would be replaced by the collective orderliness of the military post where "there is little room for presumption and individualism" and on which the stratified social order "incites no one to be more than he is" (p. 465). This is indeed an idealization of the military life and ethic, as anyone with any military experience in both war and peace knows.

The organic-corporate state may satisfy a taste for symmetry on the part of some people. In the proposals that satisfy these tastes they see operating the laws of society itself. This reviewer takes his measure of man, as many others undoubtedly will take, from Aristotle, Seneca, and the Christian-democratic and capitalist-liberal traditions. It has stood mankind in good stead for a good many years and has seen it through many a crisis no worse than the present. "Many people", says Aristotle (*Politics,* bk. V, ch. VIII), "promote innovations that they may enjoy their

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own particular manner of living." And he goes on to recommend that no innovation should be contrary to the genius of a people.

Unquestionably, the book contains much that is arresting, provocative, informative and educational. It is well organized and well written. The "Notes" should supply both the professional and non-professional student of civil-military affairs with a good bibliography for further reading.

ALBERT NORMAN

NORWICH UNIVERSITY

*A Preface to Democratic Theory.* By ROBERT A. DAHL. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1956.—xi, 155 pp. $3.00.

Knowledge and values are never separate from one another or without reciprocal effects in the real world. In each age we need all the knowledge we can get to facilitate our asymptotical approach toward the realization of democratic values. It is with these values and this necessary knowledge that Professor Dahl of Yale University is concerned in this excellent little book. It is informed with many of the qualities of an older style of political theory. His thought is systematic and subtle; his preference for democracy is clear. But his book also brilliantly represents a newer style of political theory about democracy. This style has moved away from a narrowly constitutional, legal, or governmental definition of democracy. It conceives of democracy as a specifiable set of conditions in society as a whole, not just in the polity, and it strives to make these conditions explicit.

As Dahl puts it, ". . . the first and crucial variables to which political scientists must direct their attention are social and not constitutional" (p. 83). This should not be taken to mean that the newer style of democratic theory says constitutional and other legal matters are unimportant, only that they are *one class* of social fact that must be seen in interdependence with important other classes. The newer voice in which Professor Dahl speaks is also ardently empirical. It does not accept the validity of a case made on the basis of a single brilliantly chosen instance. Rather it demands statistically representative and objectively observed data, preferably expressed in quantitative form whenever possible. Also it requires clear and specific operations by which its carefully defined concepts can be given meaning by any scientific researcher.

A style, of course, however new and well-intentioned, is not everything. Professor Dahl uses this new style to create some im-

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portant new substance. His central concern is with the dilemma that has preoccupied political theorists since that breed began, the dilemma of equality and liberty in democracy. In his analysis of "Madisonian democracy" (republican control over a possibly tyrannous majority) and "populistic democracy" (absolute sovereignty and therefore possible tyranny of the majority), he shows the theoretical and practical weaknesses in each. One of the most interesting parts of his analysis, in this connection, is of the problem of the "differences in intensity of preference" in democracies. Professor Dahl proposes a new definition, or, rather, a new set of conditions for "maximizing democracy in the real world," a definition he names "polyarchal democracy". This theory of polyarchy, as one might expect from his preconceptions, "focuses primarily not on the constitutional prerequisites but on the social prerequisites for a democratic order" (p. 82). He is very much aware, of course, of the need for a great deal more research on how the conditions he defines for a "polyarchal democracy" can be realized. But he believes that those conditions are in principle discoverable.

*A Preface to Democratic Theory* is probably somewhat more a book for professional social scientists than for others, but it is well worth the devoted attention of anyone who cares about democracy. For it will have an important influence on both future theory about democracy and on actual practice in democracies round the world. Professor Dahl has given evidence that better social science knowledge can help us to achieve our democratic values. And he has provided proof additional to what we have had before that we have an important new political theorist among us.

BERNARD BARBER

BARNARD COLLEGE

*The History of Witchcraft and Demonology.* 2d Edition. By MONTAGUE SUMMERS. New York, University Books, 1956. —xxiii, 353 pp. $6.00.

This is a second edition of a book which received considerable attention when it was first published in 1926. The publishers doubtless believe that there will be readers for it. Since every evidence suggests that the author is not perpetrating a huge irony, we must express regret at the appearance of the second edition, for the book is evil and the author is guilty of gross error. Unfortunately for serious minds, neither conclusion can be proved.

Proof is necessarily based upon accepted canons of both an

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ontological and an epistemological nature. Summers asserts the *existence* of things which the scientist denies, and of *causal* relationships which the scientist cannot test. We cannot disprove the existence of real witches, demons, genuine magical power, or the sweet odor which saints exuded (p. 45) when they were alive; but, since Summers and we cannot agree upon any procedures by which their existence and effects can be observed, our contradictory propositions cannot be tested. We can only smile indulgently when he cites "authorities" for his assertions: St. Augustine, Albertus Magnus, John XXII, Gerson, Sprenger, Bodin, or even Blackstone!

Since there were witches, and witchcraft contracts, then of course the lay and ecclesiastical cruelties against such people were justified. Summers' horror against all those blasphemies extends as well to the "hideous traditions of Hebrew magic" and the "ritual murders" by Hebrews. In the simpler values of my personal cosmos, those tortures and executions of "witches" were tragic, erroneous and evil, and Summers' resurrection of medieval and even post-Reformation dicta in order to prove that witches were really witches and really bad only outrages me.

Leaving aside both the ontological and the moral questions, and thus most of the book, there is yet another level upon which Summers' position must be faced. It is perhaps not a psychological paradox that his views are inadvertently close to those of Margaret A. Murray, whom he so repeatedly attacks. Both have made what we would now call a "content analysis" of the witchcraft literature, to ascertain the common descriptions of witchly behavior, from one commentator to another. Both Murray and Summers assume implicitly that if an apparently high percentage of the populace (1) expresses a *belief* in magical powers, (2) points to specific people as witches; and if a minority (3) admit being witches, even if under the strain of the rack, and (4) describe their own behavior as being exactly in conformity with the picture of witches which the larger populace accepts, *then* we may conclude that what they claim or confess must be *empirically* correct. So far, the reader may smile. But the apparent comparability with witchcraft in a primitive society is false: for then we can find self-admitted witches and magicians, and study the entire cult, if there is any. By contrast, Summers and Murray must constantly argue as to whether this man was self-deluded, that one a charlatan, and so on.

Summers and Murray, then, follow a similar logic, but evaluate their "facts" differently. Summers is shocked at the orgies, while Murray sees no more than the continuation of ancient,

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suppressed, folk rituals. Summers is more credulous of claims by the Church fathers, and so grants more genuine magical power to the witches, but the consistent behavioral patterns at revels or rituals are derived by both authors from similar sources. Still more fundamentally, Summers sees witchcraft not only as *a* heresy, but as springing from *specific* heresies: Manicheism, the doctrines of Tanchelin in the twelfth century, Gnosticism, and so on. But, theologically viewed, Murray's Dianic cult *was* a heresy.

Consequently, Summers' agile efforts (for example, pp. 42, 43, 44) to answer or twist Murray's arguments are surely needed if his book is not to be seen as one more documentation—true enough, with an interpretation that seems at once abominable and theologically correct!—of her thesis that witchcraft practices and beliefs were simply the continuation of folk religious practices, and that Christianity as victor could label them "witchcraft and heresy" so as to persecute such folk heretics.

WILLIAM J. GOODE

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

*Philosophy, Politics and Society.* Edited by PETER LASLETT. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1956.—xv, 184 pp. $3.00.

*Minos or Minotaur? The Dilemma of Political Power.* By JOHN BOWLE. London, Jonathan Cape, 1956.—209 pp. 15*s*.

Political philosophy in Britain is dead—probably through foul play. And there can be no reasonable doubt that the chief killer was language philosophy. This new kind of philosophy, developed by men such as Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein, Wisdom, Ryle, Ayer and Austin, has eliminated political philosophy. This is the charge made by Peter Laslett. As evidence he here submits eight essays—in addition to Professor Michael Oakeshott's inaugural lecture on "Political Education", and a piece by himself on "The Face to Face Society"—written under the influence of the accused. In his introduction he argues that it is an assumption of intellectual life in Britain that there should be philosophers who deal "with political and social relationships at the widest possible level of generality." For three hundred years, from Hobbes to Bosanquet, he says, the facts conformed to the assumption; but no longer—witness these essays—is this true.

Whereas Mr. Laslett is only saddened, Professor John Bowle, of the College of Europe, at Bruges, is deeply perturbed by the present state of political philosophy in Britain. Old devices, he insists, cannot prevail against the new political power unleashed

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in both domestic and international affairs in this century. We must resolve what he calls "the paradox between the brilliant advance of scientific knowledge, based on objective and systematic method, and the primitive, subjective, conflict of our politics." To do this we need a new Theseus. We need to learn to think about politics in a new way, "not in terms of obsolete metaphysics or quasi-scientific laws, but in terms of biology and psychological investigation." The lamentable truth, however, he reports, is that in Britain—consider the "gospel of negation" preached by Mr. Oakeshott, and the "gospel of negation" preached by T. D. Weldon—the "ideological front seems strangely flaccid." All this prompts us to ask just what Mr. Bowle would have Mr. Oakeshott and Mr. Weldon do. He is the one who knows about political theory formulated "in terms of biology and psychological investigation"; surely it is up to him, not to them, to produce such theory. Perhaps they ought to do more to promote the world society and the end of war he advocates—but that is hardly a peculiar *ex officio* duty of political philosophers.

In no place does Mr. Laslett, presumably because he thinks the answer is obvious, explain why those who live the intellectual life in Britain are correct in their assumption about political philosophers. The profound disagreement on their own social function of such men as Mr. Bowle, Mr. Oakeshott and Mr. Weldon shows that the reason why this assumption is valid is not clear. Is Mr. Laslett, we must inquire, voicing just another complaint (or confession) based on the notion that political philosophers are needed because it is up to political philosophers to envision new goals for languid political parties, to solve "problems" in domestic and international politics, and to supply nice, fresh thoughts for us to think? If so, we may wish, after commending the philosophers for their refusal to join the Grand Inquisitor, to dismiss the charge.

But let us not be hasty. For there is something about the relation of language philosophy to the study of politics that does deserve our attention; and possibly it is this that Mr. Laslett and Mr. Bowle (in his criticism of Mr. Weldon) have chiefly in mind. To appreciate this relation we must recognize that language philosophy is important. Its practitioners are engaged in an old undertaking: the tradition of critical (self-conscious) philosophy goes back to Kant and to Hume, and beyond to Socrates. What distinguishes them is that in their efforts to discover the limits and variety of our knowledge, they analyze our wording as the outward sign of our thinking. This seems reasonable. If a de-

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fense were needed, they could quote the *Report of the Departmental Committee on the Teaching of English in England* (1921), as follows: "What a man cannot state he does not perfectly know, and conversely the inability to put his thoughts into words sets a boundary to his thought. . . . English is not merely the medium of our thought; it is the very stuff and process of it."

Now it is to be noted that the first essay in Mr. Laslett's collection is Mr. Oakeshott's "Political Education". Primarily that is an appeal for the recognition of the fact that a tradition of civility, a product of work and time, not a natural good like the air we breathe, can be maintained, let alone improved, only if each generation passes on to the young by education—by direct experience, comparative study, and historical study—the tradition it has received (and perhaps improved). It is hard to see how, unless we can rely on special revelations, or on a manifest and detailed system of natural law, we can disagree. And that raises the main question, "What influence does language philosophy have on political education?"

Some philosophers—led by Mr. Weldon, whose essay on "Political Principles" states his views with great clarity—might remark, "But political education is not our concern. The purpose of philosophy is only 'to expose and elucidate linguistic muddles.'" But—granted that muddles are bad, and that we should like to be rid of them—if Mr. Weldon's definition of philosophy is correct, perhaps, in our economy of scarcity, we are expending too much of our first-rate, and most strategically placed, brainpower on philosophy. Herbert Deane, explaining the influence of Harold J. Laski, wrote: "Since the philosophers offered them little guidance or enlightenment, men have been left to the tender mercies of publicists, propagandists, and purveyors of various political and moral nostrums." Both Mr. Bowle and Mr. Laslett undoubtedly would concur.

There is a second way that language philosophy may influence political education. We cannot suppose that second-order (or analytic) statements about the first-order statements of a political tradition have no effect on the meaning of those first-order statements. To its heirs a political tradition comes as a conglomerate of prejudices—many correct, and some incorrect—through which they participate vicariously in the experience of earlier generations; and such a tradition is valuable because the heirs have not the time, energy, or occasions to experience, and then to judge, everything for themselves. Much of every political (or moral) tradition is incarnate in language, in the infinitely varied and subtle nuances of meaning with which words and trains of words

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are loaded. There is a danger that analysis may discharge those meanings. Language philosophy will not change the physical world, but it can alter a political tradition. The moral judgments conveyed by the words may be lost, with the result that new generations, coming to think with those words, may not inherit the civility achieved by their predecessors. Analysis may dissolve the old *mores;* and whereas some change is good, too much change can destroy a society. Again, Mr. Bowle and Mr. Laslett might agree.

However, before we pour the hemlock for Mr. Laslett's essayists, let us look at their essays. They are not in the grand old manner. They are not inspiring. In passages they are even dull and tedious. Yet the topics—such as punishment (dealt with by Anthony Quinton), sovereignty (dealt with by W. J. Rees), natural rights (analyzed by Margaret Macdonald), and the meaning of the word "law" (treated at too great length by Glanville Williams)—are central in the traditional concern of political philosophers. None of the writers, not even Mr. Weldon, says that politics is simply a matter of words. None scoffs at the old truths. Certainly, this is not political philosophy "at the widest possible level of generality" in the fashion of such rare greats as Aristotle, Hobbes, or Hegel. Nevertheless, it is sound and enlightening. Essays such as these are not likely to corrode the political tradition, or to corrupt the youth. A verdict of Guilty when the "victim" gives all signs of ordinary, although not Herculean, vitality would be at least unfair.

J. B. STEWART

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

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


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